Oct. 22 1992—Liberal judicial activists promote racial quotas and impede the death penalty, so why not use racial quotas to paralyze implementation of the death penalty? Justice Brennan had tried the trick in 1987 (in McCleskey v. Kemp), but, with only the support of Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, had fallen short. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, broadly rejected the claim that general statistical disparities in implementation of the death penalty can establish intentional discrimination in violation of the federal Equal Protection Clause.
Undeterred, in Foster v. State Florida chief justice (and, since 1993, Eleventh Circuit judge) Rosemary Barkett dissents from the majority’s determination that statistical evidence purporting to show that defendants who killed white victims in Bay County were more likely to get the death penalty than defendants who killed black victims failed to establish a constitutional violation. Barkett opines that statistical evidence of disparate impact in capital sentencing establishes a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Florida constitution. And there are no apparent limits to the statistical evidence that she regards as relevant: “‘Statistical’ evidence should be construed broadly to include not only historical analysis of the disposition of first-degree murder cases in a particular jurisdiction, but also other information that could suggest discrimination, such as the resources devoted to the prosecution of cases involving white victims as contrasted to those involving minority victims, and the general conduct of a state attorney’s office, including hiring practices and the use of racial epithets and jokes.”
Barkett’s approach would make the death penalty impossible. In every capital case, the defendant would be able to conduct an intrusive investigation of the general practices of the prosecutor’s office. There is also no reason why Barkett’s approach should be limited to death penalty cases, as her theory would apply equally to robbery, rape, and all other crimes. As Justice Powell put it in McCleskey, that approach, “taken to its logical conclusion, throws into serious question the principles that underlie our entire criminal justice system.”
Oct. 23 1987—Culminating an unprecedented campaign of lies, distortions, and vilification, the Senate rejects, by a vote of 58 to 42, President Reagan’s nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork to fill the Supreme Court seat vacated by retiring Justice Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Oct. 25 1957—No case is too easy for a liberal judicial activist to mess up. In Accardo v. United States, the D.C. Circuit majority concludes, in one apt sentence, that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support a conviction for attempt to commit robbery. What was that evidence? As Judge David L. Bazelon, in dissent, summarizes it: “The complainant, the proprietor of a gas station, testified that, after he had locked up for the night, a man rapped at his door and motioned to him to come to the door. He motioned to the man to go to an open window, which the man did. There followed some talk about a fan belt for an automobile and then the man produced a gun and said, ‘Now, you go over and unlock that door. I’m coming in.’”
Bazelon concludes that the defendant was “entitled to a judgment of acquittal because there was no evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that his purpose in demanding entry was to commit robbery.” “The only evidence relied on to prove the necessary intent,” Bazelon complains, “is the fact that he demanded entry at the point of a gun”! In Bazelon’s confused mind, the possibility that several other intents (murder or mayhem, for example) could be inferred from demanding entry at gunpoint somehow means that the jury did not have sufficient evidence to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to commit robbery.
2006— Who knew that the Declaration of Independence was a declaration of same-sex marriage? Echoing the Declaration of Independence, the New Jersey constitution provides: “All persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.” Based on this provision, the New Jersey Supreme Court rules (in Lewis v. Harris) that all the rights and benefits of marriage need to be made available to same-sex couples.
For an explanation of this recurring feature, see here.