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bottom in the global economy is visible. The rapid developments in
Afghanistan look as if they will have far-reaching, positive implications
for Islam and the isolation of terrorism. If so, this causes a sudden
drop in the world's demand for monetary liquidity.
Combined with the buildup in monetary liquidity in October, this
reduction in the demand for liquidity may well be enough to break
the deflation spiral. The global recovery cycle has been bowl-shaped
(slow and sloping down, slow and sloping up), not V-shaped (rapid
down, rapid up). Now we can put more emphasis on the recovery side
of the bowl.
Until now, it seemed the the desire for liquidity would outgrow
the liquidity additions by world central banks. In a deflation spiral,
the central bank doesn't catch up to the rapidly growing demand
for liquidity even through repeated interest rate cuts. The
demand for liquidity was rising very fast in 2001 due to the negative
impact of the dollar's revaluation since 1996, and the prospect
of future deflation. September 11 added economic and political uncertainty
as another reason to build cash balances.
It seemed that the central banks would have to make a conscious,
explicit effort in order to break their deflation spirals. But there's
now the possibility that the rapid rate cuts following September
11, plus the sudden change in Afghanistan, will be enough to break
the deflation spiral. Of course, the global economic recovery could
be somewhat short-lived (like the October 1998 aftermath) unless
central banks follow through by changing the policies that started
the deflation in the first place.
Liquidity hoarding (the huge demand for safe, short-term dollars
similar to the yen hoarding in Japan in the 1990s) reached a climax
(a point of capitulation) in early November in response to anthrax
and the expectations for a long Afghanistan campaign. Here are the
signs that the deflation spiral has been broken at least
for now:
· The sharp rise into positive territory for the spread
between the 2-year Treasury note and the Fed funds rate.
· The rise in several commodity indicators. For example,
the Journal of Commerce metals index has risen 7% in the
last week, indicating the dollar is becoming less scarce.
· The across-the-board rise in the U.S. yield curve in
recent days, a clear break in deflation expectations.
· The breakdown of OPEC's monopoly power due, in part,
to Russia's growing relationship with the Bush administration.
WTI oil has fallen below the neutral (or market-based) $18 price.
The economic importance of Saudi Arabia and the Arab oil producers
has been materially diminished an important step toward
a more market-based global economy.
· Extensive coverage of deflation in November from the
Economist, the New York Times, and other mainstream
sources. Expectations for the global recession have fallen sufficiently.
Since June 2000, there has been increasing damage to the world
economy from the oil spike, central-bank tightness, the U.S. policy
of an ever-strengthening dollar, and heavy tax transfer out of the
U.S. private sector. Now it's time to closely track the repairs
under way, as the bearish arguments of recent years (that there
would be a dollar crisis due to our current account deficit; that
over-capacity would take years to resolve; and that valuations are
still too high) quickly lose credibility. Turns out the deflationary
spiral was the thing to watch and it just may be winding
down.
Some
Caveats
However, there are several reasons to remain cautious about the
global outlook:
· Even if the deflation spiral stops getting worse, the
world economy still has yet to digest a portion of the dollar's
sharp post-1996 revaluation. Some prices have adjusted to the
new value of the dollar, but others have yet to adjust. This implies
more bankruptcies, higher unemployment, further slowdowns abroad,
etc.
· World financial markets have already had a strong rebound.
The change in the liquidity outlook primarily offers an opportunity
for portfolio reorientation from a deflationary stance to a more
normal recession/recovery stance.
· The price of gold remains an important indicator of
inflation and deflation. Gold prices have declined $6 in the last
week. This appears to be a reduction in gold's safe-haven value
(gold spiked after September 11) rather than a signal of deeper
deflation. An increase in the gold price is necessary to confirm
that monetary policy has finally caught up to the demand for liquidity.
Until that confirmation occurs, expect a drawn-out bottoming process
for the global economy, with the possibility of falling back into
a deflationary downturn.
· Over-capacity persists in many sectors. However, there
are several comforts: capitalism is good at handling sunk costs
faster than expected; the extent of perceived over-capacity is
a dynamic estimate it grew as the global economy sank,
and will recede somewhat once growth prospects hit bottom; the
world probably uses up over-capacity faster now than it used to,
given the fast depreciation and obsolescence rates in many of
the fast-growing sectors.
· The sharp decline in the price of oil may create political
problems (Venezuela, Arab states).
· The world economy is still absorbing the negative economic
effects of September 11, including shrinking trade, security expenses,
and a de-globalization of commerce (reversing one of the driving
forces of the 1990s expansion.)
In the very near-term, one should be cautious about the global
financial markets. But in the medium- and long-term, world financial
markets should react positively to the prospect that the multi-year
deflation spiral won't get worse. Again, we just may be seeing bottom.
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