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bottom in the global economy is visible. The rapid developments in Afghanistan
look as if they will have far-reaching, positive implications for Islam
and the isolation of terrorism. If so, this causes a sudden drop in the
world's demand for monetary liquidity.
Combined with the buildup in monetary liquidity in October, this reduction
in the demand for liquidity may well be enough to break the deflation
spiral. The global recovery cycle has been bowl-shaped (slow and sloping
down, slow and sloping up), not V-shaped (rapid down, rapid up). Now we
can put more emphasis on the recovery side of the bowl.
Until now, it seemed the the desire for liquidity would outgrow the liquidity
additions by world central banks. In a deflation spiral, the central bank
doesn't catch up to the rapidly growing demand for liquidity even
through repeated interest rate cuts. The demand for liquidity was rising
very fast in 2001 due to the negative impact of the dollar's revaluation
since 1996, and the prospect of future deflation. September 11 added economic
and political uncertainty as another reason to build cash balances.
It seemed that the central banks would have to make a conscious, explicit
effort in order to break their deflation spirals. But there's now the
possibility that the rapid rate cuts following September 11, plus the
sudden change in Afghanistan, will be enough to break the deflation spiral.
Of course, the global economic recovery could be somewhat short-lived
(like the October 1998 aftermath) unless central banks follow through
by changing the policies that started the deflation in the first place.
Liquidity hoarding (the huge demand for safe, short-term dollars similar
to the yen hoarding in Japan in the 1990s) reached a climax (a point of
capitulation) in early November in response to anthrax and the expectations
for a long Afghanistan campaign. Here are the signs that the deflation
spiral has been broken at least for now:
· The sharp rise into positive territory for the spread between
the 2-year Treasury note and the Fed funds rate.
· The rise in several commodity indicators. For example, the
Journal of Commerce metals index has risen 7% in the last week,
indicating the dollar is becoming less scarce.
· The across-the-board rise in the U.S. yield curve in recent
days, a clear break in deflation expectations.
· The breakdown of OPEC's monopoly power due, in part, to Russia's
growing relationship with the Bush administration. WTI oil has fallen
below the neutral (or market-based) $18 price. The economic importance
of Saudi Arabia and the Arab oil producers has been materially diminished
an important step toward a more market-based global economy.
· Extensive coverage of deflation in November from the Economist,
the New York Times, and other mainstream sources. Expectations
for the global recession have fallen sufficiently.
Since June 2000, there has been increasing damage to the world economy
from the oil spike, central-bank tightness, the U.S. policy of an ever-strengthening
dollar, and heavy tax transfer out of the U.S. private sector. Now it's
time to closely track the repairs under way, as the bearish arguments
of recent years (that there would be a dollar crisis due to our current
account deficit; that over-capacity would take years to resolve; and that
valuations are still too high) quickly lose credibility. Turns out the
deflationary spiral was the thing to watch and it just may be winding
down.
Some
Caveats
However, there are several reasons to remain cautious about the global
outlook:
· Even if the deflation spiral stops getting worse, the world
economy still has yet to digest a portion of the dollar's sharp post-1996
revaluation. Some prices have adjusted to the new value of the dollar,
but others have yet to adjust. This implies more bankruptcies, higher
unemployment, further slowdowns abroad, etc.
· World financial markets have already had a strong rebound.
The change in the liquidity outlook primarily offers an opportunity
for portfolio reorientation from a deflationary stance to a more normal
recession/recovery stance.
· The price of gold remains an important indicator of inflation
and deflation. Gold prices have declined $6 in the last week. This appears
to be a reduction in gold's safe-haven value (gold spiked after September
11) rather than a signal of deeper deflation. An increase in the gold
price is necessary to confirm that monetary policy has finally caught
up to the demand for liquidity. Until that confirmation occurs, expect
a drawn-out bottoming process for the global economy, with the possibility
of falling back into a deflationary downturn.
· Over-capacity persists in many sectors. However, there are
several comforts: capitalism is good at handling sunk costs faster than
expected; the extent of perceived over-capacity is a dynamic estimate
it grew as the global economy sank, and will recede somewhat
once growth prospects hit bottom; the world probably uses up over-capacity
faster now than it used to, given the fast depreciation and obsolescence
rates in many of the fast-growing sectors.
· The sharp decline in the price of oil may create political
problems (Venezuela, Arab states).
· The world economy is still absorbing the negative economic
effects of September 11, including shrinking trade, security expenses,
and a de-globalization of commerce (reversing one of the driving forces
of the 1990s expansion.)
In the very near-term, one should be cautious about the global financial
markets. But in the medium- and long-term, world financial markets should
react positively to the prospect that the multi-year deflation spiral
won't get worse. Again, we just may be seeing bottom.
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