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Mesopotamia is Greek for the region "between the rivers" the Tigris and Euphrates. While the western half of Iraq is desert, the hydro-geography created by these two rivers will have a great impact on the ground component of a war with Iraq. Both rivers essentially flow
through Iraq from northwest to southwest. The Euphrates, the southernmost
of the two, originates in Syria, and crosses into Iraq at al Saybah. It
passes about 20 miles southwest of Baghdad and then flows into the Shatt
al Arab, which then empties into the upper Persian Gulf. News reports indicate that an important part of the ground war plan is to develop signals that Iraqi units can use after the outbreak of hostilities to convey their intent to surrender. This would reduce some of the problems. But even if such signals work, the management of POWs could create difficulties. And, if Saddam does not seek to defend this area, allied forces could still be slowed because of congestion resulting from high population density and other riverine obstacles, especially if there is a problem in crossing the Euphrates. An attack along the second
axis in the south would probably be launched from the western portion
of the Kuwait-Iraq border. This frontier is about 75 miles long and opens
into the sort of uninhabited desert terrain that is tailor-made for armored
operations. Given the terrain, this axis of advance is the one that will
probably close on Baghdad first. The location of oil fields is another important aspect of Iraq's geography. As mentioned above, if Saddam ignites the oil fields, the thick black smoke will obscure the vision of the attackers and limit the use of laser-guided weapons (though weapons such as Joint Direct Attack Munitions, or JDAM, that are guided by GPS will not be affected). Iraq's three major oil fields are: 1) the previously mentioned Basrah system, located directly north of Kuwait and extending about 60 miles to the Euphrates; 2) Mosul; and 3) Kirkuk. Significantly, however, sabotage of these oil fields will not affect operations around Baghdad. The final geographical factor is weather. The average high temperature will be rising for the next few months, from the low 70s in March to the low 80s in April, and the mid-90s in May. Precipitation is infrequent and humidity is low. Some have claimed that the "window of opportunity" is closing because of rising temperatures, but heat does not foreclose war. The problems associated with heat will be exacerbated if troops have to operate in protective suits and masks, but they are not insurmountable. The same holds for problems created by desert winds. It is now the period of the sharqui, an east wind that is capable of generating violent sandstorms and sending dust thousands of feet into the air. It normally peaks in April. Such storms can, like smoke from oil fires, degrade some precision-guided weapons. It can also cause serious problems for helicopter and tank engines. But we should remember that our soldiers and Marines are not unfamiliar with problems associated with operations in the desert. The Army trains at Fort Irwin and the Marines at Twentynine Palms, both located in California's Mojave Desert, where heat and sandstorms are par for the course. There is no question that
the allies will face more daunting and complex problems than those they
faced during Desert Storm. The objectives of the approaching war are different
from those of the previous conflict and this fact, combined with a more
complicated physical environment, will create real challenges for allied
forces. Mackubin Thomas Owens, an NRO contributing editor, is on leave from the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., to write a history of U.S. civil-military relations. |
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