July
8, 2003, 8:45 a.m. Postwar
Iraq
The
big picture.
ews reports out of Iraq are becoming ever more pessimistic, what with
guerrilla attacks continuing and a new tape purportedly of Saddam urging
Iraqis to continue the campaign of deadly attacks against Coalition soldiers.
However, an objective observer would have to say that these reports lack
perspective. The real problem is not the short-term challenge in Iraq,
but the long-term health of the U.S. military.
Yes, it is true that
26 American troops have died in Iraq since May 1, when President Bush
declared an end to hostilities. Yes, guerrilla resistance appears to have
become more organized and coordinated than before. Yes, Saddam appears
to be alive. But before we declare Iraq a quagmire (which some have been
trying to do since the fourth day of the war), let's look at the big picture.
First, let's recall what didn't happen — the nightmare scenarios
involving block-by-block urban warfare against an aroused Iraqi population,
or the transformation of Iraq into something along the lines of the disputed
West Bank territories. Many of those who were pushing these nightmare
scenarios three months ago are the very experts who now complain the loudest
about the lack of progress in Iraq.
Next let's examine the track record of guerrilla war. The guerrilla fighter
is, of course, a staple of left-wing romanticism. Mao, Ho, Fidel, Che
— these constitute the pantheon of "peoples' war." But
it is hard to point to a case in which guerrillas were successful without
outside support and the existence of a conventional force of some sort.
The guerrillas in Iraq lack both. Rooting them out will be a matter of
time. Patience is the key.
Ironically, the very success of the Coalition forces during the war can
be seen to be the major cause of the guerrilla resistance. By gaining
the strategic objectives of the war so rapidly while minimizing Iraqi
casualties, both civilian and military, the Coalition may not have convinced
the Iraqis that they really had been defeated. There is little question
that the devastation that Germany and Japan suffered in World War II played
a major role in convincing the Germans and Japanese to cooperate with
the occupiers, contributing in large measure to the relative peaceful
character of postwar occupation and reconstruction. In addition, the Germans
under U.S. and British occupation knew that the alternative to having
to work with Americans and Brits was an inevitably more ruthless Soviet
occupation. Hence, they were on their best behavior.
The Japanese case is even more complex. Yes, Japan was ruined by the war.
But even in the aftermath of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, many Japanese were
prepared to fight on for the emperor if he had chosen to continue the
fight. It was only because he acquiesced in the U.S. occupation that it
became the standard against which every other occupation is measured.
To ensure his cooperation, American authorities ignored the participation
of prominent members of the royal family in such war crimes as the "Rape
of Nanking." (For a riveting fictional account of the U.S. occupation
of Japan, read Jim Webb's novel, The
Emperor's General, the title of which refers to Douglas MacArthur.)
What we face in Iraq is neither the romantic guerrilla of leftist lore
nor the sullen, resentful populace of a country that knows it has been
defeated. It is much closer to the aftermath of the 1989 revolution against
the Romanian dictator Nicolae Ceausescu. As Con Coughlin writes in the
London Sunday Telegraph, loyalists in the Romanian Securitate,
the dictator's praetorian guard, "staged a spirited, and deadly,
resistance in the hope that they might succeed in restoring Ceausescu
to power. The resistance quickly evaporated after the bullet-ridden bodies
[of the dictator and his wife Elena] were paraded on television."
Which brings us to Saddam. The administration is ill served by comments
such as those of Ari Fleischer who attempted to laugh off the new Saddam
tape recording. "Regardless of whether it is him or not, regardless
of whether he's dead or alive, the mission, in terms of getting rid of
the regime, has been achieved."
The status of Saddam
does matter when it comes to pacifying Iraq. Few Iraqis are prepared
to cooperate fully with Coalition forces until the Coalition can demonstrate
that Saddam no longer poses a threat to them. The capture of Saddam and
his monstrous sons is critically important to the stability of postwar
Iraq. Offering a substantial reward for Saddam is a good first step. After
all, intelligence is the key to locating Saddam. There is reason to believe
that in postwar Iraq, money might trump loyalty or fear.
What else should
the Coalition do to win the ongoing guerrilla war in Iraq? The increasing
use of military preemption against suspected guerrillas and their infrastructure
rather than responding to attacks mirrors the policy of preemption at
the national level. But again, intelligence is the key.
In terms of equipment,
a young Army officer writing in the Army Times has called for replacing
the ubiquitous HUMV, an unprotected wheeled utility vehicle especially
vulnerable to rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), with the old M113 armored
personnel carrier on ground patrols. Superseded long ago in Army mechanized
and armored units by the M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle, these older APCs,
with certain modifications, have been used effectively by the Israelis
in policing trouble spots in the disputed territories.
The issue of troop
strength in Iraq has been a major source of misunderstanding. When critics
claim that the Army is too small to do what is necessary in Iraq, they
don't necessarily mean that the force in country is too small, but that
the Army as a whole is stretched so thin to meet vastly expanded requirements,
not only in Iraq but throughout the globe, that readiness problems will
begin to undercut military effectiveness. The Army is especially concerned
about recruiting shortfalls and the potential loss of noncommissioned
officers, which are very likely to adversely affect the Army's performance
down the road.
Those who say the
Army should not do peacekeeping in a reconstructed Iraq are wrong. War
termination is an important objective, and a favorable outcome in Iraq
requires that the United States stay the course. Prospects for success
are good. Even a pessimist, as long as he was objective, would have to
concede that Iraq is by no means a quagmire. The situation in Iraq is
progressing, despite setbacks. But the health of the United States Army
is in the balance. Today's force is overcommitted and the strains are
beginning to show.
—
Mackubin Thomas Owens, an NRO contributing editor, is on leave
from the Naval War College to write a history of U.S. civil-military relations.
He led a Marine rifle platoon in Vietnam, 1968-69.
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ews reports out of Iraq are becoming ever more pessimistic, what with
guerrilla attacks continuing and a new tape purportedly of Saddam urging
Iraqis to continue the campaign of deadly attacks against Coalition soldiers.
However, an objective observer would have to say that these reports lack
perspective. The real problem is not the short-term challenge in Iraq,
but the long-term health of the U.S. military. 
