September
17, 2003, 9:00 a.m. The
Marines’ Perfect War
“They
wanted to die, and we wanted to kill them.”
n 400 BC, the Athenian general Xenophon led 10,000 hoplites in a march
up the Tigris and Euphrates valley — Mesopotamia, the land between
the rivers, which today is called Iraq. The Greeks defeated every army
that challenged them, including the 100,000-man force that the Great King
of Persia sent against them. Xenophon entitled his account of this campaign
the Anabasis,
"the march up," which became the bane of many a young student
of Greek.
Now two old Marines
have given us a modern-day Anabasis — an account of the march
of the 1st Marine Division from Kuwait to Baghdad, which mirrored the
route taken by Xenophon's hoplites some 2,400 years ago. The
March Up: Taking Baghdad with the 1st Marine Division by "Bing"
West and Major General Ray "E-tool" Smith, USMC (ret) provides
a remarkable description of a campaign conducted by some truly remarkable
young Americans.
The Marines permitted West and Smith complete access to the battlefield
— as long as they kept out of the way. Like the embedded journalists,
they spent time with the Marine infantrymen, tankers, and artillerymen
who raced toward Baghdad, but they were also free to move around, to hitch
rides in helicopters or on amphibious tractors (amtracs). At one point,
they were given use of a commandeered Baath-party official's SUV. All
they had to do was find gasoline for it.
But while the reports from the embedded journalists have been described
as akin to the "view through a soda straw," West and Smith were
able to visit mobile Marine headquarters and listen in as commanders briefed
their subordinates. West and Smith thus had the context that embedded
journalists, no matter how riveting their reports, usually lacked.
In the pages of The March Up, the commanding general of the storied
1st Marine Division, Major General James Mattis, emerges as something
of a latter-day Xenophon. An innovative leader who also led the task force
that seized an advanced airbase in Afghanistan at the opening of that
campaign, much to the chagrin of Army officers (see my NRO article, "Marines
Turned Soldiers") Mattis "led from the front." He clearly
had prepared his command well and it responded to his style of leadership.
His "message to all hands" issued at the outset of the campaign
contains echoes of Henry V at Agincourt. "While we will move swiftly
and aggressively against those who resist, we will treat all others with
decency, demonstrating chivalry and soldierly compassion for people who
have endured a lifetime under Saddam's oppression…Demonstrate to
the world there is 'No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy' than a U.S. Marine."
West and Smith write that military theory suggests
that the ideal
location for the general is one where he can observe the battlefield
firsthand, gauge the fighting condition of his troops and the enemy,
and still communicate with his key subordinates so that he can exploit
what he is observing….By being on scene during this battle, Mattis
was employing what theorists call the coup d'oeil, when the commander
is able to select and focus on the battle's key elements. He could see
that the Marines, although tired, were continuing to press forward,
while the enemy had retreated into the town. He could see with his own
eyes that his troops had the initiative.
On one occasion Mattis
offered some water to a tired Marine passing his vehicle. "The Marine
refilled his canteens, took a deep gulp, and patted Mattis on the shoulder.
'Thanks, man,' he said, trotting off, apparently unaware that he was talking
to his division commander."
The fact that West and Smith praise Mattis is a tribute to his leadership.
These are two men who are not easily impressed. West was a Marine infantry
officer in Vietnam where he commanded both a platoon and a company. He
was assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs
in the Reagan administration and is the author of several books, including
the recent, well-received novel, The
Pepperdogs.
Smith is one of the most-decorated Marines since World War II. He commanded
a company during the fight for Hue City during the Tet Offensive of 1968.
He began the battle with 146 men. Thirty-four days later, only seven of
his men had not been killed or wounded. He was an adviser to the South
Vietnamese Marines during the 1972 Easter Offensive. He commanded a battalion
during the Grenada operation and later a division.
My daughter asked about his nickname. "E-tool" is an abbreviation
for "entrenching tool," military jargon for the small shovel
that soldiers and Marines carry for digging their fighting holes. Trying
not to be too graphic, I explained Smith's nickname by paraphrasing his
own words: "Unlike a rifle, a shovel doesn't jam." As is the
case with most legendary characters, the story of how he earned his sobriquet
has many variations. Let's just say that the incident involved Ray Smith,
a small shovel, and one or more North Vietnamese soldiers.
The March Up doesn't sugarcoat the campaign After all, even the
best plan founders on "friction," e.g. map-reading errors, failures
to communicate, unexpected enemy actions, and the like. As well-trained
and well-led as they were, things often went wrong. . Leaders made mistakes,
but they learned as they went. Rumors about Iraqi car bombers and deceptive
surrenders spread quickly, adding to the anxieties of the young Marines
who would pay the price for complacency or a lack or vigilance. The authors'
account of the fight for Nasiriyah is particularly harrowing.
As one might expect of two men who have led Marines in combat, West and
Smith demonstrate a deep and abiding affection for the young Marines who
fill the pages of this book. West and Smith understand the bond that develops
among men at war. They experienced it. "Jobs — staying alive
— determined a Marine's family on the march up, not rank or ethnicity.
Those you lived with were those you fought with and who would keep you
alive."
The Marines faced some sharp fights on the road to Baghdad and more once
they arrived. They encountered Iraqi soldiers of all kinds: soldiers of
regular units, some of whom fought and some of whom didn't; militia, who
preferred not to fight but sometimes did because they wee intimidated
by Saddam's fedayeen; and foreign jihadis.
The jihadis asked no quarter and the Marines gave them none. The
Marines
knew
the difference between these jihad fighters and the militia. Consequently
the Marines shot them in the ditches and in the field. They threw grenades
into the bulrushes and shot the fighters when they ran out. They threw
grenades into the drainage pipes running under the road…A few of
the foreign fighters surrendered, but most did not — they had come
to Iraq to die, and die they would.
As one Marine put
it, this was the perfect war. "They want to die, and we want to kill
them."
The March Up,
like the Anabasis, is destined to be a classic.
— Mackubin Thomas Owens, an NRO contributing
editor, is an associate dean of academics and professor of strategy and
force planning at the Naval War College in Newport, RI. He led a Marine
infantry platoon in Vietnam in 1968-1969.
<% dim printurl
printurl = Request.ServerVariables("URL")%>
n 400 BC, the Athenian general Xenophon led 10,000 hoplites in a march
up the Tigris and Euphrates valley — Mesopotamia, the land between
the rivers, which today is called Iraq. The Greeks defeated every army
that challenged them, including the 100,000-man force that the Great King
of Persia sent against them. Xenophon entitled his account of this campaign
the 
