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Carville, Stanley Greenberg, and Bob Shrum have written a memo on
how Democrats should position themselves for the 2002 and 2004 elections.
It should be sobering reading for Republicans.
Their basic
task seems to be to buck up Democratic spirits. President Bush's
popularity, they say, in no way imperils the party's prospects.
This is, in part, because the public mood is now more receptive
to Democratic arguments about government activism as a way of building
a national "community" — a familiar point from the
punditry of the last two months. In addition, a war on "fundamentalism"
is raising the importance of "tolerance," "freedom
of choice," and "freedom of religion" for voters:
"Religious fundamentalism and fanaticism are uncomfortable
with the life choices and gender roles at the center of American
life." This, too, is a common subtheme of a lot of the punditry.
(You'd almost think we were fighting for abortion rights.)
Second, the
Democratic strategists think that the president's popularity is
shallow: "While George W. Bush is popular, voter doubts are
close to the surface. We should not give voice to these doubts in
this period, but we should be prepared to highlight issues that
allow those doubts to emerge later. The character of Bush's budget
and tax policies — economic damage, undermining social programs
and geared toward big business — help set up the congressional
choice for next year." Among the voter doubts they identify:
"Bush may be in over his head"; "Bush's budget policies
may produce deficits and hurt the economy long-term"; "Bush
always sides with big business and powerful interests"; "Bush
is bad on the environment."
Carville et
al recognize that the Republicans have an advantage on security
issues. But they are not worried about that disadvantage for two
reasons. First, they think the more politically important question
is whether voters see the Democrats as being just as patriotic as
Republicans — and they are convinced that from the polls that
voters do. Second, their polling also indicates that voters want
the president to concentrate on fighting terrorism but want congressmen
to focus on domestic concerns, where they believe Democrats have
an advantage. Health care and the environment are still powerful
Democratic issues. And especially since voters assign the president
and Congress different tasks, Democrats may be able to "separat[e]
House Republicans from the President."
Interestingly,
the Democratic strategists do not believe that their party has an
advantage yet on economic issues even though they think that the
Republicans' tax cuts are "out of step" with public priorities.
They write, "The economy is emerging as a major issue for next
year, but the Democrats do not yet have the advantage. Public confidence
in the economy will likely erode further, but Democrats need to
articulate strong and distinctive economic policies." They
note that voters are skeptical of tax rebates, preferring policies
that would promote investment.
The strategists
may be overestimating the increase in public tolerance for big government;
and perhaps there are public doubts about Democrats' patriotism
that are, like their doubts about Bush, below the surface. Certainly,
their idea that it would be wrong to "give voice" to doubts
about the president now but it will be ok to do so "later"
suggests a distressing complacency about how long we may be threatened
by terrorism.
But on one
point Carville and co. are quite correct: The public's political
reaction to the war depends crucially on political leadership. They
mention Tony Blair's "speech on the 'power of community,' which
lays the basis for public service and modern social democracy.'"
The natural reaction to physical danger and war is a kind of instinctive
cultural conservatism. That can take the form of increased support
for such policies as "tighter border control and limiting the
number of immigrants" — the memo mentions that the polls
show this — or it can take the form of statist communitarianism.
In effect,
the Democrats are taking advantage of two Republican weaknesses.
One is their failure over the years to offer an agenda that speaks
to Americans' fears of balkanization. Sidney Blumenthal, in the
Clinton years, argued that the Democrats were becoming the "one
nation party" because they would hold the country together
through social democracy. Republicans were off the field.
The second
weakness is Republicans' narrow definition of what politics consists
of. Democrats are actively shaping the public response to terror;
they are arguing that terror should validate statism. Republicans
aren't making a case for anything in particular. The president may
be occupied with more important matters; but where are Republican
congressmen?
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