May
15, 2002 8:45 a.m. The
Bombing Strategy
It
all makes perfect sense.
ell,
it is official. Yasser Arafat opposes suicide bombings. Who knew? He believes
that the Palestinians are close to establishing a state "side-by-side
with Israel, with the Israeli Jewish state," and that "suicide
attacks do not benefit the Palestinian people and that [Hamas and Islamic
Jihad] must halt these attacks."
Wonder of wonders.
Did Arafat wake up Monday morning and realize that suicide bombing was
morally abhorrent? Were the habits of a lifetime suddenly coming under
intense self-scrutiny? Were the Palestinians running out of volunteers?
(You have to figure that when they get down to young women and children
they are at the tail end of their mobilization base.) No, the truth is,
the Palestinian leader is being pragmatic. He and his supporters have
realized that suicide-terror bombings, for all their other tangible benefits,
just do not get satisfactory political results.
Three factors are
at work. First, Palestinian violence is losing its luster with some important
Arab leaders. Word came down from the tripartite Arab summit held last
Saturday at Sharm al-Shaykh, where Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak hosted
Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah Ben Abdul-Aziz,
the latter of whom was fresh from his personal meeting with President
Bush. The official communiqué from the summit reiterated support
for the Saudi peace plan adopted at the Arab summit in Beirut, and rejected
"violence in all its forms." Seems harmless enough, but radical
circles focused on the denunciation of all forms of violence as
a criticism of their favored modus operandi, the suicide strike. They
are reading the statement correctly. The more moderate Arab states (at
least moderate by comparison) are growing impatient with the terrorists.
The Netanya bombing gave Sharon the opportunity to mount an incursion
into the West Bank and clean house, and was also a great sign of disrespect
for the Saudi peace plan, which was on the table at the time. However,
the Arab states could not denounce Palestinian violence with the IDF on
the move. When the Israelis ended their operation, they were rewarded
with the May 7 Rishon Letzion bombing, which caused Prime Minister Sharon
to return immediately from Washington and raised the threat of an invasion
of the Gaza strip. Clearly, this was more trouble than the moderate Arabs
wanted.
Second, the suicide
attacks were not generating much sympathy abroad. Few people in the U.S.
— only the most impressionable — were buying the line that the
violence was a "spontaneous manifestation of Palestinian frustration."
Most Americans saw the murder bombings as 9/11-style terror. Public support
for Israel rose after Netanya, and Sharon's domestic approval ratings
went up as well, especially after he took resolute action. It did not
help Arafat that his most vocal international supporters were Iran and
Iraq, not a pair with a good PR record in this country. (Ironically, al
Qaeda has consistently denounced Arafat as an irrelevant old man.) After
the May 7 bombing the provocative nature of the terrorist acts became
transparent. The Palestinian leadership stated that continued violence
was counterproductive, and would only give Sharon pretexts for further
military action, as well as further diminish Palestinian international
legitimacy. The Israeli leader's statement in the wake of the bombing
— "Israel will fight anyone who tries, through suicide terrorism,
to sow fear. Israel will fight, Israel will triumph and when victory prevails,
Israel will make peace" — did not leave much room for interpretation.
After some negotiations a second Israeli attack was at least temporarily
averted, the Sharm al-Shaykh summiteers denounced violence, and Arafat
signed on immediately, singling out "Palestinian opposition factions"
as being responsible for all the terror attacks on civilians and especially
those inside Israel.
Third, a backlash
was brewing inside the Palestinian Authority. The catalytic event was
an April 23 incident outside the Israeli settlement of Netzarim. Three
Palestinian students from the nearby Sheikh Radwan refugee camp, one age
15 and two age 13, tried to infiltrate the settlement and were killed
by IDF troops. The next day WAFA, the Palestinian news agency, published
a strongly worded editorial denouncing the actions of these children and
the fruitlessness of any such amateur attacks: "Those boys were minors,
almost children really, and such young persons do not basically have the
right to make a fateful decision about disposing of God's greatest gift
to his creations, namely, life. The entire Palestinian society is talking
about this phenomenon and is denouncing and rejecting it." The parents
had indeed complained strongly to local radical leaders. The popular conception
of Arab parents being at worst fatalistic or at best euphoric over the
suicidal actions of their children is surely overstated. Yes, hundreds
of households have received cash or other payments, and Saudi Foreign
Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal has admitted that his country has subsidized
the families of suicide bombers. Nevertheless, it is not normal in any
culture actively to desire your children to die, whether or not it is
for "the cause." Even arch-martyr Mohammed Atta's father tried
at first to disassociate his son from the suicide attack he masterminded,
claiming to have spoken to him days after.
Ironically, these
three children were much more genuine expressions of the Palestinian revolt
— poor brainwashed kids motivated by a fatal idealism with no hint
of the hopelessness of their actions. Their teachers, their religious
leaders, their mass media, and their local agitators all glorified the
acts of the martyrs who lashed out at the "Zionist occupiers."
What did anyone expect impressionable youngsters to do? Moreover, whose
kids would be next? In the face of a growing parental rebellion, the PA
and Hamas both denounced the participation of children in suicide attacks
(though Hamas added the proviso that their budding ardor should not correspondingly
be diminished). But an al Aqsa Brigades commander held firm: "If
women are needed, we will use them; if kids are needed, we will do the
same."
Faced with these
pressures, Arafat decided the bombing gambit had been overplayed and that
the struggle should continue on a political level. And what of Hamas?
They are the big losers in the new, less-tolerant-of-suicide climate.
If the Israeli leadership and Arafat are reaching an understanding about
the disutility of violence, it will leave Hamas and other radical opposition
groups isolated and prime targets for combined reprisals. Thus, it is
no wonder they see Arafat as a sellout. The PA arrested 14 Hamas members
in Gaza after the May 7 bombing in an attempt to appease Sharon. When
Arafat recently tried to visit the site of the Janin "massacre,"
the wooden dais on which he was to have spoken to the refugees was burned,
and gunfire was heard as he approached the area. Young pro-Hamas fighters
mobbed the area, and Arafat's motorcade swiftly retreated. (As the scene
was later reported in the official Palestinian press, the leader "paid
a quick visit to the stricken Janin refugee camp.") Hamas has pledged
to continue suicide attacks, though Shaykh Ahmed Yasin, the spiritual
leader of the group, has maintained that the problem is really terminological.
"Forgive me, but they are not suicide attacks," he said. "Suicide
is a gesture that is an end in itself. They are human sacrifices."
Well who can argue with that?
— James
S. Robbins is a national-security analyst & NRO contributor.
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ell,
it is official. Yasser Arafat opposes suicide bombings. Who knew? He believes
that the Palestinians are close to establishing a state "side-by-side
with Israel, with the Israeli Jewish state," and that "suicide
attacks do not benefit the Palestinian people and that [Hamas and Islamic
Jihad] must halt these attacks."
