August
13, 2003, 8:45 a.m. Wheres
Bolton?
Talks with North Korea start out on a wrong note.
core one for North Korea. The State Department's decision not to send
Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John
Bolton to represent the United States at the upcoming six-power talks
in Beijing is an unexpected win for the incurably bizarre and increasingly
dangerous Northeast Asian police state.
Bolton's crime was
pointing out the obvious. Two weeks ago in a speech entitled "A
Dictatorship at the Crossroads," he offended Supreme Leader Kim
Jong Il by stating that the dictator "has not had to endure the consequences
of his failed policies. While he lives like royalty in Pyongyang, he keeps
hundreds of thousands of his people locked in prison camps with millions
more mired in abject poverty, scrounging the ground for food. For many
in North Korea, life is a hellish nightmare. As reported by the State
Department Report on Human Rights, we believe that some 400,000 persons
died in prison since 1972 and that starvation and executions were common.
Entire families, including children, were imprisoned when only one member
of the family was accused of a crime."
This excerpt seems
fairly tame compared to the vituperation the North Koreans disgorged in
response. They described Bolton as "human scum," "devoid
of reason," "an ugly fellow who cannot be regarded as a human
being," and a "bloodthirsty fiendish bloodsucker" among
other colorful things. They petulantly refused to negotiate if he was
on the American team, and until yesterday the U.S. stood by the undersecretary,
at least publicly. On August 4, White House Press Secretary Scott
McClellan stated that Bolton "was speaking for the administration.
His remarks last week reiterated things that we have said in the past."
But at behind-the-scenes meetings last
week, the North Koreans were told that Bolton's views were his personal
opinion, not policy. One wonders what part of the statement is mere opinion
that Kim Jong Il has a lifestyle that makes the late Uday and Qusay
look like perfect gentlemen? That daily life in North Korea is a bit low
on personal amenities? Or perhaps the State Department human rights report
he quoted was just his opinion? Bolton had also stated that "the
days of DPRK blackmail are over," but apparently he spoke too soon.
I can understand
a certain diplomatic mindset that would see Bolton as a polarizing presence
at the talks; the first issue on the table would be his statements about
Kim Jong Il; the North Korean delegation would make a point of walking
out; and nothing would be accomplished. But it was only because the US
took a tough stance in the first place that the multilateral talks are
going to take place at all. The North Koreans had been demanding bilateral
negotiations for months, refusing to consider anything else and threatening
dire consequences unless we responded to their demands (discussed here
last January). The U.S. team, under Bolton's leadership, called their
bluff, waited them out, and the North Koreans caved. This raises the question
are they upset over Bolton's relatively innocuous statements about
Kim Jong Il (the man President Bush was quoted as saying he "loathes"
by the way), or did they really just want Bolton out of the way because
he has their number? Did they insist on his removal as a precondition
for their participation in the talks? Seems to me that their least desired
negotiator would ipso facto be our key player.
Would Bolton's mere
presence have scuttled the entire process? Hardly. The fact that the North
Koreans agreed to talk at all shows that it was in their interest. They
did not agree to the negotiations for our benefit, but for their own.
They might have walked out of the first round of talks had Bolton been
across the table from them, but so what? They would have come back eventually.
It would only have required the patience to wait them out, as we did for
the first part of this year. Apparently someone on our side is in a hurry
to get results, but this sense of impatience plays to the demonstrated
strengths of the North Koreans. Furthermore, despite our protestations
to the contrary, they will conclude that they can shape if not
determine the composition of our negotiating teams, which will
only embolden them further.
The United States
had a decidedly mixed record in negotiations with Communists during the
Cold War. Generally speaking, we achieved favorable results in direct
proportion to our demonstrations of resolve. Since we are dealing with
the last surviving state to be erected by Joseph Stalin, one would hope
that we would apply some of the lessons learned from that era. After all,
we won, didn't we?