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Charges of terrorist ties to Saudi Arabia are not new, though the direct connection in this case to the wife of a senior Saudi diplomat is newsworthy. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef called the charges "lies and baseless words," but added that many Saudis help others who live abroad, and it is impossible to check them all. And the fact that at least 15 of the 19 9/11 hijackers were Saudis is not the fault of that state's government. The Oklahoma City bombers were Americans, they argue, should the U.S. blame itself? Nor can the Saudi government be held directly responsible for the actions of an outlaw like Osama bin Laden, who after all is a wanted (and admired) man in his homeland. But beyond a point, as the links to Saudi Arabia pile up, they attain a fissionable state. There may be no smoking gun, but something certainly smells.
Here is how the Saudi system contributes, wittingly or not, to the terrorist funding network. Banks in Muslim states have traditionally gotten around prohibitions on usury by establishing charitable foundations to administer zakat (alms or charity), one of the five Pillars of Islam. By doing this good deed, sharia law allows the banks to charge interest. (The rationale is more complicated than that, but basically it is a trade-off that evolved out of necessity.) The foundations are run by religious figures and are kept separate from oversight and direction of the secular boards of directors. (Zakat is also raised directly by mosques, and there was that "send in your gold chains" telethon awhile back that was such a hit with American audiences.) This is why so many of the fronts through which terror money flows call themselves "charitable" or "humanitarian" organizations it is not just a clever subterfuge. Of course, not all such organizations fund terrorism, nor is all or even most zakat tainted. In fact, supporting terrorism is a perversion of almsgiving; the money is supposed to go to the poor and needy, according to the Koran (9:60). However, during the Soviet war in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden secured a fatwa making it legal to give zakat to the Mujahedin. Since then, alms from across the globe have been fed into al Qaeda coffers. A July 2002 report from Canada's RCMP asserted that Saudi alms generated $1-2 million per month for bin Laden's network. The money flows out of Saudi Arabia through an informal underground banking system known as halawa, which leaves no paper trail. Yet, money has to surface eventually for it to be of any use to terrorists, and frequently this is done through foreign or offshore money laundries. This was definitely not the case when the payments came from Riggs Bank in Washington, D.C., drawn on an account in the name of Princess Haifa al-Faisal, the wife of the Saudi ambassador. This suggests either the terrorists were incredibly sloppy, or they expected the account to be covered by diplomatic immunity and thus be blocked from investigation, or the princess did not know the purposes to which the money was being put, or a combination of the above. So why does Saudi Arabia allow, if not encourage or take part in, support for terrorist activity against the United States? Don't we buy a lot of their product, and keep the sea-lanes safe and open for countries that buy even more? Didn't we save them from Saddam Hussein, either from invasion or (more probably, at least initially) regional hegemony? Don't we refrain from criticizing their repressive social policies and political autocracy (and by "we" I mean U.S. policy, certainly not NRO)? Shouldn't they, at minimum, not facilitate the transfer of funds to Saudi citizens who fly airplanes into our buildings? To add insult to injury, if we trace the origin of terrorist money far enough, we find it starts right back home. Just like the Office of National Drug Control Policy commercials linking narcotics with terrorism, our appetite for petroleum feeds the terror networks. Billions of US dollars go into the region to meet our energy needs. Despite the embargo of 1973 and the oil shock of 1978-9, and the United States is as dependent as ever on Saudi oil. Thus our most critical national-security commitment (the security of the Middle Eastern oil supplies and routes) and gravest security threats (Islamic radicalism and regional WMD proliferation) both spring from a single source: the Saudi oil wells. To date the United States has been a reactive force in this region, responding to threats as they arise, and attempting to achieve stability. What is called for is a proactive approach, which changes the critical calculus in the region, and decreases the dominant influence of Middle Eastern oil on our national security. Part of the "defense transformation" framework being promoted by the Department of Defense involves global-shaping operations that is, finding ways to influence circumstances worldwide to head off crises before they occur. This necessitates long-term large-scale shifts in policies and relationships with countries to make the world safer for the United States at home and abroad. A crucial part of global shaping should be both reducing demand for petroleum overall through exploiting alternative energy sources, and shifting sources of supply to other, more stable, friendlier parts of the world. A national energy strategy should be a major component of the U.S. national-security framework. Energy is not just a domestic issue, it has global implications. The surest way to defund the terrorists as well as the regional members of the axis of evil is to stop the cash transfers at their source. Of course, we can play to other American strengths to get the job done. In August 2002 thousands of families of 9/11 victims filed a class-action suit targeting Saudi banks, "charities" and the royal family. They charge them with complicity in the acts if terror that claimed the lives of their loved ones. The awards could total in the trillions of dollars, and bankrupt the Saudi financial system. The Middle East exports fatwas, we export lawsuits. May the better decrees win. James S. Robbins is a national-security analyst & NRO contributor. |
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