The most disruptive
outbreak of state AG activism has been the anti-tobacco crusade. Beginning
in 1994, 40-plus states filed baseless lawsuits asking courts to order
cigarette makers to reimburse them for Medicaid expenditures covering
smoking-related health problems. As a matter of law, the cases were wholly
without merit. Yet the AGs succeeded in extracting a settlement largely
because the tobacco companies knew they could pass the costs along to
smokers. And if that were not enough, the market shares of the giant tobacco companies' shares are protected by the settlement agreement, which essentially blocks future entrants into the market. Incredibly, the agreement requires that smaller companies that didn't consent to the settlement even new companies that didn't exist when the settlement was signed pay damages into escrow to cover any future liability they might incur for smoking-related illnesses. The intent, of course, was to prevent upstart cigarette makers from cutting prices and taking market share away from the four majors. Naturally, the states had to assure the financial viability of the companies that each year would be fattening state coffers. In a nutshell, the
tobacco litigation meant de facto increases in cigarette taxes, obscene
enrichment of politically connected trial lawyers, and states acting as
cartel managers for giant cigarette makers. What can be done to put an end to this kind of state AG activism and backdoor tax increases? Several alternatives are available. Four states have passed statutes greatly restricting their AGs' ability to hire private contingency-fee lawyers. Others are considering legislation that would limit state claims to those that could be asserted by private defendants that is, states would have no greater legal rights than a private party suing on his own. Those stop-gap measures are no doubt helpful. But the underlying problem requires a more permanent remedy: Serious thought should be given to restricting or even eliminating state AGs' common-law and parens patriae authority. Otherwise, the temptation to sue unpopular businesses on trumped up legal theories may well be irresistible. Michael DeBow is professor of law at Samford University's Cumberland School of Law. He is the author of Restraining State Attorneys General, Curbing Government Lawsuit Abuse, just released by the Cato Institute. |
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http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-debow052102.asp
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