Perhaps the most destructive notion some foreign policymakers have is that an election constitutes democracy. An election on its own, however, does not a democracy make. An election is the capstone of a democracy, not the makings of one. Before balloting marks the triumph of political freedom, a number of other factors must come together to give meaning to any vote. A free press is essential to keep the politicians honest and to spread the messages of various candidates. Free enterprise is necessary to provide protection from retribution by the sitting government against those who back opposition parties or candidates. And of course, freedom of association is vital in order for people to freely organize and assemble an effective opposition movement. But those elements of a free society that make elections truly free and fair are still missing from the Palestinian territories. Arafat directly controls TV and radio, and he uses the threat of violence or arrest to intimidate those who work for technically independent Palestinian newspapers. Even more significantly, between Fatah and Tanzim and his many different security forces, Arafat has the means to control the process from a distance with the mere threat of reprisal. The almost unavoidable futility of any Palestinian election in the absence of overt United States involvement renders many in the administration unwilling to support Arafat's newfound embrace of imminent elections. "What would an election alone accomplish? Nothing," insists a senior administration official. This official stresses that holding an election without first ending Arafat's death grip over Palestinian society would achieve nothing more than granting the terrorist the legitimacy he so desperately craves. Despite the compelling case that giving Arafat an immediate election is terribly misguided at best, the camp inside the administration headed by Secretary of State Colin Powell and his deputy, Richard Armitage, is willing to gamble on the ballot box. No one in this group seriously believes that Arafat will make the leap from terrorist to statesman as a result of another election, but they hope that casting ballots would appease the Palestinian street for at least a year or two, just as the 1996 sham election did. The split within the administration between the Defense and State Departments and at a deeper level between career staff and political appointments has ground most U.S. activity in the Mideast to a halt. Judging by the few things that are actually being done right now, however, that inactivity is better than the alternative. CIA Director George Tenet is feverishly attempting to reform the Palestinian security forces, coordinating his efforts with both Egypt and Israel, among others. Arafat intentionally designed a security-force patchwork consisting of just over a dozen agencies so he could play them off each other and prevent any one person from acquiring the requisite power base to challenge his authority. Tenet is working with Arab neighbors, particularly Egypt, to goad Arafat into accepting a reorganization of the security forces, which would involve dramatically shrinking the number of agencies down to one to four branches. Under the theory that doing things that Arafat hates will be good for the Palestinian people, maybe this approach will yield some tangible benefits. But Jim Phillips of the Heritage Foundation is skeptical that consolidating the confusing array of security forces will actually accomplish anything, because "It doesn't matter how many agencies you have; they're still thugs." In addition to prodding Arafat to accept reform of his security forces, Egypt is pushing the Bush administration to defang the Palestinian leader. Playing both sides against the middle, Egypt and other Arab neighbors are lobbying behind-the-scenes to reduce Arafat to figurehead status, while publicly slamming Israel's desire to oust him. The Arab figurehead blueprint would involve a prime minister who holds most of the power, with Arafat serving essentially as president emeritus. Though the idea of marginalizing Arafat holds tremendous surface appeal, it's likely just a pipe dream. Even as a figurehead, Arafat could still squash real reform, because he would most likely have the power to act as Palestinian puppet master, pulling the strings outside of public view to ensure the outcome he desires. With Arafat's history of violence against his own people, particularly those who cross his political path, Palestinians are not likely to stick their necks out and openly challenge his leadership. Monitors would thus be needed not just on the day of voting, but in the preceding months to prevent Arafat from strong-arming the media or threatening political enemies and the only way to do that is outsiders thoroughly injecting themselves into the election process at least six months before ballots are cast. Given the anti-Semitism on display throughout the United Nations and the European Union, the burden of thwarting Arafat's iron fist would fall on the U.S., a prospect not embraced by the Powell crowd, in large part because they fear any heavy lifting. Conducting an election without necessary oversight, however, would continue the tyranny initially imposed by Israel a decade ago, when it forced a band of thugs from Tunisia on the Palestinians. The strategy employed by Powell and career staff at State can best be described as steadying the boat in choppy waters, while paying scant attention to finding the path to calmer territory. "The State and CIA view is stability, which means putting off long-term things for the long term. They are unwilling to address the issues that got us where we are," comments a senior administration official. The long-term goal that must be on the U.S.'s radar is the eventual emasculation of Arafat, for freedom cannot take root so long as his grip on power goes unchecked. Arafat will use every tactic he can muster to fight real democracy for the simple reason offered by Phillips: "You can't teach an old terrorist new tricks." Joel Mowbray is a freelance writer.
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http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-mowbray060502.asp
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