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September 10, 2002 1:00 p.m. Blair’s Choice His Rubicon.

hen Julius Caesar launched his military coup to become Rome's dictator, he did so by crossing the river Rubicon that represented the boundary of Roman territory, uttering the famous words: "the die is cast." And when Prime Minister, Tony Blair, flew across the Atlantic last weekend to consult with President George W. Bush on joint Anglo-American military action to remove Saddam Hussein, he also crossed a Rubicon.

He committed himself beyond second thoughts to the "special relationship" at a time when Britain's partners in the European Union are suspicious of this Anglo-American closeness and when his own party is in near-rebellion at the approach of war.

Such momentous decisions often bring peace of mind. When the die is truly cast, you set aside your previous agonizing and attend to the practical matter of ensuring victory, often in an unexpectedly cheerful frame of mind. Mr. Blair's buoyant demeanor at Camp David suggested that he had reached this state of mental calm.

Now that he has returned to London, however, he is almost certainly finding that he has crossed one river only to find himself on the bank of a second and even more torrential Rubicon. And he is still in two minds about crossing this one.

His dilemma has nothing to do with any Labor unease about his Iraq policy. Mr. Blair can face down any parliamentary rebellion because he can rely on the support of 169 opposition Tories. Only military failure could seriously undermine his short-term dominance of the British political scene. And no one really expects that.

No, what is worrying Mr. Blair is that he is suddenly gripped by uncertainty on the topic of Britain's role in European-American relations. And he cannot quite understand why he should be so anxious — since everything on that score is working out exactly as he planned.

Consider his strategy until now: He depicts Britain as the indispensable bridge between the U.S. and continental Europe — America's best friend in Europe, Europe's most influential member in Washington. He denies that there is any need for Britain to choose between the U.S. and the European Union. And if any Tory ever argues that Britain should make such a choice in America's favor, he replies sternly that the Americans want Britain inside the European Union to press Washington's case.

Mr. Blair is undoubtedly sincere in his pro-American stance. But it also advances his other key political objective. For Mr. Blair is also a convinced "European" who wants Britain to vote in favor of joining the European single currency in a referendum expected next year. And an Anglo-American victory in Iraq might help him drag a reluctant British electorate into the "Yes" camp.

It would reassure those voters who fear that Britain is losing too much of its independence to the EU. It would give Mr. Blair a usefully statesmanlike aura just in time for the referendum campaign. It might even persuade Mr. Bush or Secretary Colin Powell to publicly endorse Britain's joining the euro.

Nothing too explicit, of course. Just a friendly hint that official Washington would be happy to see a strong and friendly Britain more committed to Europe. But that would be enough to "dish" those Tories who warn that the EU is gradually developing into a fortress of anti-Americanism in world politics. It might carry Blair past the winning post in the referendum. And after Camp David, it looks like a realistic political strategy.

So why might Mr. Blair be suddenly uneasy about it?

One answer is that Blair is genuinely pro-American — and he has recently come to see just how deeply anti-Americanism is embedded in the structures of the EU. Blair has pro-American allies among EU leaders, notably Italy's Silvio Berlusconi, but they are currently outnumbered by the Americophobes. And the EU bureaucracy is a hotbed of anti-Americanism. Turning the EU into a reliable U.S. ally looks a great deal harder than he had previously realized.

That in turn must raise doubts in his mind about pushing Britain further into the EU's apparatus of common decision-making. If a common EU foreign policy was fully in place, with qualified majority voting that bound Britain to accept collective decisions on major issues, Blair would almost certainly have been unable to commit British troops to a U.S.-led operation against Iraq as he did last weekend. Instead of Britain leading a sluggish EU to join with America, as the "Trojan Horse" theory predicts, the EU would have restrained a U.S.-friendly Britain.

And, finally, Blair (who dislikes EU summits with their bickering and time-wasting at the best of times) is all too aware that he will be the target of hostility at the next one for taking America's side so strongly in recent days.

All in all, the British prime minister would be less than human if he did not occasionally dream about opting out of the intrusive process of EU political integration while keeping its free trade benefits in a Trans-Atlantic Free Trade Area that would combine the U.S., the EU, Britain, and perhaps the new democracies of eastern Europe.

But it is a mighty Rubicon. Will he go beyond dreaming about it?

— This originally appeared in the Chicago-Sun Times. It is reprinted with permission.