John O'Sullivan on Tony Blair & Europe on National Review Online


European Blair
The bad news from Berlin.

On the day of the European "Big Three" Summit in Berlin last week, British Prime Minister Tony Blair was preening himself on a diplomatic triumph. He had finally put Britain "at the heart of Europe." In future the European Union would be run not by a Franco-German alliance but by a Franco-German-British triumvirate. And since Mr. Blair is America's closest European friend, this must be good news for the U.S. Right?

Not right at all, alas. Or, as the Duke of Wellington remarked on being addressed as Mr. Smith: "If you believe that, Sir, you will believe anything."

Even on the day of the summit itself, France's President Jacques Chirac had publicly snubbed Blair, telling him that he could never hope to enjoy the unique comradeship of the Franco-German relationship. That took the shine off the diplomatic triumph — and transformed the British press headlines to "BLAIR HUMILIATED." And a few days later, it was clear that Blair had fallen headlong into a subtle diplomatic trap.

In the months leading up to the Berlin summit, Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder had realized that their alliance could no longer dominate Europe as it had done since the late 1960s. In an EU of 25 members (with more coming along in a few years), even the Franco-German Leviathan would have neither the economic weight nor the raw voting power to ensure that its agenda always prevailed. That is why both countries, but especially Germany, are bitterly determined to reduce the voting rights of medium-sized countries like Poland and Spain in the proposed EU constitution — even to the point of allowing the last full EU summit to collapse in acrimony.

All this put Tony Blair in the catbird seat. Britain was widely seen by most of the smaller European powers, especially the ten new EU members in central and eastern Europe, as their natural friend and protector against the dominant Franco-German bloc. They also share Britain's traditional resistance to the imposition of job-destroying economic regulations from Brussels. And together with Spain and Italy, they had joined Blair in supporting the U.S. over the war in Iraq and more generally as the indispensable provider of European security through NATO.

If Blair had decided to head a coalition of the small and medium-sized European powers against the Franco-German core, he would have been able to ensure that France and Germany could no longer speak for "Europe." He would also have increased his ability both to advance Britain's traditional agenda of free trade, deregulation, and national sovereignty inside the EU and to buttress the Atlantic alliance against European anti-Americanism and its divisive schemes like an independent EU defense force that competes with NATO.

Why did he not do so? In the first place, unlike most of his countrymen, Blair is a passionate "European" who believes that the nation-state is inevitably being superseded by new supranational organizations like the EU. This view is distorted by vanity. Blair wants history to see him as the man who took Britain into the heart of a united Europe — not the man who divided Europe into two camps. And, in addition, his usual political technique is to blur differences not to fight them out.

Joschka Fischer, Germany's foreign minister, played cleverly on these traits. He gave an interview to the Euro-skeptic Daily Telegraph to declare that Germany now accepted the British vision of a non-federal Europe of nation states. Both Blair and the Telegraph swooned with maidenly delight. Blair then accepted the invitation to join the Berlin "Big Three."

And the trap was sprung.

By going to Berlin, Blair lost any hope of ever leading the great majority of European nations inside the EU. Both Italy and Spain reacted with anger at their exclusion from the Berlin summit. And the smaller countries naturally oppose an EU structure in which they are expected to take orders from either a Big Two or a Big Three.

None of these countries, thus betrayed, will trust Britain to protect their interests in future — or as long as Blair remains in Downing Street. What is Blair's reward for this loss? Little or nothing. Inside the Big Three, he will be outvoted two-to-one on almost every issue of major importance from immigration control to employment rights. Little more will be heard of Joschka Fischer's conversion to a Europe of nation states. And Mr. Blair will have to content himself with his seat at the top table and a few minor concessions for appearance's sake.

In Berlin, for example, he persuaded France and Germany to endorse his proposal for a kind of "Deregulation Czar" for the EU. It is hard to see this as any kind of "triumph" — or any kind of benefit to the Brits. Britain's economy is already deregulated by European standards — thanks to Lady Thatcher. The EU Lisbon summit agreed to deregulate the other Euro-economies in response to earlier entreaties by Blair some years ago. Nothing serious has yet come of the so-called "Lisbon agenda." And a new EU commissioner is unlikely to improve matters greatly.

If Europe is to carry through an economic reform program, it will be because national governments decide it is either necessary or unavoidable. In the case of Germany it is certainly necessary. Because we think of Germany as the economic powerhouse of Europe, it is a shock to learn that, as this week's Economist points out, per capita income in modern Germany has fallen below the European average. But so far reform has not been unavoidable. Indeed, the German government has avoided anything but the most modest reforms.

And there's the rub. Blair has joined the Big Two at exactly the moment that their political power and economic clout are diminishing. It is a bad bargain for him and the Brits. But why should anyone else worry?

Unfortunately for the U.S. the main item on the Franco-German agenda is the creation of an independent European defense separate from NATO. Even before the Berlin summit, Blair had been going along with this scheme, all the time assuring Washington that nothing really serious would happen. Yet at each stage he has capitulated to whatever Paris and Berlin demanded. Now that he is one of the Big Three, Blair will be even more likely to brush aside Washington's concerns on defense.

Blair is now doing what he said he would never do — choose between Europe and America. He is choosing Europe. Don't say you weren't warned.

John O'Sullivan is editor-in-chief of The National Interest. This piece first appeared in the Chicago Sun-Times and is reprinted with permission. O'Sullivan can be reached through Benador Associates


 

 
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