Author Archive E-mail Author Send to a Friend <% dim printurl Version

April 1, 2002 8:45 a.m. What Can the Arabs Do? Not much, thankfully.

ou have to feel sorry for the Arab statesmen. They thought they had a way to keep things quiet on the Palestinian front, a peace plan everyone could sign on to, a real face saver that called for going back to the status quo ante, 1967 version, accepting the existence of Israel moving on. But they didn't count on the radicals, who marked the adoption of the peace plan with the terror bombing in Netanya, a provocation so barbaric the Israelis had to respond. Now with Yasser Arafat surrounded in Ramallah and the IDF attempting to roll up the terror networks he had let flourish, the Palestinians are calling on their brother Arabs to show their solidarity and take concerted action.

American commentators are making much of the recent display of Arab unity — of course, it was an Arab summit, so what else do they expect? In fact, the Arab states do not have all that much in common. They have different histories, governments, cultures, economies, and national interests. The trick has always been for the Arab states is to pursue their interests without disturbing their various civic myths, i.e., the social bases for the legitimacy of their regimes. One of these civic myths is manifest opposition in one form or another to the state of Israel. It is an important, long-standing, and useful tradition. The myth has been very useful to regimes with shaky foundations — Israel is the permanent scapegoat and perfect distraction. Whatever goes wrong, Israel can be blamed. The "anti-Zionist" drumbeat in the press, in the mosques and in the schools endured for decades. Arab leaders flout it at their peril. Anwar Sadat did and paid with his life — killed by some of the same people we are currently fighting in the war on terror.

Unfortunately for the regimes, the masses that have been brought up on this hatred really believe it, and are starting to hold their governments accountable. This constitutes a serious threat to their survival. Some have been defter at handling it than others. The Jordanian monarchy took this to a high art by giving up its territorial claims to the West Bank, which rid it of a Palestinian population it didn't want and removed itself from the front line of the struggle, while simultaneously recognizing Israel and supporting the Palestinian Authority. It's almost enough to make a refugee forget the war King Hussein and Arafat fought back in 1970 when the PLO was trying to remove him from power.

Coupled with the threat to their legitimacy if the Arab states do not act against Israel is a nascent regional economic crisis. Rapid population growth and stagnating oil prices have significantly weakened the regional economies. Some countries are cutting back on social services that citizens had expected to enjoy gratis forever. When you add up a disgruntled population facing a serious gap between their expected and actual futures, plus regimes that cannot live up to the demands of their civic myths, the outlook is grim. The Saudi peace plan was an attempt to get ahead of the looming train wreck.

But the radicals know the scope of their power — they know they have influence that reaches beyond the governments that support them. They speak to the people. Osama bin Laden was an extreme case, a terrorist who openly advocated the overthrow of what he saw as corrupt, Western-influenced regimes. The Palestinian radicals, who have different objectives, have been subtler in playing this card. Witness for example the videotaped message of teenage supermarket suicide bomber Ayat Akhras, who shamed the Arab states for standing by while women do the dirty work. Colonel Jibril al-Rujub, head of Arafat's Preventive Security Department, was a little more explicit, stating that if the Arab leaders allowed Arafat to be harmed, "the entire regional stability will be disturbed. Thrones will fall and regimes will be changed." Hasan Asfur, Palestinian Authority Minister of Non-Governmental Organizations, was downright threatening. He told al Jazeera that any Arab state that kept silent would be considered part of the anti-Palestinian conspiracy. He warned President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan: "Do not wait for Yasser Arafat to be assassinated and then go to sleep peacefully in your homes. You will not be safe from the Palestinian blood wherever you might be and no matter what protection you might have. There is no protection for anyone if the symbol of the Arab dignity is harmed." For his part, Mubarak offered to fly Arafat to Egypt, but Arafat refused. It was a smart move by Mubarak, since it would have defused the crisis and even making the offer helps establish his bona fides with his restless and radicalized citizens.

So what can the Arab states do? They can make statements — surely, they must at least do that to placate the mob. They cannot send troops, at least openly. Arab arms do not have a good record of accomplishment against the Israelis, and a lost war would not bode well for internal stability. The petroleum producing states might consider using oil as a weapon, but they would do so at their peril. True, when OPEC first wielded petroleum strategically in 1973 to punish the United States for its support of Israel in the Yom Kippur War, it helped bring down a President. The oil shock of the late 70s contributed to the downfall of President Carter. Yet since then oil markets have broadened, and vast new oil fields have been discovered. The global market seems able to accommodate crises — the expected oil crunch attending the Gulf War never happened, and there was no gas shortage even when Kuwait's oil fields went up in flames. (Other aspects of the "Oil weapon" myth were addressed recently in NRO) Most importantly, the Arab states know that any attempt to influence the United States (and by extension Israel) using oil would strain their own economies to the breaking point — a point which is much closer today than it was 30 years ago.

So they cannot attack militarily; they have no realistic economic leverage; they can go on the diplomatic offensive, and are, but that will have limited impact on the ground. They can't press the crisis too far because they know their long-term interests lie in maintaining good relations with the United States, and they know that whatever happens Israel will still be there. So the best move is to stick to the agreed upon peace plan, condemn the violence and hope that Israel overplays its hand, the Sharon government falls, and Labor returns. On the other hand, perhaps the Americans will step in to try settling matters and returning the focus to Iraq. Either way the crisis will be defused, or so they hope.

Meanwhile the Palestinian radicals are assured a steady flow of arms and money from states in the region like Iran, Syria, and especially Iraq that have a strong interest in seeing that the situation stays in disarray. Hamas and the al Aqsa Brigades have already threatened to step up the tempo of their attacks, to engage in "unprecedented military actions in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem, and everywhere, which will be above anything Israelis can imagine." They claim to have hundreds of istishhad men and women (i.e., suicide bombers) ready to go. But if the IDF is effective in apprehending their leadership and the campaign winds down, if the Arab states don't respond in force, if the United States does not intervene but acquiesces to Israel's self-defense measures, how then to get things to boil over? One report had the "united leadership of the intifada in the territories" stating that "U.S. facilities, targets, and interests throughout the world should be harmed" because of U.S. support for Israel. Coincidentally, the indispensable al Jazeera network recently reported a similar statement allegedly from the fugitive Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Hey, it worked for him...

— By James S. Robbins, a national-security analyst & NRO contributor