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November 18, 2002, 8:45 a.m. How Afghanistan Was Won Woodward’s blockbuster!

o now we know the war in Afghanistan was not won with an innovative fusion of advanced technologies and transformational military tactics but was in fact the work of a 59-year-old CIA operative named Gary with a bag full of money. Who knew it would be that easy?

The story of the CIA "Jawbreaker" bribe squad broke over the weekend in a Washington Post front-page promotional press release for assistant managing editor Bob Woodward's new book Bush at War. (The author, Mike Allen, has already come under fire for conflict of interest in filing the story, since he is praised in the book's foreword. Of course, his Post piece was not a book review but a news story, though it does raise the question of what the news value of the piece was and why it was considered front-page material, a matter best explained by the Post's editors.) One might assume from the headline, "CIA's Cash Toppled Taliban," that the news content was the previously hidden role of bribery in defeating the Afghan regime. Spin-off reports picked up on the theme, and some ascribed more punch to the payoffs than others. For example, the AP story (which was widely reported and reprinted) ran under "Book: US Paid Off Afghan Warlords." The AP reporter noted "the ultimate defeat of the Taliban was due largely to millions of dollars in hundred-dollar bills the CIA handed out to Afghan warlords to win their support." Other news sources also credited the Afghan victory to Agent Gary and his men. The Boston Globe headlined, "Book Says US Bought Afghan Victory." And the London Observer won the hype prize with "How a Suitcase Full of Dollars Finished Off the Taliban."

But — ignoring the hyperbole for a minute — the fact that the Allies employed bribery as a means of wedging the Taliban from their less-ardent supporters is not news. Woodward may introduce some fresh details, but the fact that the U.S. engaged in the time-honored practice of paying off Afghan warlords was well known before Saturday. In fact, reports on this facet of Operation Enduring Freedom emerged almost as soon as the CIA and Special Operations Forces (SOF) teams hit the ground. For example, on October 6, 2001, the New York Post ran an article entitled "CIA $$$ Woos Warlords Away From Taliban." The Post, citing "senior U.S. officials," reported, "teams from the CIA's Directorate of Operations are engaging in a centuries-old practice of Afghan warfare in which an advancing army pays local warlords to switch allegiances. Sources say buying off the warlords, who control hundreds of fighters in key areas of Afghanistan now aligned with the Taliban, is a critical element in the Bush administration's plan." The Washington Post itself ran a piece four days later entitled, "CIA's Stealth War Centers on Eroding Taliban Loyalty and Aiding Opposition." In it a CIA veteran of Afghan operations stated, "Winning Pashtun defectors …will not be difficult for the CIA. 'These are rented relationships — if you have common grounds, common interests, you can do something for a few bucks.'" An article in the London Guardian on October 20 detailed the arrival and activities of the SOF psyops teams, the special-forces groups pursuing similar subversion missions against the Taliban's support network in the countryside. The November 4, 2001 London Observer ran a lengthy piece on the bribery topic that revealed that the CIA had been attempting to buy (or rent) the loyalties tribal leaders as early as April 2001 (that is, around six months before 9/11) and were "hampered by a lack of funds." And in its November 5, 2001 issue, Newsweek ran "Warlords: For Sale or Rent," a thorough 2700 word article on the U.S. bribery mission, which implied that our problem in Afghanistan was we were not paying off the warlords as effectively as we should be.

So the bribes per se are not news. But did they win the war? They certainly helped. The art of the bribe is essential to politics in Afghanistan. The Taliban rose to power in part by paying off local warlords to support them, either through cash grants funded by their supporters (among them Osama bin Laden) or giving monopoly rights to favored smuggling routes. They were not hard-core Muslim ideologues but local tribal rulers who used Taliban support to defeat rival claimants in their regions of influence. It was much easier to buy their support than fight them, and as Sun Tzu teaches, the most successful commanders are those who win battles without fighting them. So, when in Rome; the Allied bribery effort was multiculturalism in action. It demonstrated profound sensitivity to local ways of doing business. And, to quote the president, it was a "bargain," both in dollars and lives saved on both sides. The direct cash payments — estimated between $70 and $125 million — can be kept in context in comparison to the billions of dollars spent on the military side of the war, and the additional $850 million in humanitarian and reconstruction assistance since October 2001. In terms of lives saved, the bloodless surrenders of Kabul and Kandahar would have been impossible without Allied influence operations, and to this day the open checkbook of U.S. and Allied assistance keeps relative stability in Afghanistan.

Bribing warlords was never easy. They had to be convinced of a number of things, particularly that the side offering the payment was likely to be the victor. Arranging defections was not just a matter of buying warlords off the shelf. Complex, sometimes lengthy negotiations were involved. Initial bribes of tens of thousands of dollars were often presented by way of introduction along with satellite phones to facilitate negotiations. Sometimes the target warlords would turn the phones in to the Taliban and keep the money. Other times they would hit "dial" and negotiations would commence. The defection of pro-Taliban leader Nuridin Akhmadi to the Northern Alliance followed three months of talks, principally to ensure that he and his 1,000 men would not face retribution once they switched sides. Yet, sometimes bribery worked hand in hand with force, a variation of what is known in the trade as coercive diplomacy. In an example cited in Woodward's book, the CIA offered a Taliban commander $50,000 to defect. He asked for time to think it over. The Agency then arranged to have bombs dropped nearby, and returned offering only $40,000. He accepted. (Shades of Luca Brasi's role in the Johnny Fontane contract renegotiation — it was an offer the Taliban leader couldn't refuse.)

But it would be a mistake to credit the bribes with winning the war outright absent the pressure of armed force. The United States in no way "owned" the warlords — at best it was a highly restrictive leasing arrangement of indeterminate term and with no buyout option. The military assistance rendered the indigenous Afghan forces played the principle role in achieving the battlefield victories that the influence operations facilitated. Allied airpower, special operators, and ultimately ground troops guaranteed the victory over the Taliban. Furthermore, the overt use of military force represented the practical demonstration to those who accepted the bribes why continued cooperation with the Allied powers was in their best interest.

One fears that the president's critics might seize on this information as a means of challenging his success in the War on Terrorism, charging that he simply purchased the victory, as the Globe headline implies. If they think it was that easy, they might ask why it had not been done in a previous administration. A more constructive approach would be to frame the influence operations in Afghanistan in the broader context of using contracted forces in pursuit of U.S. national-security objectives generally. Don Snider of the United States Military Academy at West Point suggests that this "limited and focused effort" in Afghanistan is minor compared to the general drift towards subcontracting defense to private military companies. Furthermore, this is the type of warfare one will increasingly encounter in failed or rogue states in which central authorities are either absent or adversarial. Where factions exist it is foolish not to use them to one's advantage. If money decides the issue that only plays to our strengths.

Speaking of which: Is Gary available for Iraq?

— James S. Robbins is a national-security analyst & NRO contributor.