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Ilan
Berman A tour de force performance. The president's address to the United Nations struck exactly the right notes. First, it clearly articulated the case against Iraq Saddam Hussein's proven track record of oppression, his quest for weapons of mass destruction, his ongoing support for terrorism, and his continued defiance of international norms. It neatly encapsulated that the Iraqi regime is a "grave and gathering danger," not just to the United States but to the world at large. Second, it was a bold ultimatum to the international community. If Baghdad's broken promises remain unaddressed, no less then the credibility of the United Nations is at stake. And while America is prepared to work with the Security Council to end the Iraqi threat, it is not prepared to simply do nothing. A compelling reason, if ever there was one, for U.N. support.
Finally, it captured the essence of the Bush administration's larger vision for the Middle East a fundamental transformation of the region from dictatorship to democracy. Dealing with Iraq is the first step in that direction, and it is one we are willing to take alone. The world has been put on notice. Edwin
J. Feulner President Bush did more today than make a case for removing Saddam Hussein from power. He made a case for U.N. delegates to choose between good and evil. He declared that the world shouldn't be subject to the "will and wickedness" of dictators and that terrorists and other allies of Iraq were at "war against civilization." Saddam has flouted numerous U.N. resolutions and has created a regime that poses a "grave and gathering danger" to the rest of the world.
Like Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence, President Bush, in his speech before the United Nations General Assembly, has chosen to "submit facts to a candid world," detailing the repeated violations by Saddam Hussein of specific U.N. Security Council resolutions, as well as the terms of the 1991 cease-fire. This is in keeping with the advice proffered by people such as Henry Kissinger, who have urged the administration to make the case that any action against Iraq serves the general interest by recasting Hussein as a threat to international peace and security. From the tenor of his remarks, it seems clear that the president and his advisers hope to legitimize the use of force against Iraq without having to seek a new mandate, either from Congress or from the Security Council, on the grounds that the president is seeking to enforce existing and binding congressional and U.N. resolutions. Moreover, Bush has placed his opponents both domestic and international in an awkward position. Kofi Annan had declared only moments before that any state "committed to the rule of law at home" should also be committed to the "rule of law abroad." By citing the Secretary-General's own reports, the president illustrated Iraq's continuing lack of compliance. Advocates of international law and multilateral organizations must now choose whether to endorse U.S. action or Iraqi defiance. A note of caution, however. "The eyes of Argus are upon me," George Washington reportedly said upon assuming office, well aware that every act he undertook in office set precedents for the future. The president's enthusiasm that all U.N. resolutions vis-à-vis Iraq be implemented immediately, and without delay, may come back to haunt the United States, when presented with evidence of other mandates similarly left unenforced. Security Council Resolution 1244 calls for the return of all refugees to Kosovo and mandates the province remain a part of Yugoslavia. The administration should think very carefully about all the ramifications of assuming the mantle of the "enforcer" of U.N. resolutions. Tread carefully.
The idea that George W. Bush was going to the United Nations to "plead" a "case" should have evaporated almost as soon as he began speaking. Rather than pleading a case, Bush was putting the U.N. on notice. In effect, he turned the tables on his critics: instead of accepting the charge that American action would be illegitimate without U.N. sanction, he told the General Assembly that it would be putting the U.N.'s legitimacy at risk if they failed to act. In Bush's words, the U.N. will become "irrelevant," a stark (and proper) warning that future conflicts and dilemmas would be solved outside of the U.N.'s aegis if it comes to be perceived as nothing more than a dithery liberal coffee shop on the East Side, arguing the finer points of resolution-crafting while monsters like Hussein busy themselves making nuclear weapons. Bush also shifted the moral burden of action back onto the U.N., by hammering home the point that he's saying nothing that hasn't been said in U.N. resolutions for over a decade. At times, he seemed almost on the verge of hectoring the delegates, seemingly lecturing the hapless League of Nations rather than its successor. (Given the current level of debate in the U.N., it's not an unreasonable comparison, and Bush implied right at the outset of his speech that this is period in history with direct parallels to the days of appeasement before World War II.) There could have been a bit more specificity to some of the president's charges, but in the end, Bush rightly took the tone that the case against Iraq is obvious and doesn't need a lot more legal wordsmithing. Bush rightly noted that Hussein has "made the case against himself," and that nothing any Western government could add would tip the scale of a judgment that is already manifest. There will no doubt be some crowing that this is a victory for the go-slow types like Colin Powell, but nothing in the president's speech limited American options. Indeed, at the end of the speech, Bush reinforced the American commitment to go after Hussein, one way or another, noting that there is "no limit" to Iraq's ambitions, and that the U.S. will not wait for Iraq to give nuclear weapons to terrorist "allies" before it acts. His pledge to "work with" the Security Council might reassure some who are hoping that the U.N. can abort the removal of Hussein, but even that small concession is little more than a warning, again, that the U.N. has one last chance in the face of a "grave and gathering danger" to get on the right side of history.
The president's diplomatic approach is both innovative and refreshing. The president is approaching the U.N. not cap in hand to ask permission to take action, but as an unsatisfied major stockholder demanding the company do its job. The U.N. has itself laid out the requirements and conditions with which Iraq must comply on weapons of mass murder (WMM), and Iraq has flouted them. If the U.N. will not step up to the plate and enforce its own edicts against this rogue state, the United States and its coalition partners will be forced to. (See this piece from last November has it been that long?) Utilize Security Council Resolutions 1194 and Security Council Resolutions 1205 from September and November 1998 to force the issue. Be creative about interpreting Security Council Resolution 687 (under which Iraq must "unconditionally accept" the elimination of its missiles and WMMs), and adopt a more aggressive posture in executing the process. If Iraq denies entrance to inspectors and we suspect a site, bomb it. This action is provided for in paragraph 12 of the resolution which calls for the "destruction, removing or rendering harmless as appropriate" these weapons. Bombing them is as certain as any other method, and it may have the beneficial effect of facilitating future inspections. Overall, force the U.N. to come to grips with the disconnect between the mandate of its charter, the resolutions of the Security Council, and the facts on the ground. The U.N. has a chance to make itself useful. If not, it should get out of the way. |
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