NRO Weekend, September 23-24, 2000
Shots in the Dark
Bellesiles Arming America is novel in both senses.

By Clayton E. Cramer, author of Concealed Weapon Laws of the Early Republic

Arming America: The Origins of a National Gun Culture , by Michael A. Bellesile (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 578 pp. $30.

rofessor Bellesiles of Emory University has provided a novel work in his Arming America. It is novel in both senses: much of it is certainly "new," and much of it is highly imaginative fiction. The book discards many long-cherished myths of early America about violence, guns, and the militia, and in doing so Bellesiles presents some astonishing revisionist perspectives on early America that will startle most Americans. Many historians will probably react to the claims in Arming America in the same way that I did: first intrigued, then amazed, then perplexed, and finally, infuriated.

First, and least controversial (at least to historians), is Bellesiles's portrayal of the ineffectiveness of the militia in American history. Many Americans have grown up with a vision of Minutemen, running out the door, Kentucky long rifle in hand, to take on them "Redcoats." (Think Mel Gibson in The Patriot — a fine film, but about as accurate as something Oliver Stone might produce.) Historians have recognized for at least 40 years that for every success of the "citizen soldier" in defending home and nation, there were far more examples of militias turning tail in battle, or simply leaving for home, because harvest time had come.

But even on this point, Bellesiles will not settle for the disappointing reality of the militia in American history; he has to blacken their reputation, and by implication, the notion that armed civilians could have any real military value. But the ineffectiveness of the militia is really a sideshow in Bellesiles's book. The truly novel aspect of Arming America is Bellesiles's claims that guns were scarce in America until nearly the Civil War.

Why were guns scarce? Because not only were guns expensive, but also because, "the majority of American men did not care about guns. They were indifferent to owning guns, and they had no apparent interest in learning how to use them" (p. 295). Marksmanship was extraordinarily poor, and large numbers of adult men had no idea how to load a gun, or how to fire one.

To hear Bellesiles tell it, this lack of both interest and knowledge reflected the fundamentally peaceful nature of early America (pp. 314-15), and that hunting was almost unknown until the mid-1830s, when a small number of wealthy Americans chose to ape their upper-lass British counterparts (pp. 320-23). Indeed, Professor Bellesiles would have us believe that by the 1830s, a pacifist movement, fiercely hostile not only to gun ownership, but also to a military and hunting of any form, was becoming a major influence on American society (pp. 300-1). And then the nasty government stepped in and finally persuaded Americans that they really wanted guns!

When Bellesiles first presented these ideas in a Journal of American History article in 1996, I was starting research on a related question: why did eight slave states take the lead in the development of concealed-weapon regulation in the period 1813-1840? Bellesiles's claim that guns had been rare in America until the Mexican War was certainly an intriguing concept. It might explain why so many of these laws regulating the carrying of deadly weapons (including handguns) appear at a time that Bellesiles claims America was changing from a peaceful, gentle, and almost-unarmed nation into a land of violent gun-owning hunters.

As I researched my topic, it became apparent that Bellesiles was wrong — way wrong. The traditional view of early America, as a place where guns and hunting were common, appeared repeatedly in travel accounts, memoirs, and diaries. I at first assumed that Bellesiles was simply mistaken — that his choice of sources had been atypical, or that in his zeal to confirm a novel hypothesis, he had simply misread his sources. Unfortunately, novelty is, at times, of more value in the academic community than accuracy. Who wants to listen to a paper that confirms what is already conventional wisdom? The iconoclast is always more interesting!

Having now read Bellesiles's book-length treatment of his ideas, and checked his sources with great care, I am sorry to report that what is wrong here is a lot more serious than atypical sources, or even excessive zeal defending a mistaken hypothesis. Generally, the errors in Arming America can be divided into the following categories: out of context quotes; using sources that confirm his thesis, while ignoring sources that contradict his thesis; and intentional deception.

I am not suggesting that Bellesiles simply missed sources that might have contradicted his claims of an America with few guns and little hunting. Indeed, most of the examples here of selective use of sources use Bellesiles's own citations — so I know that he read these documents. His use of the sources is so biased that one is hard pressed to take seriously any claim that he considered both sides of his argument. As an example, Bellesiles quotes Washington, concerning the 1756 emergency call-up of the Virginia militia:

Colonel Washington reported on the militia to Governor Dinwiddie: "Many of them [are] unarmed, and all without ammunition or provision." In one company of more than seventy men, he reported, only twenty-five had any sort of firearms. Washington found such militia "incapacitated to defend themselves, much less to annoy the enemy." (p. 159)

But when you examine what Washington actually wrote in that letter, you find that Bellesiles has misquoted Washington in a way that suggests that Washington's statement was the general state of the militia. Washington is clearly referring to only some militia units:

I think myself under the necessity of informing your Honor, of the odd behaviour of the few Militia that were marched hither from Fairfax, Culpeper, and Prince William counties. Many of them unarmed, and all without ammunition or provision. Those of Culpeper behaved particularly ill: Out of the hundred that were draughted, seventy-odd arrived here; of which only twenty-five were tolerably armed.

Washington considered the militia arriving inadequately armed to be "odd behaviour," and worthy of note. The implication is thus that militia arriving from other counties were adequately armed, and brought ammunition with them.

I proposed to the unarm'd, that as they came from home (at least with a shew) of serving their country; and as they were, from the want of arms, incapacitated to defend themselves, much less to annoy the enemy, or afford any protection to the Inhabitants; that they shou'd (during their short stay here) assist in forwarding the public works; for which I offered them 6d. per day extraordinary. But they were deaf to this and every other proposition which had any tendency to the interest of the Service.

As such a conduct is not only a flagrant breach of the law, and a total contempt of Orders, but will be such a precedent (shou'd it pass with impunity) as may be productive of the most dreadful consequences. I therefore flatter myself, your Honor will take proper notice of these men. I have written to their County Lieutenant on this subject.

Washington sought to have these men punished, strongly suggesting that their behavior — arriving inadequately armed, without ammunition, unable to fight, and unwilling to serve on public works — was exceptional, not typical.

Bellesiles claims that, "Massachusetts conducted a very thorough census of arms, finding that there were 21,549 guns in the province of some 250,000 people. General Gage succeeded in capturing or expropriating 1,778 of these in the immediate aftermath of the Concord campaign." (p. 180)

Bellesiles's source for this claim is an inventory of "Warlike Stores in Massachusetts, 1774" contained in Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts in 1774 and 1775. But when you examine the inventory, dated April 14, 1775, there is nothing that tells what categories of firearms and ammunition are being counted. Certainly, it includes stockpiles owned by towns. But does it include all privately owned arms as well? Bellesiles certainly thinks so.

The only mention of the census that I can find is a note of February 13, 1775, that orders a committee to inquire "into the state of the militia, their numbers and equipments, and recommending to the selectmen of the several towns and districts in this province, to make return of their town and district stocks of ammunition and warlike stores to this Congress." This by itself seems to imply that only militia members and publicly owned weapons were being inventoried.

Reading pages indexed under "fire-arms" suggests that firearms were plentiful, and that the inventory that Bellesiles represents as including all privately-owned firearms included only arms of militiamen and those stockpiled by the towns. An entry for October 27, 1774 directs inhabitants of Massachusetts to be "properly and effectually armed and equipped" and that "if any of the inhabitants are not provided with arms and ammunition according to law, and that, if any town or district within the province, is not provided with the full town stock of arms and ammunition, according to law, that the selectmen of such town or district take effectual care, without delay, to provide the same." A committee appointed to examine the problem of soldiers who lacked firearms reported on May 9, 1775:

Whereas, a few of the inhabitants of this colony, who are enlisted into its servicen, are destitute of fire arms, bayonets, and other accoutrements;

Resolved, That the selectmen of the several towns and districts in this colony be, and hereby are, directed and empowered to examine into the state of the equipment of such inhabitants of their respective towns and districts as are, or may be, enlisted into the service of this colony, and where any are deficient in arms or accoutrements, as aforesaid, it is recommended to the selectmen to supply them out of the town stock, and in case of a deficiency there, to apply to such inhabitants of their respective towns and districts as, in their opinions, can best spare their arms or accoutrements, and to borrow or purchase the same for the use of said inhabitants so enlisted: and the selectmen are also directed to take a bill from such persons as shall sell their arms and accoutrements, in the name of this colony….

If the Revolutionary government of Massachusetts was desperately short of arms for its soldiers, one would expect them to have used their power of eminent domain to obtain privately owned firearms. Instead, the private owners were told, "[I]t is strongly recommended to such inhabitants…, that they supply the colony with same." A request of June 15, 1775 for individuals to sell their arms is phrased in terms that seem quite voluntary. "Resolved, that any person or persons, who may have such to sell, shall receive so much for them, as the selectmen of the town or district in which or they may dwell, shall appraise such arms at…."

As the war continued, there were again discussions of the need to arm those soldiers "who are destitute of arms," but there is no indication that this was a problem of great concern. Indeed, if there was a serious shortage of firearms or ammunition for the militia, and firearms were rare among the general population, it seems strange that the Provincial Congress on June 17, 1775 recommended to non-militia members "living on the sea coasts, or within twenty miles of them, that they carry their arms and ammunition with them to meeting on the sabbath, and other days when they meet for public worship."

There are records of guns, "fire-arms," and "small arms" purchased from private parties by the Provincial Congress — and the appraisal values do not suggest great scarcity. The average price of these weapons comes to just under £2. Perhaps some of these "small arms" were actually pikes or swords, but assuming that only transactions labeled "fire-arms" or "guns" are such, and none of the "small arms" are guns, still shows an average price of £2 5 s. — not a trivial amount of money for the time, but about the same as a sergeant's monthly wages in the Massachusetts army.

EDITOR'S NOTE: A more detailed critique of the Bellesiles's claims, including other diaries, travel accounts, and statistical evidence, can be found here.