Terrorist Rights?
The case of the 20th hijacker.

October 25, 2001 8:55 a.m.

 

ust what, exactly, are Zacarias Moussaoui's constitutional rights? The 34-year old French Moroccan is sometimes referred to as the 20th Hijacker, because it appears he was part of the group that carried out the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. But Moussaoui might be better known as the Stupid Hijacker, since he was picked up by authorities a month before the attacks when he raised suspicions at a flight school by openly declaring his desire to learn to fly — but not to take off or land — a commercial jet.

Now Moussaoui sits behind bars somewhere in New York. The Justice Department will not comment on his case, but he is said to be refusing to cooperate with authorities investigating the terrorist attacks. It appears that Moussaoui, who was originally detained in Minnesota on immigration charges, is being held as a material witness in the events of September 11. "A person who is arrested pursuant to a material witness warrant is presented to a judge, entitled to have counsel appointed, and is detained only if the judge decides he is a flight risk," says Susan Dryden, a Justice Department spokeswoman. "All material witnesses have been presented before a judge and represented by counsel."

Now the question is what to do with Moussaoui. In dealing with him and other alleged terrorists, the government has two main options: conventional and unconventional.

If the government chooses the conventional route, law-enforcement authorities could charge Moussaoui with a crime if there's enough evidence to establish that he was a co-conspirator in the September 11 attacks. He could then be kept in jail under pretrial detention laws, but the government would have a legal obligation to give him a speedy trial — and make at least some of its evidence public. Another possibility is that the government could continue to hold Moussaoui without bond as a material witness even if he is not charged with a crime. That could go on for a very long time — long enough for prosecutors to place his actions in the context of new information that might be discovered in the course of the war on terrorism. A third possibility is that prosecutors could take action against Moussaoui on immigration charges.

But each of those choices leads to a question: Is the purpose of prosecuting Moussaoui to punish him or to get information out of him? It's not really an either/or issue, but prosecutors will have to base their strategy on the likelihood of learning anything of value from Moussaoui. "My experience is that terrorist cells operate on a need-to-know basis," says Michael Wildes, a former prosecutor and immigration lawyer who represented Hani al-Sayegh, a Hezbollah member suspected in the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers barracks in Saudi Arabia. "It's likely that he may not be able to tie others to more impressive information, but only the intelligence and law enforcement agencies can make that decision."

If the government believes that Moussaoui does indeed have valuable information, another option would be to send him to some nation that is friendly to the United States but unfriendly to terrorists. There, Moussaoui — without the rights he has in the U.S. — could face torture and other rough handling designed to coerce him to tell authorities what he knows. If American officials choose that option, they might not even have to follow through on the plan. "Sometimes just the threat of that will encourage people to cooperate here in the United States, where they are likely to keep all of their limbs when they are interrogated," says Joseph diGenova, a former U.S. Attorney in Washington. The problem is that if Moussaoui stays silent and is deported, there are no guarantees the cooperating government will actually get information out of him.

Those are the conventional options. The unconventional choice is to take terrorist cases out of the civilian justice system altogether. The government could create some sort of new — and semi-secret — judicial body to handle cases like Moussaoui's. In that scenario, a military war-crimes commission or other specially created court would try alleged terrorists in a way that would protect U.S. intelligence secrets. It's an idea that is receiving serious consideration. "This does not belong in a courtroom," says Michael Wildes. "This was an act of war."

Such actions are not without precedent. These days a number of experts are discussing a case from World War II in which eight Germans were captured after entering the United States with plans to commit terrorist acts. They were tried by a special military commission set up by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and six of them were executed in short order. The president still has such extensive, if vaguely defined, powers to hold and try suspects for national security reasons. "The outer limits of presidential power to sequester individuals who are a threat to the United States are as yet undefined," says diGenova.

It's not clear if any of those measures will be used in case of Moussaoui and other suspects now being held in the United States. But the national security implications and problems involved suggest that officials should try to make sure that there are as few as possible new cases in the future. President Bush has made it clear he wants Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda associates "dead or alive." As a practical matter, the United States would be much better off if it is the former, and not the latter.

 
 

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