Enron, Round One
Why the White House should tell everything about Enron.

January 10, 2002 9:15 a.m.

t's a headline to warm a Democrat's heart: A Justice Department task force been formed to conduct a criminal investigation of a company that was one of George W. Bush's biggest political supporters. The probe of the collapse of Enron might well warm Democratic hearts for months to come; the investigation will undoubtedly go on for a long time, and some well-informed observers suspect it will find evidence of misconduct — perhaps of the prosecutable kind, perhaps not — inside the giant energy corporation. And even though there is no suggestion of any wrongdoing on the part of anyone in the administration, Democrats will remind the public on a daily basis that the head of Enron, Kenneth Lay, is a big, big George W. Bush booster, as are other top company executives.

Even as the Justice Department investigation gets underway, a single congressman, operating without the authority of any committee, has already made a few headlines from the Enron story. Last month, California Democratic Rep. Henry Waxman, ranking minority member on the House Government Reform Committee, sent a letter to Vice President Dick Cheney asking about meetings between representatives of Enron and members of Cheney's National Energy Policy Development Group. In particular, Waxman wanted to know whether the Enron representatives shared "information about [the company's] precarious financial position."

Writing back last Friday, Cheney counsel David Addington revealed, for the first time, that there were five meetings last year between Enron representatives and policy group staff members. In addition, there was one face-to-face meeting between Cheney and Lay (which Cheney discussed in a television interview last May).

Three of the staff meetings occurred while Cheney's group was actually working on the administration's energy policy statement. According to Addington, two meetings, one in February 2001 and the other in March, involved only Enron staffers. The third meeting, in April, involved about two dozen people from several utilities, including Enron. In addition, in August 2001, after the release of the energy policy, staff members met once with representatives of a German subsidiary of Enron. In October, staff had one final meeting with Enron officials. "None of these meetings included discussion of the financial position of the Enron Corporation," Addington wrote.

Cheney no doubt released the new information with the full knowledge that it would only leave Waxman demanding more. Sure enough, the day after receiving Addington's letter, Waxman wrote to Cheney again. "Your response...raises additional questions about the extent to which Enron may have influenced the Administration's energy policies or provided information about its own operations," the congressman wrote.

Waxman said Addington's letter "shows that the access provided to Enron far exceeded the access provided by the White House to other parties interested in energy policy." Waxman also broadened his request for information to include "the subjects discussed at the meetings, any requests for changes in federal policies made by Enron executives at the meetings, copies of any documents presented or discussed at the meetings, and the names of persons attending the meetings."

Finally, Waxman complained that Addington's letter "does not address whether White House officials had other 'contacts' with Enron, such as telephone conversations or e-mail communications," nor does it cover "any meetings or contacts that Enron may have had with White House officials who were not part of the energy task force, whether on energy-related issues or other matters." "I hope you realize the inadequacies of Mr. Addington's letter," Waxman concluded. "I urge you to provide a full accounting."

Waxman has no power to do anything beyond urge Cheney to respond. As the ranking minority member of the House Government Reform Committee, he cannot issue subpoenas or begin an investigation. So far, committee chairman Dan Burton has shown no interest in joining in any requests for Enron information, which means that Waxman will have to continue freelancing, at least for the time being. (The real Capitol Hill investigations will come in the Senate, where Democrats control committees and the subpoena process.)

Still, Waxman's inquiries have prompted Cheney to release information that he had been reluctant to divulge in the past. Last summer, when Waxman demanded to know the names of people who had consulted with the energy task force, Cheney refused, just as he also refused a similar request from the General Accounting Office. At the time, the vice president's aides said Cheney believed revealing the names would make outsiders reluctant to offer confidential advice in the future. "People will not engage us in candor" if they knew their advice would appear in the newspapers, a Cheney aide told National Review last year. "We would be chilling the process in the future."

Now, while Cheney still has not released the names, he has revealed the number and dates of Enron meetings, and, given congressional interest in the subject, it seems likely that he will release more information in the future. All of which suggests that the vice president should have revealed the energy information last year. Most observers believed it was going to come out some time; had Cheney released it then, it would have been done in the interests of open government. Now, it is being done in the context of a criminal investigation of a major administration supporter.

In addition, the present clamor suggests that if the White House has anything — anything — it feels it should reveal about dealings with Enron, it should do so now. That doesn't mean giving in to Waxman, who not only has no committee power but also has no grounds to make demands after years of stonewalling investigations of possibly criminal wrongdoing in the Clinton administration (not just by supporters of the administration, but by administration officials themselves). Rather, the White House might ask Burton or some other House committee chairman to make a formal request for information, which the White House could then supply in its response. All through the proper channels. In the months to come, the administration's enemies will certainly demand more and more disclosure; the White House might as well use its friends to get it done.