Critics have often lambasted the Bush administration for what they see as its divisive and unilateralist approach to the war on terror. But recent developments demonstrate that, while the U.S. may not enjoy widespread global support for its efforts in Iraq, it has managed to gain the support of an ally whose importance cannot be overstated. In fact, few have recognized the remarkable level of cooperation the U.S. has been able to establish with Pakistan since 9/11.
Recently, U.S. counterterrorism agents worked closely with their Pakistani counterparts to nab embassy-bombing suspect Ahmed Ghailani and al Qaeda computer whiz Mohammed Noor Khan. Khan’s arrest enabled authorities to crack a cell operating in Britain that allegedly planned to target the northeastern U.S., possibly in the lead-up to the November elections. Pakistan has also captured and turned over to the U.S. al Qaeda leaders Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, Ramzi Binalshibh, and Abu Zubaydah. In total, Pakistan has arrested over 500 al Qaeda and Taliban members since 9/11.
This achievement is even more noteworthy given Pakistan’s recent history of support for terrorism. With its army and intelligence services largely sympathetic to Islamic extremists, Pakistan emerged as the primary sponsor of the Taliban during the late 1990s; for years, the powerful Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency also trained and supported thousands of terrorists who fought against the Indian army in Kashmir. In 1998, according to the recently released 9/11 Commission Report, the State Department’s acting counterterrorism coordinator even advised Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to designate Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism.
In fact, Pakistan’s military intelligence service was training Kashmiri terrorists at one of the al Qaeda camps hit by U.S. cruise missiles following the August 1998 embassy bombings in Africa. Although Pakistanis died in that strike, there was speculation in Washington that a Pakistani official may have tipped off Osama bin Laden or the Taliban after receiving forewarning from the U.S. that missiles would be traveling through its airspace. Fear of Pakistani leaks also led former counterterrorism czar Richard Clarke to oppose a U-2 surveillance flight over Afghanistan that was intended to expand U.S. intelligence coverage. As the 9/11 Report notes, Clarke wrote that “Pak[istan’s] intel[ligence service] is in bed with [bin Laden]” and would warn him about an impending bombing campaign.
This side of Pakistan’s intelligence service was further revealed in October 2001, when the head of the ISI, Lt. Gen. Mahmud Ahmed, was forced to step down after he was tied to Omar Sheikh, who had wired $100,000 to lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta (and who would later be implicated in the murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl). Additionally, according to a May 2002 Time article that quotes an ex-Taliban official, Ahmed disobeyed orders to pressure Taliban leader Mullah Omar to turn over bin Laden during a September 17, 2001, visit to Kandahar, instead urging Omar to fight U.S. forces.
But in the months following 9/11, Pakistan changed course dramatically, as President Pervez Musharraf launched an aggressive campaign to combat Islamic extremists. Notably, he appointed his close friend General Ehsan ul-Haq to head the ISI in order to Westernize and reform the powerful intelligence agency. And for the first time since the country’s creation in 1947, Pakistani troops have entered the autonomous tribal areas of Waziristan, suffering heavy casualties while hunting for Taliban and al Qaeda operatives. Musharraf has also tried to spearhead a reformation of the Muslim world. Writing in the Washington Post in June 2004, he urged Muslims “to drag ourselves out of the pit we find ourselves in, to raise ourselves up by individual achievement and collective socioeconomic emancipation.”
This major shift was undoubtedly motivated by self-preservation, following a number of assassination attempts on Musharraf by Islamic extremists. But the U.S. has also been able to put strategic pressure on Pakistan with a combination of sticks and carrots: While threatening to make Pakistan an international pariah if it did not join in the fight against terrorism, the Bush administration also offered extensive economic and military aid. For a country mired in poverty and desperate to keep pace with India in their arms race, the prospect of these aid packages has proved highly tantalizing.
And as Pakistan has responded favorably and showed signs of tangible cooperation, the U.S. has moved to tender handsome rewards. Most significantly, in June, the U.S. designated Pakistan as a “major non-NATO ally,” a status that allows for closer military cooperation between the two countries and allows Pakistan to acquire American arms. Moreover, the U.S. has already approved a $3 billion aid package for Pakistan that includes military assistance.
While there have certainly been considerable hiccups, most notably the revelation of a nuclear black market run by Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, the U.S. has continued to cultivate stronger ties with Pakistan. Aware that Realpolitik dictates close alliances with non-democratic nations of traditionally questionable virtue (see: Saudi Arabia), the U.S. hopes to use its relationship with Pakistan as a model for future successes in the war on terror.
–Lorenzo Vidino and Josh Lefkowitz are terrorism analysts at the Investigative Project, a Washington, D.C.-based counterterrorism research center.