In early October, just days after the Syrian leadership had reportedly promised a U.S. delegation to Damascus that it would cooperate with U.S. troops in controlling the Iraq-Syria border, President Bashar al-Assad delivered a confrontational speech criticizing U.S. efforts to force Syria from Lebanon, calling them blatant meddling in Lebanese affairs and saying they could push the Middle East toward greater chaos.
Against this backdrop, the Washington Post reported on December 8 that “US military intelligence officials have concluded that the Iraqi insurgency is being directed to a greater degree than previously recognized from Syria where they said former Saddam Hussein loyalists have found sanctuary and are channeling money and other support to those fighting the established government.” Apparently, the Syrian leadership still thinks it can weather U.S. and world pressure by hedging its diplomacy. In fact, Syria is at a crossroads. The time is now ripe for the U.S. to articulate a strategy that would prod Damascus to end its double-standard attitudes while at the same time assisting the country in finding alternatives to its policies.
A STRAINED RELATIONSHIP
America’s war on terrorism cast a scrutinizing light on Syria and Hezbollah, the Lebanese Islamist party. Syria condemned the September 11 attacks on the U.S. and offered its help in the war. Indeed, Damascus helped save American lives by assisting in foiling terror attacks on U.S. troops and interests in Bahrain and Ottawa.
Since the run-up to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, however, the U.S.-Syrian relationship has come under significant stress, largely because Damascus opposed the Bush administration’s efforts to dislodge Saddam Hussein. This tension intensified during the U.S. invasion following intelligence reports that Syria had provided Iraq with military equipment, given safe haven to senior Iraqi officials, and allowed jihadists to cross the border into Iraq. Testifying before Congress in September 2003, John Bolton, the undersecretary of State for arms control and international security, said, “Syria permitted volunteers to pass into Iraq to attack and kill our service members during the war, and is still doing so. Syria continues to provide safe haven and political cover to Hizballah in Lebanon, which has killed hundreds of Americans in the past.”
Although Syria denied these allegations, Damascus and Washington have set themselves on a collision course over terrorism and Iraq. Frustrated by Damascus’s lack of cooperation, the Bush administration dropped its reservations against punishing Syria. Punishment came in the form of the 2003 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Act, which calls on Syria to stop its “support for terrorism, end its occupation of Lebanon, [and] stop its development of weapons of mass destruction…”
Ironically, where Assad senior had sacrificed Arab nationalism at the altar of Syria’s national interests in general and regime security in particular, the young Assad has advanced Arab nationalism with the objective of countering U.S. plans in the region. Why has the Syrian leadership staked out this position? Apparently, it is concerned about future U.S. plans in the Middle East, particularly Washington’s enforcing a Pax Americana at Syria’s expense. This perception is buttressed by the fact that the idea of a regime change in Syria has been circulating in some neoconservative circles in Washington. In an interview with the Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Anbaa, Assad said that “targeting Syria has preceded the war, and this is why we knew there will be threats after the war.”
BASHAR’S BURDENS
On a closer look, however, this Syrian position has stemmed no less from the country’s inability to articulate a strategy to meet regional and internal challenges. The Syrian leadership perceives that the security and survival of the regime is related no less to keeping a check on political and economic changes in Syria–and on political developments in Lebanon–than in Iraq, where it finds itself at the mercy of the only world superpower.
Damascus is facing several immediate intertwined concerns, blurring the lines between domestic and foreign affairs. Since his inauguration speech, in which he promised modernization and reform, Assad has been struggling with a reform movement growing bolder by the day. That movement is upset with the regime’s selective and inconsistent policies, which are geared toward regulating the economy. In fact, the regime has satisfied none of the reformers’ demands, which include revocation of martial law and security trials, and freedom of opinion and assembly. Instead, the regime has arrested a number of outspoken reformers, including parliamentarians Riad Seif and Mamoun Homsi and human-rights activist Aktham Nuaissi.
Burdened with a large public sector and high inflation and unemployment, the regime is trying to fix the system without breaking it. It is trying to copy the Chinese model by introducing some free-market policies that could promote growth without endangering the system itself. The economy is high on Assad’s agenda, especially in light of the decline in profits from illegal Iraqi oil sales–that is, sales from Saddam’s regime through Syria, against U.N. resolutions and the oil-for-food program–since the U.S. occupation of Iraq. Moreover, the Lebanese economy, which functions as a patronage system to reward regime’s loyalists, has sunken into deep economic crisis.
Finally, Bashar seems to be trying to widen the circle of loyalists in the regime. A recent reshuffling of the government that included the appointment of Ghazi Kenaan–former intelligence chief in Lebanon–as interior minister indicates that Bashar is trying to strengthen his grip on power.
FLAWED INTELLIGENCE
The Syrian regime knows deep down that change is inevitable. As a result it has been hedging its diplomacy by attempting to reconcile incompatible policies. Its cooperation with Washington on al Qaeda has been markedly offset by lack of cooperation with the U.S. on Iraq and Hezbollah. This equivocal position has caught up with the Syrians. The Bush administration imposed sanctions on Syria and found in France an ally to pressure Damascus to withdraw from Lebanon and disband Hezbollah’s militia. Thanks to their coordination, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1559, which called on all remaining foreign forces to withdraw from Lebanon, insisted on the disbanding of Lebanese militias, and declared support for a free and fair presidential election. Damascus could no longer escape the gaze of the world community. Even Arab countries such as those of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) urged Syria to respect the resolution.
Still, Damascus made a big mistake by directing its loyalists in Lebanon to extend for three years the term of its ally, President Emile Lahoud, in the face of almost universal Lebanese opposition. Apparently, the Syrians chose stability above all by keeping Lahoud. Sticking to their old strategy, they wanted an ally in Lebanon who could withstand international pressure by insisting on the resistance role of Hezbollah and “special relations” with Syria. In addition, Damascus would maintain its strategic cooperation with Iran by keeping the Iran-Damascus-Hezbollah axis as an option against growing Israeli and American warnings about Tehran’s nuclear plans.
However, what the Syrians have so far failed to realize is that since the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon in the summer of 2000 the political dynamics of the country have changed and, by extension, the Lebanese-Hezbollah strategy has outlived its purpose. It is no coincidence that many Lebanese, including Syrian allies, opposed the extension of Lahoud’s term. Significantly, Walid Jumblat, leader of the Druze community, has been vocal in his opposition to amending the Lebanese constitution and extending the president’s term. In the meantime, Marwan Hamade, a member of parliament and Jumblat’s National Struggle Front narrowly escaped a recent assassination attempt. Even the most ardent of Syrian supporters knew that Syrian intelligence, in coordination with that of Lebanon, was behind the attempt. The Syrian record is long on the alleged assassinations of prominent Lebanese political figures, including the Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt in 1976, President-elect Bashir Jumayil in 1982, and President Rene Mouawad in 1989.
Following an outpouring of Lebanese condemnation of the assassination attempt, Hamade received a visit from Rustum Ghazale, Syrian intelligence chief to Lebanon, and Lebanon’s public prosecutor Adnan Addoum. This signaled the confusion of Syrian intelligence in Lebanon as well as the breakdown of taboos buttressing Syrian power. It was under these circumstances that Kenaan, the master of balance-of-power politics in Lebanon, was appointed interior minister. His appointment, along with that of some other Bashar loyalists (including Lahoud and Omar Karame as Lebanon’s prime minister) indicates that the Syrian regime is entrenching itself to better control domestic affairs in both Lebanon and Syria.
But Syria is in for hard times. Unlike in the past, Damascus is now under the spotlight of the U.N. Relying on U.N. support, the opposition may well swell its ranks and trigger a domestic recrimination of Lahoud that could force him out of power and bring down the Syrian order in Lebanon.
WANTED: A STRATEGY
On the surface, it is against this background that the Syrian regime is considering helping U.S. troops in Iraq to control the Syria-Iraq border. On a deeper level, however, Damascus (along with Tehran) would not like to see Iraq emerge as a bridgehead for a Pax Americana in the region. It would prefer to see the U.S. fail and even humiliate itself in Iraq. By directly or indirectly helping the insurgency, Damascus believes it can “kill two birds with one stone”–undermining American efforts in Iraq while highlighting its importance in pacifying the country.
But Washington would be wrong to think that the Syrian regime is looking only for a quid pro quo: helping the U.S. in Iraq so that Washington will reduce its pressure through the U.N. on Syria’s presence and support for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Damascus urgently needs to trade with Iraq and resume sales of Iraqi oil. In fact, following the visit by Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi to Syria in late July 2004, the two countries agreed not only to form joint committees to control the border but also to promote trade between them, which has been gradually rising since.
Washington is at critical juncture with its relations with Syria, which may further affect Washington’s policies in Iraq. Washington must capitalize on the current situation and articulate a Syria strategy, recognizing that the Syrian regime will have to revert to its pragmatist approach in order to survive internal and regional challenges. Washington cannot promote democracy in Iraq and turn a blind eye to democracy in Lebanon. Washington must remain adamant about Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. Meanwhile, Washington should make it clear to Damascus that its genuine cooperation with the U.S. to control the Iraq-Syria border would entail American help in supporting the creation of a significant trade zone between Iraq and Syria, including reopening the oil pipeline between the two countries. At the same time, Washington should put a stop to all talks about removing the Baathist regime in Syria, because they are absurd and counterproductive under the current circumstances in Iraq. Progress on the Lebanese and Iraqi tracks should also pave the way for renewed peace talks with Israel regarding the Golan Heights.
The ball is in Syria’s court. Its cooperation will be rewarded. Otherwise, the Syrian regime, under the scrutiny of the world community, will have no other choice but to gradually wither under the weight of its blunders, confusion, and despotic ways.
–Walid Phares is a senior fellow with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington, D.C. Robert Rabil is a visiting professor of political science at Florida Atlantic University. He is the author of Embattled Neighbors: Syria, Israel and Lebanon.