That means standing up for Ukraine with strength and decisiveness.
That means standing up for Ukraine with strength and decisiveness.
A n emerging group on the right doesn’t think NATO is worth maintaining, and certainly doesn’t think we should go to bat for Ukraine, a non-NATO country.
In his most recent Wall Street Journal column, Gerard Baker wrote about this view:
Trumpian acolytes, neoisolationist lawmakers and an emerging breed of “national conservative” ideologues are coalescing in an unlikely antiwar front of “Not in My Name” protest, urging U.S. restraint toward Russian aggression in Eastern Europe.
Isolationists are using the Ukraine crisis and its threat to NATO as a chance to highlight their strategic vision for U.S. foreign policy. Their belief is that the U.S. has little to no national-security interests in preventing an invasion of Ukraine and that if we do not have a contractual obligation to protect an ally and promote democracy, we should not do so.
On February 2, President Biden approved the deployment of 2,000 troops to Poland and Germany and another 1,000 troops to Romania. Yesterday, Biden affirmed the U.S. commitment to NATO and promised “to defend every inch of NATO,” saying that “our commitment to Article 5 is sacrosanct.” He reiterated his promise to enact “powerful sanctions,” “export controls,” and “intense pressures on [Russia’s] largest and most significant institutions and key industries” in conjunction with allies, should Putin go ahead with the invasion.
While Biden’s track record of having responded “decisively” is nonexistent (and probably isn’t doing much to scare Putin), isolationists are still against all the saber-rattling.
First things first: We are not sending American troops to fight for Ukraine. Pentagon press secretary John Kirby explicitly stated that “these forces are not going to fight in Ukraine.” We are, however, supporting NATO allies. That’s not an escalation; it’s a treaty obligation. If the U.S. cannot stand by its allies, let alone its strategic partners and friends, then the already-deteriorated U.S. deterrent will evaporate to the delight of our adversaries.
Isolationists are missing the big, strategic picture. Should the U.S. pull back all pressure on Russia, as many isolationists desire, an already-rogue world order will gain momentum, eventually eclipsing the cause of liberal democracy and sovereignty.
Frederick Kagan, a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and the director of its Critical Threats Project, laid out the stakes in an interview with National Review. “If you are against an international order in which disputes between states are settled by invasions, mass killings of people, mass destruction of infrastructure, and conquest, then the United States has quite a significant interest in stopping Putin from invading Ukraine and defeating him if he does.”
Certain norms are worth upholding. Russia’s invasion would normalize unprovoked aggression toward democracies. And what kind of message does it send to our allies, and especially our enemies, if we allow an American-recognized democracy to fall into the hands of an autocrat?
U.S. credibility is at an all-time low, especially after the Biden administration’s massive mishandling of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Our adversaries are taking notice and filling the gaps. As the Wall Street Journal editorial board put it,“Rogues are on the march.” China, Russia, and Iran have tested the past three White House administrations and are now taking full advantage of Biden’s lax global approach to expand their sphere of hegemony.
As Russia prepares for a possible invasion into Ukraine, it’s essential that the U.S. opt for a position of strength, both deterring a Russian invasion with sanctions and military aid for Ukraine as well as standing united with the NATO alliance.
Yet isolationists argue that Ukraine — a non-ally — isn’t our problem. Ross Douthat wrote in the New York Times:
The United States in its days as a hyperpower made a series of moves to extend our perimeter of influence deep into Russia’s near-abroad. Some of those moves appear to be sustainable: The expansion of NATO to include countries of the former Warsaw Pact was itself a risk, but at the moment those commitments seem secure. But the attempt to draw Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit, the partway-open door to Ukrainians who preferred westward-focused alliances, was a foolish overcommitment even when American power was at its height.
Alliances, however, aren’t the be-all-end-all when it comes to U.S. interests abroad. Kagan explained why the U.S. does, in fact, have an interest in standing up for certain friends. “If [isolationists] say that we don’t have an interest in that, then you’re saying that the emergence of a fully Hobbesian world in which the strong do whatever they like and we defend a very limited number of states that we happened to have alliances with doesn’t affect us.”
Kagan told me that it would be a mistake to believe that a “Hobbesian world will somehow stop at the places where we desire it to stop.”
To Kagan, this kind of world order would allow our adversaries to run amok. “You’re saying that a world in which aggressive dictators like Putin, Xi Jinping, and Khamenei can set the rest of the world on fire doesn’t affect us.”
They are indeed running amok, and it’s not only in their “spheres of influence.” Russia, for instance, has spread its presence all the way to the Western Hemisphere, solidifying bilateral relations with Cuba’s and Venezuela’s authoritarian regimes. Without an earnest U.S. effort to de-escalate the threat of a Russian invasion, Putin and other adversaries will continue to export their destabilizing agendas.
Presently, there’s a camp dedicated to tabling the Ukraine issue and putting NATO on the back burner to reorient all resources toward China. Rod Dreher, a vocal proponent in favor of pulling the U.S. out of the Ukraine crisis, wrote in the American Conservative:
“Our real strategic challenge is with China, in East Asia. That demands all our focus. We have no realistic choice but to cede to at least some of Russia’s demands — including recognizing the fact that Ukraine will never be part of NATO.”
Elbridge Colby has argued the same thing, tweeting:
“Americans and our allies need to grapple with the reality: We don’t and won’t have a military big enough to increase commitments in Europe *and* have a chance of restoring our edge in Asia against China. We *must* prioritize. Arguments that don’t reckon with that are misleading.”
But backing down from a diplomatic dispute with Russia (and certainly turning away from NATO allies) would send a clear sign of weakness to China.
Dalibor Rohac, one of Kagan’s colleagues at AEI, said decisive action in “gray area situations” are the most important opportunities to create credibility. With Afghanistan, another “gray” situation with a non-ally, Rohac said the Biden administration’s withdrawal sent “a sign of weakness and unsteadiness.” To Russia, that was a green light to push ahead: “I think that’s exactly why Putin is doing what he’s doing at this particular moment.”
The American response to Ukraine will directly inform Xi’s assessment of U.S. intentions in Taiwan. Kagan told me that “the burden of evidence is high on anyone that wants to claim that credibility is partible.” Without standing by NATO members and supporting Ukraine, it would be nearly impossible to convince China that “we’re really serious about defending an island whose independence we don’t even recognize.” (We do, however, recognize Ukraine’s independence.)
While isolationists call on leaders to do less, President Biden isn’t doing quite enough. The threat of massive sanctions and the blocking of Nord Stream 2 are, at this point, the best he can offer. And these would certainly impose a huge cost to Putin. But President Biden demolished all U.S. strategic ambiguity by clearly saying we will not “send American servicemen to fight Russia in Ukraine.” I’m by no means advocating war, but his words haven’t left any of our adversaries guessing. He has also shown weakness in moving the American embassy from Kyiv to Lviv. Big picture, the Biden administration has been unwilling and unable to make decisions that reaffirm America’s leadership abroad.
Yesterday Biden did, however, correctly identify what’s at stake. This is indeed “about more than just Russia and Ukraine.” This is about standing for “the future we want for our world, for liberty — for liberty, the right of countless countries to choose their own destiny, and the right of people to determine their own futures, for the principle that a country can’t change its neighbor’s borders by force.”
That means standing by our allies and our friends alike. That means standing up with strength and decisiveness.