The West Swears It Will Avoid Another Munich

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky examines weapons as he attends tactical military exercises at a training ground in the Rivne Region, Ukraine, February 16, 2022. (Ukrainian Presidential Press Service/Handout via Reuters)

But what about a mini Munich?

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But what about a mini Munich?

T he NATO countries met at the annual Munich Security Conference this weekend to pat themselves on the back for rallying against the danger of a Russian invasion of Ukraine.

But a couple of ghostly figures showed up to remind them they were meeting in the very place where history had judged previous Western leaders harshly for not doing enough to ward off aggression. In 1938, Adolf Hitler used the infamous Munich Conference to intimidate Britain and France into going along with his demands that they approve the surrender of the Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland into his ravenous hands. A new Netflix film, Munich — The Edge of War, based on the thriller by Robert Harris, highlights the tragedy of this appeasement and the fact it led to a wider war less than a year later.

At the Security Conference, Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky slammed the West’s response to Russian meddling in Ukraine since Vladimir Putin took charge in Russia two decades ago:

It was here 15 years ago that Russia announced its intention to challenge global security. What did the world say? Appeasement. Result? At least — the annexation of Crimea and aggression against my state.

We will defend our land with or without the support of partners. Whether they give us hundreds of modern weapons or 5,000 helmets. We appreciate any help, but everyone should understand that these are not charitable contributions that Ukraine should ask for or remind of. These are not noble gestures for which Ukraine should bow low. This is your contribution to the security of Europe and the world.

Zelensky was preceded to the microphone by Vitali Klitschko, the mayor of Kyiv, Ukraine’s capital city, who told U.S. secretary of state Antony Blinken and Germany’s foreign minister Annalena Baerbock that his nation needed “defensive weapons.”

“We’re ready to fight, we’re ready to defend our families, our states, our cities, our citizens — we need support,” he said. He reminded Blinken and Baerbock that in 1994 the United States, Russia, and Britain committed to respect “the sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine” and “to refrain from the threat or use of force” against the country. Those assurances were integral to convincing Ukraine to give up its “independence inheritance” from the Soviet Union: the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal, some 1,900 strategic nuclear warheads. How well has that agreement worked out for Ukraine? Few believe that Putin would be nearly as aggressive toward Ukraine today if it were still a nuclear power. No wonder Kyiv feels betrayed.

Baerbock sympathized with Klitschko but didn’t retreat from her government’s decision to soft-pedal help for Ukraine. Germany drew condemnation from Ukraine last month after it blocked Estonia’s request to transfer some German-made military equipment to Ukraine. Instead, last month Berlin sent 5,000 military helmets.

Klitschko ridiculed the decision at the time. “The behavior of the German government leaves me speechless,” he told Reuters. “What kind of support will Germany send next? Pillows?”

Baerbock responded this weekend to Kitschko by meekly acknowledging the helmet issue. She pathetically said, “I’m sorry it was only 5,000.” She then expressed her hope that Germany would have a “new list” of equipment that could be sent — in the future.

As dangerous as the Russian buildup is, it’s still unlikely that Putin wants to undertake a complete military takeover of Ukraine and all the risks of an endless Afghan-like guerrilla war that an invasion would bring. Putin’s goal is to try to squeeze the Ukrainian economy so that it collapses. An economic collapse could undermine Zelensky at home and have him overthrown by internal opponents. A similar situation occurred in Georgia in 2008 after Russia invaded but then stopped. Ever since then, Georgia has been far more subservient to Moscow.

Fred Kempe, of the Atlantic Council, believes that Putin wants Ukraine so structurally dependent on Russia that it wouldn’t join NATO even in the unlikely event that membership was offered. “He believes Russian can deal with the chaos much better than we can, and he knows where our pain points are,” Kempe told CNBC. Chief among those pain points is that, by shuttering its nuclear power plants, Germany has made itself dependent on Russia for over half of its heating needs in winter.

Fiona Hill, a former National Security Council specialist on Russia, agrees that Putin has “put down so many chips, he can’t walk away with nothing.” She told the New York Times, “He wants to wreck Ukraine (more than seizing it). He will do the minimum amount he can that leaves him with a strong probability of having wrecked Ukraine, and no more.”

What this all means is that Putin is probably willing to do everything short of waging full-scale war to get his way. He likely believes that he can so unnerve the Western powers through fear and the higher energy prices that a crisis would bring that he can gain concessions at the last minute or just after fighting breaks out.

To their credit, NATO allies remember enough of the stain of the Munich Conference of 1938 that they are unlikely to surrender Ukraine the way Neville Chamberlain appeased Hitler. But as Zelensky and Klitschko know so well, it wouldn’t take a complete capitulation to castrate Ukraine’s independence. Just perhaps a mini Munich.

 

John Fund is National Review’s national-affairs reporter and a fellow at the Committee to Unleash Prosperity.
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