The U.S. should spend a little more time and energy devising potential off-ramps and less on dreaming up ways to fuel a war that serves nobody’s interests.
The U.S. should spend a little more time and energy devising potential off-ramps and less on dreaming up ways to fuel a war that serves nobody’s interests.
I s there more the United States can do to help Ukraine resist Russian president Vladimir Putin’s war of choice? Could NATO be more aggressive in its response to the biggest land war in Europe since World War II?
John Yoo and Robert Zubrin use separate pieces in these pages to essentially make the same case: Yes, it can. Yoo alleges that the Biden administration is over-dramatizing the risk of escalation with Russia and mischaracterizing the U.S. experience during the Cold War in order to keep Washington from embracing a more proactive approach. Zubrin’s argument is bolder: Washington is keen on tying Moscow down but is uninterested in giving the Ukrainians the necessary military support to prevail. For Zubrin, the entire Ukraine imbroglio is a black-and-white phenomenon: Either Ukraine emerges victorious, or the U.S. watches as a Chinese surrogate, otherwise known as Putin’s Russia, dominates the Eurasian continent.
Unfortunately for Yoo and Zubrin, their cases are about as airtight as an old wooden boat left to rot in the backyard.
First, we should be clear about one thing: The U.S. is not sitting on the sidelines or acting passively. The response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been quite remarkable in terms of its speed, scope, and intensity. Never before in postwar history has a coalition of powers worked so feverishly to unplug a major economy from the international financial system. There have been so many economic sanctions imposed on Moscow since February 24, the opening night of Russia’s war, that you would need days just to keep track of the penalties. Those sanctions and export restrictions had an immediate effect. Russia’s $1.5 trillion economy, which depends on the export of natural resources and energy products, is projected to contract by as much as 15 percent this year — the largest dip since the birth of modern-day Russia. Products that rely on U.S. technology, from semiconductors to airplane parts, are now prohibited from reaching the Russian market. The ruble is hemorrhaging in value, and highly skilled young Russians are leaving the country by the tens of thousands. While Putin may be happy that these rabble-rousers are leaving for greener pastures, he won’t necessarily be happy with the brain-drain.
Militarily, the U.S. is essentially serving as the Ukrainian army’s personal arms dispensary. Last week alone, the Biden administration authorized a fresh shipment of $1 billion in military equipment. Some of these items, including shoulder-fired anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, have proven highly impactful on the battlefield. We know this because of footage that shows columns of Russian armor destroyed or damaged on the roadside. Zubrin’s contention that the U.S. is trying to avoid actions that make Putin “too unhappy” doesn’t pass the laugh test; I’m not a mind-reader, but I’m pretty sure Putin isn’t especially pleased with how the invasion has proceeded during the first month. About 26,000 Russian casualties, including more than 9,800 Russian troop deaths, is nothing to smile about.
Second, Yoo and Zubrin are far too cavalier about the prospects of Russian escalation. Yoo, for example, uses the case studies of West Berlin in 1949 and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis to suggest that the U.S. need not worry about how Moscow would respond in the year 2022. The implication: Because Russia decided to stand down in both events, it won’t push the envelope too far in Ukraine if the U.S. begins delivering bigger defense platforms (such as fighter planes) to Kyiv.
Yoo, however, overlooks some of the details of these past stare-offs. In the Berlin airlift, the Soviets couldn’t block U.S. planes from delivering supplies to West Berlin (one can’t say the same thing about Ukrainian airspace, which is covered by an assortment of Russian fighter planes and air-defense systems). The Cuban Missile Crisis is depicted in American lore as an unmitigated success for the U.S. since the Soviets eventually decided not to stand down in the face of a U.S. embargo of the island. But let’s not pretend, as Yoo does, that U.S. resolve was the sole factor driving Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev’s decision-making at this time. President John F. Kennedy was willing to cut a deal with Khrushchev that would trade the removal of U.S. nuclear missiles in Turkey for the removal of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The island also wasn’t especially important for the Soviets and thus wasn’t a vital security interest. Ukraine’s geopolitical orientation, however, is quite important to modern-day Russia.
Yoo and Zubrin’s recommendation is to basically call Putin’s bluff. The problem is that we don’t know for certain whether Putin is indeed bluffing or whether U.S. escalation would prompt him to become more merciless than he already is. This is no fantasy contingency. By invading Ukraine, Putin has gambled big and dug himself into a hole militarily and geopolitically. The Russian military is exposing itself as a highly lethal but incompetent organization consisting of demoralized conscripts, terrible field commanders, and an insular leadership. Putin’s decade-long military modernization drive looks less like a game-changer and more like a ruse. The Ukrainians are dispersing and relying on smaller, more mobile units. The Russians, in contrast, resemble the slow-walking elephant getting stung by a bunch of hornets.
Unfortunately, this isn’t all positive for the Ukrainians. While it may sound counterintuitive, the lack of clear Russian military progress may actually compel Putin to double down on his current strategy. CIA director William Burns, a seasoned Russia hand who once served as America’s top diplomat in Moscow, told the House Intelligence Committee earlier this month that the Russian strongman will accelerate his efforts to overthrow Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky’s administration. It’s difficult to envision how pouring Patriot missile batteries, MiGs, and F-16s into Ukraine will push Putin into seeing religion.
Robert Zubrin lists three possibilities for Ukraine: 1) Russia wins and NATO accepts the result, 2) Russia wins, but NATO doesn’t accept the result, and 3) Ukraine successfully pushes Russia out of its territory. Yet there is a fourth option available that he doesn’t bother to consider: Russia and Ukraine come to terms and settle on a diplomatic end to the war.
Right now, the fourth option looks a long way off. Reports of progress between Ukrainian and Russian negotiators coexist alongside strong doubts among U.S. officials that Moscow is serious about diplomacy. Even so, a mutually acceptable compromise is the only way all parties in the conflict avoid the classic escalatory ladder. The longer the war goes on and the more Russians are killed, the worse it will be for Ukraine when a negotiation eventually happens and the more likely Russia trips into a multi-year occupation it can’t afford. The U.S. should spend a little more time and energy devising potential off-ramps and less on dreaming up ways to fuel a war that serves nobody’s interests.