Are China and Russia as Close as They Appear?

A t first glance, China’s president Xi Jinping appears to be Vladimir Putin’s insurance card at an especially troubling time for Russia geopolitically. The two strongmen have met each other more than three dozen times since 2013, with the latest confab ending in a 5,000-word joint declaration lauding the Russia–China relationship as a counterbalance to what they label as U.S. “hegemony.”

However, Russia’s four-month-old war in Ukraine is adding some tremors to the so-called no limits partnership. There’s no dispute that China has supported Moscow in the court of international public opinion, is staunchly opposed to U.S. and EU sanctions against Russia, and has blamed NATO for instigating the war. But it’s also indisputable that Beijing is cautious about how much support it provides to the Russians. Xi may look up to Putin as the quintessential leader, but he isn’t willing to undermine China’s own strategic interests to bail out his Russian friend.

Of course, China will assist Russia to the extent it can. Just as Beijing offered Russia an economic lifeline when the U.S. and Europe imposed sanctions against Moscow after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Beijing will try to insulate Moscow from economic shock. Whereas countries in the West are downgrading their economic links to Russia and phasing out Russian oil, China is happily buying Russian barrels — allowing Moscow to recuperate some losses it would otherwise suffer as a result of the Western embargoes. China’s purchase of Russian energy, including oil, gas, and coal, increased by 75 percent in April, to over $6 billion. China’s overall trade with Russia jumped by 12 percent in March, despite Putin’s ordering the invasion of Ukraine a month earlier.

The Chinese are also not afraid to stick up for Russia on the diplomatic stage. Beijing has instructed its diplomats to not support U.S. and Western-authored U.N. resolutions condemning Russia’s unjustified war and calling for the withdrawal of Russian forces. This isn’t a surprise: Russia and China have increasingly teamed up at the Security Council to stymie U.S. initiatives. But it reinforces a belief within Russian policy circles that Moscow should enhance relations with China instead of repairing them with the West.

But it would be a mistake to categorize Russia–China ties as all sunshine and roses. Senior Chinese and Russian officials can muse about their everlasting friendship all they want. The reality is that Beijing and Moscow have different equities to preserve and protect. No two countries have identical interests, no matter how much affinity their leaders may have toward one another.

This is playing out in full view during the war in Ukraine. Notwithstanding China’s proclamations of support for Moscow, Asia’s largest geopolitical player is extremely cautious, unwilling to offer the Russians everything they are requesting. Despite reports that Moscow approached Beijing early in the war for military supplies and indications that China was considering the request, no such aid has been granted. This could be for any number of reasons — Beijing’s historical non-interference policy, a preference for resolving the war diplomatically, or concern that sending Moscow military equipment would incite the U.S. to send more sophisticated weapons to Kyiv. The end result, though, is the same: If Putin thought he could rely on his Chinese neighbors to buttress his war, he miscalculated.

China is also wary of getting on the wrong side of U.S. sanctions and export restrictions. The Chinese Communist Party may not respect what they deem extraterritorial U.S. economic measures, but to date, it has largely abided by them. Washington’s decision to ban the U.S. technology exports, including dual-use items, that could contribute to Russia’s defense industry is affecting China’s own sales to the Russian market. According to Chinese government data, exports of Chinese laptops to Russia fell by 40 percent between February and March. Chinese smartphone exports are also down by about two-thirds.

This can’t be a coincidence. The Chinese, like any country dependent on U.S.-designed technology, has an interest in following the rules administered by the U.S. Commerce Department, even if they don’t support them in principle. China is especially sensitive to U.S. export controls given its experience. Huawei, one of the largest telecommunications companies in the world, saw its annual revenue plummet in 2021 by nearly 30 percent because of Washington’s export restrictions targeting the entity. Unable to use the U.S.-manufactured microchips required to build its network and sustain its smartphone business, Huawei lost some of its market share to competitors. Xi Jinping doesn’t want to relive this experience.

China continues to view its economy as a core pillar of its global power. The U.S. is Beijing’s largest trading partner by far, with the two powers exchanging more than $655 billion worth of goods last year alone. So when senior U.S. officials warn Beijing about flouting U.S. sanctions or trade restrictions on Russia, Xi can’t simply disregard them. He’s got a lucrative trading relationship to protect. Frankly, giving full-throated material assistance to the Russians isn’t worth the risk of jeopardizing access to the U.S. market.

When asked about China’s position with respect to the war in Ukraine, one individual with knowledge of internal policy discussions in Beijing gave a telling observation, stating, “We understand [Moscow’s] predicament. But we cannot ignore our own situation in this dialogue. China will always act in the best interest of the Chinese people.”

The U.S. should keep this anecdote in mind when it assesses Russia–China ties more broadly. A shared animus toward U.S. grand strategy is the glue that keeps the bilateral relationship from splitting. But ultimately, Moscow and Beijing’s dealings are no more immune to the temptations of self-interest than any other partnership is.