No, Ukraine Can’t Negotiate with Russia — Yet

O ver the summer a cacophony of voices has risen up across the West demanding that Ukraine seek negotiations with Russia to end the war. While some of these calls are genuinely well-meaning, desiring an end to the bloodshed as quickly as possible, the idea that Ukraine should begin to negotiate now ignores both how negotiations have historically worked and the current state of the battlefield in the Russo–Ukrainian war. It likewise also ignores the geopolitical reality of Ukraine’s importance in the West’s coming 21st-century cold war with China.

Much of the demand for negotiation arose from the fact that Ukraine was for months seemingly not making progress against Russia, though demands for negotiations began almost immediately after Russia’s initial gains. Jeffrey Sachs, writing for CNN in April, called for a negotiated peace to end the war. In June, Politico ran a piece arguing for peace due to the fact that “the momentum on the battlefield [was] shifting in Russia’s favor.” Similar pieces cascaded throughout the summer.

If the Russo–Ukrainian war had proceeded as Russia originally expected, with most of Ukraine being conquered within weeks, the demands for Ukraine to negotiate would be understandable, as they likewise would be if over the summer the momentum had indeed continued to shift in Russia’s favor. But it hasn’t. Not only has Ukraine held out, but in early September the Ukrainians carried out a spectacular dual Kherson/Kharkiv offensive in the south and east of the country; as of this writing, Ukraine claims to have recaptured over 6,000 square kilometers of territory. While Russia will likely make some sort of attempt to take back the territory — if its forces are even capable of mounting a counteroffensive — it is clear that the outcome of the conflict is very much in flux.

And this “battlefield flux” makes serious negotiations essentially impossible. World War I went on for four years, and throughout it all some lines on the Western Front never moved beyond a few miles — yet there were no real negotiations for most of the war, due to each side’s potential for victory. This is likewise why Abraham Lincoln agreed to hear Confederate appeals for peace only when the American Civil War was essentially finished and is why there were no negotiations between the Allied and Axis powers until the latter had clearly lost World War II.

But victory in the Russo–Ukrainian war is not clear-cut, as definitions of victory vary. Russia’s original goal was a decapitation of the Ukrainian government and its replacement with a pro-Moscow regime. That clearly is not happening; but while their lines in the east are collapsing, the Russians still have options, particularly now that Putin has announced a mobilization of up to 300,000 men, though experts have cautioned that Russia’s mobilization will possibly be less effective than the Kremlin hopes. There is also the nuclear question, which Putin highlighted in his mobilization address. While concerning, this most recent threat in itself is not likely to be a game-changer, as this is far from the first time in this conflict that Putin has, via implication, threatened the use of nuclear weapons. While the potential for a tactical Russian nuclear strike exists, of course, it has for the entire duration of the war.

For Ukraine, “victory” is fuzzy; the Zelensky administration has repeatedly claimed that victory must result in the expulsion of Russian troops from all occupied territories, including Crimea (though it remains to be seen whether Crimea is truly a red line for Ukraine). But wherever that line is, the current state of the war cannot be the end state of the war if Ukraine wants to have a hope of survival in the post-war future. This is mostly due to Russian-occupied Kherson, which Russia is currently trying to formally absorb via referendum. Located in the southwest of the country, Kherson is critically important to both parties. If Russia holds Kherson, the crucial port of Odesa is within reach — as is the rest of Ukraine’s coastline, the seizure of which could cripple the country. Even without Odesa, with Kherson occupied, Russia can still blockade Ukraine and threaten the interior. But if Ukraine takes it back, Russia’s gains will have been limited to the southeast region of Pryazovia and the Donbas; plus, if Ukraine gains momentum after taking Kherson, there is no guarantee that Russia’s gains in Pryazovia would hold. With Russia already having suffered tens of thousands of casualties, at best this would be a pyrrhic victory for the invaders — and at worst, a defeat. As a result, Ukraine is likely to be completely unable to negotiate until the outcome of its Kherson/Kharkiv offensive is clear.

Post-Kharkiv, most voices calling for negotiation have (at the moment) fallen silent. The few who still are, such as Douglas MacGregor, have essentially been forced to fall back on flatly denying the reality of Ukraine’s victory in Kharkiv. And while it’d be a mistake to deny Ukraine’s win, it would also be a mistake for Ukraine to assume it now has the upper hand. Russia’s mobilization will take some months to complete; in that time Ukraine, far from considering negotiations, must take as much territory as it can to be in a strong position before fresh (albeit likely unprepared) Russians troops arrive, along with the onset of winter.

PHOTOS: Russian-Ukraine War

With this clearly in mind, Ukraine has thus far categorically refused to negotiate with Russia, post-Kharkiv, until the invader withdraws from all occupied territory. Ukraine’s leaders obviously view negotiations without preconditions as not in their interest. But unconditional negotiations would also not be in the interest of the United States, as they would place us on poor footing in the coming ideological confrontation with China. Many of those who are questioning support for Ukraine see China as the largest threat to the West and believe Ukraine to be a distraction. But Ukraine is arguably key to the upcoming struggle between China and the West. Russia will, for decades to come, essentially be the junior partner in the Sino–Russo alliance. Should Russia be allowed to dominate Ukraine, China by extension will too, as it would likely pay for rebuilding in Russian-held areas. China would, after all, have significantly more capital to do so than Russia and has already expressed an affinity for economic colonization. With its growing influence in Central Asia, indirect control of Ukraine would effectively make China master of Eurasia at the starting gun of the new cold war — a terrible development for the EU and the U.S. Compounding this is the fact that abandonment of Ukraine, especially at a moment when it has a genuine chance of victory over Russia, would be seen negatively by current loyal allies and would make it difficult for the United States and major European powers to gain new ones for the coming contest with China.

In six months or even less, the battlefield of the Russo–Ukrainian war could look very different. Russia hopes that Ukraine will still falter, and Ukraine must attempt to take back Kherson because negotiating without Kherson would be tantamount to surrender.

So for now, negotiations must wait.