Thinking through the unthinkable as the Ukraine conflict enters a dangerous new phase.
Thinking through the unthinkable as the Ukraine conflict enters a dangerous new phase
T here is a pattern in the interplay between Washington and Moscow when it comes to the war in Ukraine. Washington draws a firm-ish line in the sand, hoping to deter Moscow. Moscow notices the hedging, and presses forward. Washington, suddenly now worried about what new precedents are being set by Russian action, scrambles to invest more in the conflict, and then draws another firm-ish line, effectively daring Moscow to cross it.
It’s a game of escalation by miscalculation. So, for instance, before the present phase of the conflict began, the White House indicated that a full Russian invasion of Ukraine would be met with stiff sanctions, but a “minor incursion” might be met with something less. Meanwhile, American intelligence agencies let it be known that the U.S. believed Kyiv’s government would not last long in the event of an invasion. Vladimir Putin responded that he expected and was prepared for the sanctions. Russia invaded, partly confident that its own assessment of Kyiv’s strength was reflected by NATO.
But then Kyiv held out, and remained able to receive extraordinary Western help. Western policy-makers — incensed that Putin had crossed their firm-ish line — started sending far deadlier aid to Ukraine, and began speculating that the war should properly end with regime change in Russia.
Now, Russia was most definitely on the back foot and another round of escalation by miscalculation could begin.
On ABC’s This Week this past Sunday, General David Petraeus was asked what would happen if Russia used a so-called tactical nuclear weapon in an effort to halt or reverse its losses in Ukraine. (Ukraine’s deputy intelligence chief, Vadym Skibitsky, has said the likelihood of Russia making such a move is now “very high,” and Putin has started making nuclear threats as loudly as he can.) Petraeus said that he hadn’t spoken to U.S. national-security adviser Jake Sullivan about exactly what the U.S. response would be, but then went on to speculate that, “We would respond by leading a NATO — a collective — effort that would take out every Russian conventional force that we can see and identify on the battlefield in Ukraine and also in Crimea, and every ship in the Black Sea.”
Pressed a little by host Jonathan Karl, Petraeus explained, “There has to be a response. It [the use of a tactical nuke] cannot go unanswered. But it doesn’t expand. It doesn’t go nuclear-for-nuclear.” Petraeus was not just speaking on his own, here. Newsweek has reported that the Biden administration believes non-nuclear threats will stop Putin, and that a non-nuclear response to the use of a nuke is its preference:
The military sources tell Newsweek that there are subtle moves being made with regard to nuclear threats, including moving submarines and aircraft and drilling B-52 bombers. But they stress that non-nuclear military options—the use of conventional weapons and special operations, as well as cyber and space attack—are front and center, to include a decapitation strike to kill Putin in the heart of the Kremlin.
So, the top minds in the administration and one of the most respected generals of his generation believe that if Russia uses a tactical nuke in Ukraine, NATO forces could suddenly join the war as full belligerents, proceed to annihilate the entire Russian military and/or launch a missile strike into the heart of Moscow to kill Putin — and Russia would not “expand” the conflict from there?
I’m sorry, but that is crazy and dangerous. No nuclear power would refuse to escalate as another one attempted to obliterate its armed forces and government. (Notice as well that General Petraeus does not say the president will go to Congress to seek a declaration of war — in his mind, the president apparently just gives the order.)
The fundamental problem of being unable to properly match threats of escalation has its roots at the very start of the conflict over Ukraine in 2014, and it is why I have opposed every Western step deeper into the conflict. Ukraine is not a member of NATO and is unlikely to become one, but NATO has staked its own credibility on the notion that it must not be forbidden by Russia from becoming one. It is a trap that has led both the U.S. and Russia to miscalculate.
On the Western side, Ukraine’s non-membership in NATO is one of the primary reasons that the White House keeps floating the novel idea that conventional threats can deter nuclear threats. To promise a full nuclear retaliation is to render the difference between NATO and non-NATO states meaningless. It is also a promise that the United States cannot make on its own without risking the ire of major NATO members such as France and Germany, and thus the fracturing of the alliance.
What’s more, by staking its overall credibility on the outcome in Ukraine, NATO has made it seem to Russia that defeating Ukraine includes the bonus prize of defeating the alliance, and that — again, because the alliance has signaled reluctance to respond to a nuke with a nuke — this bonus prize can be had without the risk of a direct nuclear conflict. It is precisely this dynamic which could lead Putin, in a moment of desperation, to try to “escalate to de-escalate.”
And what if Putin did use a battlefield nuke, even in a demonstration calculated to minimize casualties? There is little reason to expect the next steps would follow any sort of predictable or rational plan. The emotional shock of a broken nuclear taboo would send policy-makers reeling. They would be immediately confronted by the question of whether an exchange of strategic nukes is worth avoiding a new precedent whereby nuclear powers can explode their weapons in the sky in order to have their territorial demands satisfied. And they would be confronting this question in an atmosphere of panic and uncertainty. Markets might respond to the use of a tactical nuke by cratering. The nuke itself would explode only on Ukraine, but the economic fallout would reach everyone. Tens of thousands of people would begin fleeing major cities. Social disorder could begin to break out beyond Ukraine as people scrambled for groceries and gas.
PHOTOS: Russian-Ukraine War
American policy-makers have been conducting their proxy war in Ukraine as if it were like other recent wars — say, the toppling of Moammar Qaddafi in Libya, or Syrian Civil War. That is, they’ve been conducting it on the understanding that the American people would not have to make big sacrifices or endure serious risks in the bargain. Ukrainians, like the rebels in Syria and Libya, would make the big sacrifices while the West assisted with money, matériel, and intelligence.
It is possible that in this case they will be right — that Ukraine will be able to inflict a humiliating defeat on Russia, and that Americans won’t feel any serious blowback from it. NATO’s combined economic and military power may ultimately allow the Ukrainians to end Putin’s historic blunder in a simple, clear defeat and retreat for Russia.
For everyone’s sake, we’d better hope so. We have seen how Russians have reacted to Putin’s imposing more sacrifices on them as the Russian war effort falters: Many are fleeing the country, many others have been arrested for protesting, and some have even set fire to draft offices. What would be the reaction of the American people if President Biden informed them that their lives had been directly gambled on the proposition that Russia would respond cautiously or submissively to a direct American attempt at regime change? I don’t want to find out.
Ukraine’s application for expedited NATO membership, submitted last week, is rational from its perspective. President Volodymyr Zelensky argues, not unreasonably, that Ukraine is a de facto member of NATO anyway. But are the 30 NATO countries ready to commit to this?
Ukrainian membership in NATO would mean a Ukraine politically and militarily detached from Russia. Since Kyiv claims Crimea as part of its territory, it would also oblige NATO to eject Russia from its long-established naval base at Sevastopol, and to defend another 2,300 miles of border. Is Biden willing to impose the costs and risks that this project entails on Americans?
The question demands an answer, because we’re rapidly approaching a point where he may no longer be able to conduct this war as if it were a small conflict with a power incapable of reaching us.