Biden’s Slow Walk Away from Venezuela

Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro speaks during a meeting with Belize’s Prime Minister John Briceno at the Miraflores Palace in Caracas, Venezuela, November 25, 2022. (Leonardo Fernandez Viloria/Reuters)

The administration has weakened the democratic opposition and strengthened the Maduro regime in exchange for maybe a few drops of oil and little else.

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The administration has weakened the democratic opposition and strengthened the Maduro regime in exchange for maybe a few drops of oil and little else.

T he Biden administration is tired of Venezuela and is slowly walking away from efforts to promote democracy there.

No other conclusion can be reached from its decision to soften sanctions on Venezuelan oil and permit Chevron to produce more oil in the country. Because it would be untenable to treat Chevron far better than any other oil company, more such moves will be coming soon. Lawyers and lobbyists for European and Indian oil companies that have clamored for the opportunity to produce or purchase Venezuelan oil are no doubt composing their letters to the White House, Treasury, and State Department right now.

Lifting sanctions in exchange for real democratic gains has always been U.S. policy. Lifting sanctions without such gains is the Biden administration’s sad mutation. For what is the United States getting in exchange as it begins to lift sanctions? The ostensible “concessions” from the Maduro regime are laughable — in fact they’re illusory.

First, Maduro has agreed to a plan to allow the use of billions of dollars in frozen assets for humanitarian programs in Venezuela. This is a move that, with billions sloshing around, will inevitably allow the notoriously corrupt regime to steal more money. And this, incredibly enough, is listed as a regime concession.

The second “concession” is agreeing to return to negotiations, in Mexico, with the opposition. Now, “return to negotiations” means sitting at the table. The regime has done this year after year, in the Dominican Republic, in Mexico, and elsewhere, for decades. Consider this Joint Statement on Venezuela Negotiations released a few days ago, on November 26:

The following statement was released by Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell Fontelles, the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs the Honourable Mélanie Joly, and the United Kingdom Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs James Cleverly.

We welcome the decision announced today by Venezuelan negotiators to restart the dialogue process in Mexico City.

From there it goes on and on. Now consider last year’s statement, released August 14, 2021:

The following statement was released by Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, and Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Marc Garneau. . . .

We welcome the announcement that Venezuelan-led, comprehensive negotiations will soon begin in Mexico City, Mexico.

From there it went on and on. In 15 months the only thing that has changed is the willingness of the United States to begin lifting sanctions despite any real political concessions by the Maduro regime. The United States did not demand the release of political prisoners. We did not demand any freedom of the press. We did not demand that the regime allow any exiled political leaders to return. We did not say we would lift sanctions only when a free election is held. Instead, we began lifting sanctions when the regime said it would send a few officials to Mexico City.

Why this abandonment of U.S. policy? First, oil: There is a forlorn hope that increased Venezuelan oil production can reduce world oil prices. That hope is forlorn because the Venezuelan oil patch is so badly degraded by decades of neglect, corruption, and abuse that only a little more production is possible without billions of dollars in new investment. It is less ironic than it is grotesque that the Biden administration would rather see Venezuelan than U.S. oil production increase.

Second, fatigue: To help the Venezuelan opposition survive, reorganize, and struggle against the regime is an arduous task. As we see today in Iran, such struggles may take decades — yet popular opposition can survive and can be sparked into life. If you think the Venezuelan opposition is okay watching U.S. support waver, and happy to see U.S. diplomats fly into Caracas to meet with Maduro, think again. These decisions are being made without real consultation with the democratic forces in Venezuela. Opposition leaders are forced to accept whatever Biden officials decide, and if they protest too vigorously and too loudly they will be written off as “unrealistic,” “troublemakers,” and all the other terms Foggy Bottom uses when it decides people have become “difficult.” In this case, that means people who are more dedicated to Venezuelan freedom than to covering up Biden-administration concessions.

Third, immigration: The Biden administration has a huge crisis at the southern border and wants to be able to send back the Venezuelans among the migrants. It will be far easier to do so if a case can be made (even dishonestly) that conditions in their home country are improving because negotiations and humanitarian spending programs have begun.

Venezuela is scheduled to hold a presidential election in 2024, and both the United States and Venezuela’s democrats want it to be free. To lift sanctions when the release of political prisoners has begun, when newspapers and TV can begin to report freely, when exiled leaders can start returning home, and when a fair and independent electoral commission is established would be sensible. To start lifting them now — when the vicious, brutal Maduro regime has agreed to nothing but sitting down in Mexico again — is a betrayal. In nearly two years in office and despite the occasional speech about democracy, the Biden administration has weakened the democratic opposition forces in Venezuela and strengthened the Maduro regime.

Elliott Abrams is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the chairman of the Vandenberg Coalition.
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