To advance core interests like countering China, the U.S. should put the promotion of its democratic values and institutions at the forefront of its Africa policies.
To advance core interests like countering China, the U.S. should put the promotion of its democratic values and institutions at the forefront of its Africa policies.
I n a recent National Review article warning about growing Chinese influence in Africa, Mike Coté argues that countering such influence requires the United States to “reprioritize national interests over progressive values.” Though Coté’s piece raises some important points, his assertion that values such as the “respect for human rights” and “our belief in democracy” ought to play a “supporting role in an age of great-power conflict” is misguided. Indeed, to advance core interests like countering China, the U.S. should put the promotion of its democratic values and institutions at the forefront of its Africa policies.
American engagement in Africa during the Cold War serves as a cautionary tale about the perils of a values-neutral approach to the continent. Fear of Soviet incursion led the U.S. to support the overthrow of Moscow-aligned governments in favor of dictators who would supposedly toe the Western line. For example, in Ghana, President Kwame Nkrumah’s perceived flirtation with the Soviet Union led the U.S. to tacitly support his overthrow — a policy that inadvertently triggered decades of political instability that saw Soviet influence expand dramatically. Today, framing the threat of Chinese influence in Africa as a zero-sum competition threatens a return to the flawed Cold War approach that undermined American interests on the continent. However, thanks to President Ronald Reagan’s vision outlined at Westminster “to foster the infrastructure of democracy,” the U.S. now maintains the resources and programming to support the development of political institutions abroad, especially in Africa.
Ghana’s recent history speaks to the advantages of a democracy-centered foreign-policy approach. As Ghana has entrenched its economic growth, political stability, and democracy, with Washington’s support, it has remained a key U.S. regional partner. Despite the acceleration of Chinese engagement in both the economic and political realms, U.S. policy toward Ghana has avoided becoming one-dimensionally focused on great-power competition, as is evidenced by the vast majority of U.S. assistance supporting Ghana’s health services, economic development, and education system. In addition, the U.S. has regularly supported the development and maintenance of democratic institutions, thereby engendering political accountability, a key advantage of democratic societies that has played a central role in checking Beijing’s influence.
Ghanaian civil-society activists and opposition politicians possess greater means to hold the government accountable in its dealings with China. Though negotiating power often remains tilted in Beijing’s favor, transparency and accountability reduce the kleptocratic kickbacks and secrecy that allow China to gain undue influence and resources from such deals. Democratic transparency and accountability also serve as a bulwark against Chinese political influence in Ghana. Though both major political parties in Ghana have participated in party-to-party exchanges with the CCP since 2016, the CCP has not coaxed Ghanaian parties into adopting the Chinese model of governance when in power, which frequently alternates. Ghana’s robust media environment, a key component of open and democratic societies, is a major contributor to this necessary level of transparency and accountability, including on Accra’s engagement with Beijing.
Given the transparency and accountability evident in Ghana’s political institutions and broader society, there are limits to Chinese influence there. Coté’s recommendation to downplay the emphasis on democracy would risk undermining democracy’s benefits, including in quelling Chinese influence, that are present in Ghana, and potentially engender a replay of the Cold War script where obsession with great-power competition fostered autocracies that allowed Soviet influence to thrive. Coté’s criticism of Vice President Kamala Harris’s “prioritizing democracy promotion” on her visit is thus unwarranted. To deprioritize democracy would risk reversing the progress Ghana has made in resisting Chinese engagement.
The unfortunate reality, however, is that most African countries do not possess the democratic institutions, such as free and fair elections, a robust civil society and media, and an independent judiciary, that are critical to diminishing some of China’s malign intentions. Thus, in many instances, the U.S. will have to, as Coté suggests, “hold [its] nose and work with imperfect allies who share [its] interests” since disengagement allows for autocracy to flourish, citizen agency to be quelled, and unchecked Chinese influence to prevail.
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, citizens have demanded transparency concerning various mining contracts with Chinese firms — uncompetitive and corrupt deals that often have prevented the U.S. from sourcing critical minerals. The continued development of democratic institutions in the DRC would raise the prospects for American economic investment and increase the likelihood that access to critical minerals such as cobalt is not cornered by China, since competition for contracts would be more transparent, accountable, and therefore equitable.
Democratic institutions will not develop overnight, and American support for them is certainly no guarantee that they’ll take root. But recognizing their central role in promoting American interests and curtailing nefarious Chinese influence is paramount. National Bureau of Asian Research fellow Nadège Rolland highlights the centrality of democratic institutions to countering Chinese influence in Africa. “Beijing is evidently striving to encourage African countries to adopt its governance practices in an effort to make them better client states,” Rolland writes, adding that it finds democracies harder to work with. Thus, she recommends that the U.S. should “work with African governments and civil society groups to bolster their efforts to build resilient, effective institutions and open societies.”
Rather than having democratic values play a supporting role and handling China’s influence in Africa by “competing with it directly,” the U.S. would be better off focusing less on competition with China in Africa and more on assisting the development of democratic political institutions, which in turn will diminish the most deleterious aspects of Chinese influence on the African continent, such as military engagement, sharp-power political and media-influence strategies, and economic coercion. This should not preclude the U.S. leveraging its comparative advantages in other realms by supporting infrastructure development and technology transfer, as Coté advocates. But ultimately, the U.S. will not be able to contend with the scale of China’s state-backed engagement in such areas. Only by promoting democratic values and institutions will the U.S. be able to promote its interests and keep China’s malign intentions in check. Contrary to Coté’s assertion, we can’t “beat China at its own game.” But we can beat it at ours, while helping the vast majority of Africans who seek to exercise their agency in democratic societies.