The United States is sleepwalking into a disaster of its own making.
The defense-industrial base that was once the foundation of American power has atrophied in ways that would astonish previous generations.
From raw materials to essential components to final assembly — and the supply chains that tie everything together — the U.S. has insufficient capacity, is vulnerable to shortage-prone inputs from single-source suppliers, and has little ability to surge production.
All the while, the world is growing more dangerous. We are approaching a full two years during which the U.S. and other Western powers have supplied Ukrainians with the critical weapons and munitions necessary for the defense of their country against an unprovoked Russian invasion. Taiwan’s government has prudently — if belatedly — begun to fortify itself against the threat of Beijing’s aggression. Now, Israel’s righteous war on her terrorist enemies will undoubtedly lead to a further drawing down of important stocks. Unless Americans choose to throw our friends to the wolves, our allies’ need for U.S. munitions and weapon systems will only grow.
But, unfortunately, the United States is no longer the muscular Arsenal of Democracy it once was. Americans should be alarmed by war games, such as those conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), showing that, should a fight come in the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. could blow through its entire stockpile of some long-range precision-guided munitions in only a few weeks of high-intensity conflict.
One example among many is the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile. Plentiful anti-ship cruise missiles will be vitally important assets in any attempt to stop a Chinese amphibious invasion of Taiwan. But in two dozen simulations, CSIS found that American forces quickly “went Winchester” on our entire reserve of LRASMs during just the first week of action. Until recently, it took nearly two years to produce a new missile from start to finish. Earlier this year, however, due to increasing demand, Lockheed Martin opened a second production line in its Troy, Ala., facility, upping total production of the LRASM and its variants to 500 per year. This is a good if insufficient start, but problems persist: The LRASM, along with most other American cruise missiles, operates with a turbofan built by a single American company.
There’s more, of course.
Amazingly, the United States — a continental nation full of vast natural resources — depends on foreign countries, including the People’s Republic of China, for raw materials and components for American weapons. In particular, China dominates the market on rare-earth minerals, which are crucial for the production of many modern munitions.
And despite the Chinese threat in the Pacific theater being primarily a maritime challenge, the U.S. is going the wrong way in shipbuilding. Despite repeated calls for a larger fleet, the Navy fell below its 300-ship target 20 years ago. Seth Cropsey, a former naval officer and the president of the Yorktown Institute, has described in these pages how the Navy’s submarine fleet has been net shrinking by a boat every other year. During a time when we need every submarine we can put to sea, we’ve been retiring four attack boats for every three we build!
If a fight comes over Taiwan, Americans should know that the time will have long since passed when we could have prudently built out our industrial capacity, ordered more weapons, or secured our supply chain.
There are many on both left and right who will object to the expense of such an effort. There will be grumbles about inefficiency, waste, and the profits earned by defense contracting companies. And certainly in any effort, checks must be put in place to keep national security from becoming an excuse for industrial policies not reasonably related to defense.
But the time for half measures is gone. The post–Cold War peace dividend has long since been spent. China, Russia, and Iran are congealing into an axis of revisionist powers with the shared hope of breaking the American-led order. Congress must allocate the funds that are necessary to rebuild and onshore critical parts of our defense-industrial base and supply chain. It must cut red tape, grant permits, waive certain environmental regulations, curtail NIMBYism, and extend financing to industry as required. And it must operate with seriousness while writing forward-looking budgets and offering ambitious multi-year acquisitions contracts in order to efficiently and predictably stimulate supply.
If a fight comes in the Taiwan Strait, not a single American will complain that the U.S. built too many advanced missiles or fast attack subs or that the capabilities of American industry are already up and running. We should think not only of what we build, but of what we can replace. That was the advantage that Americans had in past wars, and we are at grave risk of losing it.
No part of this problem will be easy or inexpensive to fix. The American defense-industrial base faces major shortfalls in three areas: time, money, and will. Congress can provide two out of the three; and there is no time to waste.