McConnell: ‘I Don’t Know How’ We Replenish Our Own Ammo If Spending Bill Stalls

The Senate minority leader speaks with NR about the Ukraine-aid bill, the failed border deal, and more.

S enate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell took a moment on Wednesday to speak with National Review. In our discussion, McConnell discussed his thoughts on the Senate-passed bill to aid America’s front-line partners, which has stalled in the House. In addition, he outlined his thoughts on the implications of the bipartisan border deal’s failure, the threats America faces abroad and our ability to meet them, and his hopes for the future of the conservative movement.

Thank you, Mr. Leader.

Do you mind if I, kind of, start here by tracing my own history that led to my views on this issue?

Of course.

My dad was a foot soldier under General [George S.] Patton in World War II. And he met the Russians in Pilsen in the Czech Republic. He wrote some letters to my mother — again, a regular foot soldier — saying he thought the Russians were going to be a big problem. And they certainly have been for most of my life.

We did a lot of smart things after World War II, which many prominent Republicans opposed — NATO and the Marshall Plan. One of the things I’ve noticed about Republicans is whether we are isolationist or internationalist sort of depends upon who the president is. [Robert] Taft and [Dwight D.] Eisenhower shot it out in ’52, and the international guy won.

It’s a good thing that we did what we did after World War II. I don’t think there’s much doubt that peace through strength plus NATO finally tore the Soviet Union down. And, as Americans typically do, we got optimistic that things were going to be different with the Russians. I think [Bill] Clinton, and [George W.] Bush, and even [Barack] Obama tried to treat Russia like a, sort of, normal country. But, alas, in the end, the smartest thing we — I was involved in it, not as a leader, but as a backbencher — [did was] expanding NATO all the way over to the Russian border. Very smart thing we did, and it hugely confined the Russians to their original country.

So, after the Berlin Wall fell, we thought our only real problem was going to be terrorism. We had 9/11. Terrorism is still out there, but now we have not just one big-power competitor but two, because the Chinese during that period became a national-security threat as well as a commercial competitor. So, I don’t think there is anything more important right now than getting this right.

When you have the prime minister of Japan saying, “If you want to send President Xi [Jinping] a message, beat Putin in Ukraine,” and the South Koreans, and the Taiwanese, and the Australians all think the same thing, this is big. We should be leading, not following.

When we have a Democrat in the White House, the isolationist side of the party is pretty prominent, and the most significant Republican with the biggest bullhorn is against the bill. So, it’s been a challenge.

What are the stakes if the Senate supplemental stalls out indefinitely? What does that communicate to our front-line partners and adversaries?

It would be very bad. Fortunately, every criticism of this [bill] has been wrong. One criticism you’ve heard people make was that the Europeans were not doing enough. Well, they’re doing as much as we are. The EU just sent $55 billion to Ukraine. The money we’re spending is not, most of it, going to Ukraine. It’s being spent in this country retooling our industrial base. They’ve argued, somehow, it’s irrelevant out in the Pacific. That’s totally false. I think regular citizens, you know, don’t have the time to follow the details, but the details are not unimportant. And I think every single argument I’ve heard against this is wrong in every way, both from a fact point of view and from a policy point of view.

You noted that this is basically an effort to rebuild our defense–industrial base and replenish our ordnance stocks and those of our allies. If this doesn’t get passed, is there a “Plan B” to do that within a realistic time frame necessary to meet the foreign challenges the Pentagon outlines?

I don’t know how, because the budgets we’ve been passing for the Defense Department are not adequate. This gives us the opportunity to do something we were basically not doing through the regular order. As you can tell, I can’t find any good argument against this, and that’s why, you know, at least for myself and the 22 Republican senators [who voted to approve the foreign-aid supplemental] — and it may have been more than that if we had a secret ballot — this is big stuff, important stuff.

What does the failure of the border deal say about the prospects for bipartisan lawmaking? Why would any member craft durable reforms if their participation in that process paints a target on their backs?

On that issue [of border security], we went through several phases. Everybody knows it’s a big issue. No question about that. Everybody knows we ought to do something. No question about that. And my conference, a few months ago, wanted to make a law. Well, obviously, to do that, we’ve got to talk to a Democratic Senate and a Democratic White House. Senator [James] Lankford did a hell of a job. I mean, his product was endorsed by the [National] Border [Patrol] Council, the big union down there, by the Wall Street Journal editorial page and the Washington Post editorial page. And then a number of our members said, “Well, it’s not good enough.” And then, our likely candidate — presidential candidate — said, “Don’t do it at all.” So, we went through these several phases before we got to the point where it was pretty clear we weren’t going to be able to do the border on this bill, but that’s not a good argument for not doing the rest of it.

Speaking of former president Donald Trump, Republican voters often cite the policies Trump pursued in his first term as the basis for their support, but, particularly on foreign policy, he hates all the architects of those policies, and the feeling is mutual. For example, do you think we would get a second Trump administration that is as confrontational toward Russia as it was in its first term?

I think we just don’t know. I know what I’m going to be doing, for whatever that’s worth: Arguing for Ukraine, and Israel, and NATO, and the international order that has been built in the years since World War II. Frankly, I’ve been disappointed in Biden as well. I thought the withdrawal from Afghanistan was an outrageously huge mistake.

Do you think that contributed to Russia’s second invasion of Ukraine?

Absolutely. I mean, no one can prove it, but the timing was interesting.

Do you have hope for the conservative movement within the Republican Party?

Well, I hope so. I think those of us who were, what I guess could best be described as traditional Reagan Republicans, are still around. We’ve had these internal debates over the years. And you’ve had, as I mentioned earlier, as prominent a Republican as Robert Taft being an isolationist. I think, in the end, there’s no question that, whoever the leader of the party is, he’s the president or the candidate for president, is going to have the most influence over the voters attracted to that particular party. And that may change from time to time.