Donald Trump can’t seem to decide what he wants to do with tariffs.
If Trump thinks tariffs are good in and of themselves, his promise for universal tariffs makes sense. Of course, that would immediately run into a wide range of problems, since people don’t really object to imports of out-of-season fruits and vegetables from South America, for instance, and the manufacturing sector would be slammed since about half of U.S. imports are inputs for domestic production.
Universal tariffs would also be a radical departure from Trump’s first-term trade policy, which focused on specific goods (e.g., steel and aluminum) and specific countries (e.g., China). Before even taking office for the second time, Trump reran an episode of his first-term trade policy by threatening 25 percent tariffs on all goods from Mexico and Canada in response to drugs and illegal immigration.
Following through on the threat would be enormously destructive to the U.S. economy and would hit politicians’ beloved automotive sector especially hard, as auto parts and finished cars traverse both borders by the thousands each day. It would also violate the USMCA that Trump brags was a major accomplishment of his first term. (Mexico is currently violating the USMCA, something Trump should crack down on, but these tariffs aren’t about that at all.)
It wouldn’t accomplish much of anything on fentanyl interdiction, since most fentanyl smugglers are U.S. citizens and plenty of fentanyl ingredients are simply sent through the mail. One of Trump’s top priorities in January absolutely should be securing the border, which means blocking the illegal entry of people and goods, not taxing the legal entry of goods and punishing the people who buy and sell them.
If the tariffs are simply a negotiating tool, as some tariff proponents say, then universal tariffs are untenable. What concessions is the U.S. looking to get from every country in the world all at once? And if every country is tariffed already, then threatening tariffs on specific countries for specific behaviors means less.
As we see in the Canada–Mexico example, the relationship between tariffs and the supposed goal in negotiations is tenuous at best. Using the threat of tariffs to get another country to open market access for certain industries is one thing. Making vague accusations about fentanyl and promising tariffs on everything from avocados to computers to oil to timber is another.
In the meantime, U.S. businesses have no idea what to expect the trade regime will be come January 20, and there’s no reason to believe Trump will stick to one policy even when he does assume office. This uncertainty creates major costs for Americans and makes planning around hiring and investment more difficult.
In the competition with China, keeping friendly countries onside and winning over neutral countries must be a priority. The U.S. has been derelict in this mission, especially in Latin America, as China has become a larger trading partner than the U.S. for many South and Central American countries. If China can promise stable trading relationships and the U.S. is liable to blow them up whenever the president feels like posting threats on social media, it’s hard to blame countries for opting for China.
At one moment, Trump seems to believe tariffs are a weapon that can be aimed at countries to force them to do what he wants. At another moment, he seems to believe tariffs are a good thing in and of themselves because they raise revenue or protect domestic industries. This basic inconsistency in his views will make it difficult to enact any kind of coherent trade policy, which means, if he gets his way, that the U.S. will experience the negative effects of tariffs in a more or less random way.