Forcing the Divestiture of Google Chrome

A fter winning a major antitrust lawsuit against Google this summer, the Department of Justice proposed a series of remedies last month, including the divestiture of Google’s Chrome browser and potentially its Android operating system. The DOJ’s remedies aim to address concerns about Google’s dominance in the online search market; however, they largely overlook an essential aspect of the case — how Google’s horizontal integration and ownership of Chrome and Android benefit consumers and the competitive process.

In August 2024, the Court of the District of Columbia found that Google had unlawfully maintained monopoly power in the relevant market for “general search services” (i.e., online platforms like Google that provide users with search results from across the Web) and “search text advertising” (i.e., advertisements displayed along with search results). Under the Sherman Act, a landmark law passed in 1890 to prevent monopolistic business conduct, possessing monopoly power alone is not per se a violation of U.S. antitrust law. However, practices that allow companies to maintain monopoly power through anticompetitive means are prohibited unless pro-competitive benefits (e.g., improved innovation or lower prices) justify them.

The district court determined that Google’s default search engine agreements with third parties bolstered its dominance in a way that violated antitrust law. However, while addressing Google’s alleged dominance, the court and the DOJ have paid limited attention to the broader context of Google’s ecosystem — which includes Chrome and Android — and how it benefits consumers and the competitive process in markets beyond those for online searches.

First, Google users benefit from Google’s integrated suite of products, which has become a major factor in attracting users to its ecosystem. A comparable but more limited example can be seen in the Apple ecosystem, where users appear to value the integrated experience across Apple devices and applications. Horizontal integration also plays an essential role in improving functionality. For example, Chrome supports the search engine by refining the relevance of its search results, while integrating Google Translate improves Chrome’s functionality and the translation tool itself through user feedback. While such integration can raise competition concerns, these concerns must be examined against the benefits that consumers receive through more streamlined, improved quality across the product ecosystem.

From a cost perspective, Google’s business model — in which advertising accounts for around 78 percent of its revenue — allows it to cross-subsidize certain products and offer them at reduced costs. That is one reason why, unlike Microsoft Office, Google Workspace products, such as Google Docs and Sheets, do not require a paid subscription — ultimately benefiting consumers through lower costs and improved competition. Whether the proposed remedies will affect the provision of such services is another important question that does not appear to have received significant attention from the DOJ and the court.

Beyond direct consumer benefits, there are also important implications for competition in other markets. Unlike Apple, Google allows third-party companies to install its open-source operating system and Google Mobile Services (GMS) applications, which include the Google Play Store and other essential apps such as Google Maps, YouTube, and Gmail. The ability to use Google’s platform and GMS applications without needing to develop such tools in-house lowers entry barriers for emerging smartphone and tablet manufacturers, allowing them to compete more effectively with established players like Apple and Samsung. However, mandating the divestiture of Chrome and Android could pose significant challenges to such practices with pro-competitive benefits.

Forced divestiture and other proposed remedies, such as requiring Google to share user query data with third parties, would, of course, provide some competition-enhancing benefits. However, such measures risk significantly disrupting the user experience, weakening the quality of Google’s product offerings, and exposing users to significant data privacy and security risks. These risks must be carefully considered and evaluated against potential competition benefits for each proposed remedy.

While the district court’s initial ruling focused on Google’s dominance, pro-competition arguments could find a more sympathetic hearing from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. That was the case, for example, for the United States v. Microsoft in 2001, when the appeals court took a broader view of market dynamics and overturned the lower court’s ruling. While the most likely outcome is a protracted lawsuit, Google should have a strong case as it appeals the proposed remedies.