James Burnham’s Divided Legacy

C onservatives are more divided over American involvement in Ukraine than liberals are. Some conservatives continue to favor aid for the nation Russia invaded, a stance resembling the anti-Russia position of the Cold War, updated for a world of American hegemony. Other conservatives preach an “America First” approach that questions U.S. interest in Ukraine’s security as part of a broader skepticism of the post–Cold War international order. Both views can to some degree be traced to James Burnham, an influential academic who became an editor at National Review after abandoning communism. That’s because there were in fact two James Burnhams. Each inspired a part of American conservatism.

The first James Burnham was an international hawk. Writing during the Cold War, this Burnham demanded a hardline aggressive foreign policy that aimed at liberating the people of Eastern Europe from the Soviet yoke. His The Struggle for the World (1947) warns against Soviet expansion and insists that the United States must use power — possibly even violence — to confront the Soviet behemoth because containment could never win. The hardliner argued that provincial isolationism no longer sufficed in the dangerous post–World War II era. This Burnham demanded an American empire — specifically, a soft empire, through which the United States exerted its power around the world against communism.

This internationalist Burnham favored a U.S.-led NATO. He believed that the U.S. must use hard and soft power in the international arena, or it would be used against her. Power had to be used against communists because they sought to expand their totalitarian system around the world. Burnham was an “America Firster.” Yet unlike pre– and post–Cold War “America Firsters,” his prioritizing the U.S. meant American engagement with the world. The haunting specter of communism required this. Anything else would lead to the destruction of the United States, something no patriot could accept.

This Burnham would have favored American involvement in Ukraine. Influenced by the geopolitical strategist Halford Mackinder, Burnham viewed Eastern Europe as the world’s pivot point; whoever controlled this “heartland” controlled the world. From 1955–1978, Burnham promoted international activism as senior editor for National Review.

In a 1971 article titled “Joys and Sorrow of Empire,” he argued that the United States was a hegemony, whether she liked it or not. And being rich and powerful had a price. Americans had duties, or what Burnham called “imperial responsibilities.” These included maintaining the health and prosperity not just of her citizens, but of her “allies, associates and clients.” Couldn’t the U.S. renounce her duties, maybe if she promised to limit her privileges? No, she could not. Burnham told a story from his schoolboy days when the strongest kid on the block did not want to be the champ; he preferred the role of chump. Consequently, he got abused by everyone, even the weakest boy.

Neoconservatives draw from this Burnham. The influential 1996 article “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy” by William Kristol and Robert Kagan could just have easily been called “Toward a Neo-Burnhamite Foreign Policy.” It contained the central ideas from Burnham’s writings. Explicitly rejecting neo-isolationism, it demanded American leadership in the world. The most powerful nation on Earth could not retreat in the post–Cold War era. Kristol and Kagan advocated a “benevolent hegemony,” one whereby the United States would exert disproportionate power around the world. And they contended that Americans needed to be better educated about the nature of the global leadership position that had fallen to them.

There was a second James Burnham, however. Though related to the first one, this Burnham was different. He advocated internationalism, but decried globalism. He argued that whereas internationalism was good and natural, globalists were neo-Marxist “ideological hucksters.” This second James Burnham equated globalism with humanitarianism and universalism — two things he resisted. This James Burnham criticized international organizations such as the U.N., believing that they worked against the interest of the United States by providing cover for communist expansion. In a 1962 piece for NR titled “What to Do About the UN,” Burnham reasoned that all nations pursued their own interests, and thus the United Nations, at least diplomatically, was meaningless, regardless of what the “disillusioned junta from the upper echelons of the Establishment” tell us.

The second James Burnham was domestically oriented. He penned classics such as The Managerial Revolution (1941) and The Machiavellians (1943). Preceding current conservative positions by eight decades, these works promote a worldview that distrusts the bureaucracy, government, and the ruling elite. The Managerial Revolution predicts a future ruled by corporate managers and bureaucrats. The Machiavellians insists that the elites only work to perpetuate their power and privilege, making them the enemies of democracy.

In a 1959 article for Human Events, Burnham provided the example of the faceless “permanent officers” of the Public Health Service. These people advocated for the expansion of government health-care services to promote their own power and special interests. They may not be ideological socialists, but they usually vote liberal. And it is not just health care in which nonelected officials wield power. Agriculture, education, social insurance, housing, and even the military have members whose entire livelihood is invested in the state. The distrustful Machiavellian maintains that such bureaucrats naturally oppose any policy that shrinks the state because that would mean cutting their own throat.

Burnham contended that the bureaucracy does not just shape domestic policy. Through groups like the CIA, the bureaucracy even directs foreign policy. The State Department and the Foreign Service are loaded with people whose “independent power” is so great, he designates them “Indians” because they exist outside the bounds of any federal oversight. Burnham insists that even some foreign policy decisions were made by the “permanent bureaucracy rather than the President and his supposedly policy-making appointees.” This Burnham shaped the attitudes that have culminated in the efforts by President Trump and Elon Musk at DOGE.

Also consistent with President Trump, this Burnham was not an ideologue or a universalist. He questioned whether parts of the non-Western world were even capable of Western-style democracy. This Burnham would have questioned nation-building in the Middle East and American involvement in Ukraine, likely believing that they were not in America’s best interests. This Burnham helped inspire the relative isolationism of paleoconservatives such as Pat Buchanan (whose torch would be passed to Trump). Whereas Kristol and Kagan urged using U.S. power to overthrow Saddam Hussein, Buchanan demanded an “America First” approach that meant promoting U.S. economic and geopolitical interests above any cosmopolitan or humanitarian ideals.

More isolationist paleocons tend to reference an NR article that Burnham wrote in 1972 titled “Selective, Yes. Humanism, Maybe.” It rejected the existence of a universal humanity. Under a subtitle “My Tribe and Yours,” Burnham argued that humans are naturally tribal — we all want our country to win the war and our team to win the pennant. This Burnham doubted that non-Western nations were even capable of achieving Western style democracy and economic status.

James Burnham’s intellectual legacy is profound. In 1987, William Buckley called Burnham National Review’s “dominant intellectual influence.” Burnham’s ideas are today reflected in divisions within conservatism over the war in Ukraine.