Trade

A Trade Deal Without Teeth Isn’t Worth the Paper It’s Printed On

Seated from left: Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto, President Donald Trump, and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau at the USMCA signing ceremony in Buenos Aires, Argentina, November 30, 2018. (Shealah Craighead/White House)
USMCA’s success cannot hinge on political mood swings.

When Canada, the United States, and Mexico signed USMCA, their new free trade agreement, in 2018, it was supposed to lock in a generation of trade stability. The agreement modernized NAFTA for a digital era, expanded market access, and renewed North America’s commitment to open and rules-based commerce. Six years later, the deal’s durability is already in question.

The problem isn’t that trade volumes have fallen — they’ve grown. The problem is enforceability. When one partner disregards the spirit and letter of the deal without consequence, the entire North American trade framework collapses. The 2026 USMCA review must deliver ironclad enforcement provisions that make the rules stick.


At the heart of the coming 2026 review — or renegotiation, as it is fast becoming — must be a serious conversation about how to ensure the rules are respected. An agreement that can be violated or ignored with impunity is no agreement at all.

The Trump administration’s renewed use of Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Expansion Act — claiming “national security” to justify punitive tariffs on Canadian steel, aluminum, and, more recently, copper — reveals the core weakness of the current deal. These tariffs are not about national security. They are protectionism dressed up as patriotism.

Canada is the United States’ closest ally, an integrated defense partner, and a supplier of critical materials that underpin North American security itself. To suggest that Canadian metals threaten U.S. security is as illogical as claiming that oxygen threatens life. Yet Washington has repeatedly used Section 232 as a cudgel to extract concessions or to appease domestic lobbies, knowing that the trade remedies within USMCA are too slow, too narrow, and too political to deter bad behavior.




Compounding the problem, the Trump administration has invoked the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose further tariffs on Canadian exports — an unprecedented use of an emergency war powers statute against a treaty partner. This directly undermines USMCA’s credibility.

The genius of a free trade agreement lies in its predictability, in the assurance that once a deal is signed, its terms will be respected. Investors, exporters, and workers make long-term decisions based on that promise. If the rules are discarded, the foundation crumbles.

What has become clear to Canadians since 2018 is that the United States can weaponize its domestic legislation to override its international commitments, and that Canada and Mexico have no equivalent recourse. We can appeal to panels, lodge diplomatic protests, or apply narrow retaliatory tariffs — but the power imbalance remains.


That is why the most important outcome of the 2026 review must be a beefed-up enforcement and compliance regime, one that removes the temptation for any country to play fast and loose with the spirit and intent of the agreement and protects investors across North America from further uncertainty.

First, snapback provisions should be introduced to automatically reinstate reciprocal tariffs or penalties when any member state imposes unjustified trade measures. In other words, retaliation would be automatic, not discretionary, deterring violations before they occur.

Second, we need a legislative lock-in mechanism to ensure a president or prime minister can’t unilaterally invoke national security statutes (like Section 232 or IEEPA) against its treaty partners without legislative oversight.


Third, the notorious “poison-pill” withdrawal clause must be revisited. The current Article 34.6 allows any party to withdraw from USMCA with just six months’ notice. That clause invites instability as every election cycle brings the threat of a walkout. A renegotiated agreement should instead require a supermajority domestic approval to withdraw, and a multi-year consultation process that presages a party’s intention to exit.

Fourth, binding dispute settlement panels must be empowered to issue timely, enforceable decisions. The slow-motion rulings we’ve seen on dairy access and auto rules-of-origin disputes underscore the need for deadlines measured in weeks, not years. Without timely resolution, even the most sophisticated legal architecture becomes meaningless.

Finally, we must consider a North American Trade Stability Council — a permanent, independent body with the authority to monitor compliance, recommend remedies, and publicly report on violations. Sunlight is a powerful disinfectant.


Critics will argue that these measures infringe on sovereignty. But true sovereignty is not the freedom to break promises; it is the discipline to keep them. A stronger enforcement regime would benefit all three nations, protecting jobs, investments, and public confidence within the rule of law.

USMCA’s success cannot hinge on political mood swings. All parties need assurances that when they open their markets, the rules will hold. American manufacturers, in particular, need stable access to the continent’s integrated supply chains — from Ontario’s auto corridor to Mexico’s semiconductor hubs.

A new, enforceable USMCA would also signal to the world that North America still believes in rules-based trade at a time when protectionism and economic nationalism are on the rise globally.

If Canada broadens out the renegotiations to a “grander bargain,” it will have a great deal to offer the U.S. — our critical minerals, energy exports, agricultural reliability, and shared security commitments — but an even greater contribution would be to champion a framework that ensures predictability, fairness, and enforceability.


All parties should pursue enforceability as insurance — insurance against arbitrary politics, protectionist whims, and the erosion of trust that has so severely damaged the global trading system.

If we get enforcement right, the rest will follow. Without it, no amount of market access or modernization will matter.

Ed Fast, distinguished fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute and the Center for North American Prosperity and Security, is a former Minister of International Trade who led Canada’s negotiations on CETA, the TPP, and the Canada–Korea Free Trade Agreement.
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