

Driven by anti-Trump rhetoric, many Democrats have become unwilling — or unable — to stand with Venezuela’s fight for freedom.
S ince the start of President Trump’s crusade against Nicolás Maduro’s drug empire, many Democratic officials have voiced grave concerns. They argue that Trump’s hard-line approach — from sweeping sanctions to hints of military action — risks dragging the U.S. into another “forever war.”
Whereas concerns about the legality of the 16 lethal drug-boat strikes that have killed 66 alleged narco-terrorists, and about Trump’s potential abuse of presidential authority, are still up for debate, House Foreign Affairs Committee Democrats also warned on social media that “Trump and [Marco] Rubio are pushing for regime change in Venezuela.” In September 2025, Democratic House leaders such as Representative Gregory Meeks likewise warned Trump’s authorization of lethal strikes on Venezuelan targets “risks dragging us into another endless war.”
Former Biden administration officials have echoed these warnings. Juan S. González, who served as one of President Biden’s top Western Hemisphere advisers, described Trump’s maneuvers — such as his deploying Navy ships and even striking a suspected drug boat — as “a lot of political theatre” that carried a “very high risk of military confrontation.” The Democratic narrative about the Republican approach to Venezuela has been somewhat consistent since 2017: Trump’s “maximum pressure” strategy — including sanctions, covert actions, and bellicose rhetoric — is viewed as dangerous adventurism that could harm Venezuelan civilians and entangle America in war.
Venezuelans, meanwhile, tell a very different story — one that suggests that the greater danger lies in doing too little rather than too much. Far from rallying against U.S. pressure, the overwhelming majority of Venezuelans support strong measures to remove Maduro’s authoritarian regime. Polling consistently shows that Venezuelan public opinion rejects Maduro and even welcomes international intervention to end their country’s agony. According to a recent poll, nearly 63 percent of Venezuelans say Maduro is not the country’s legitimate president, and 74 percent of those who oppose his regime support a U.S. policy aimed at removing Maduro from power. This feeling is not new: A nationwide survey in March 2019 found that a stunning 87.5 percent of Venezuelans were in favor of foreign intervention to oust Maduro.
The desire for regime change in Venezuela is not a Trumpian obsession — it is a popular demand of the Venezuelan people. When Democrats say, “Americans don’t want another war,” they overlook that Trump doesn’t want one either — what he wants is to stop the influx of drugs into America and to deter the expansion of socialism in America’s front yard, which could be achieved only by removing Maduro.
Democrats who warn that tougher action could hurt Venezuelans should consider that Venezuelans are already living through a catastrophe equal to a war — except this war is being waged by Maduro’s regime against his own citizens. By almost every metric, Venezuela’s collapse in the past decade is unprecedented in modern history. The currency is now practically worthless, with hyperinflation hitting 300,000 percent in 2019. More than 90 percent of Venezuelans live in poverty, and about two-thirds in extreme poverty, unable to afford basic food and medicine. Over one-third of the population skips meals or goes entire days without eating. More than 8 million Venezuelans have fled their homeland, and 7.6 million people still inside Venezuela require humanitarian aid.
Consequently, Venezuelans overwhelmingly blame Maduro’s policies — not U.S. sanctions — for their suffering. In fact, the status quo is far deadlier than any calibrated intervention or sanctions regime could ever be. Democrats’ fears that Trump’s hard-line stance will hurt Venezuelans in fact promotes a narrative that the regime has designed to rally some international opposition against Trump. González worries that a U.S. intervention would be “disastrous” — and, indeed, any military engagement must be well planned. But one is compelled to ask: Disastrous compared with what?
Let’s be clear: A disaster already occurred when González helped draft the Biden White House’s Venezuela playbook. First came the “deals” — the administration green‑lit swaps that sent Maduro’s convicted narco‑nephews home in 2022 and freed his sanctioned financier Alex Saab in 2023, demonstrating to the regime’s inner circle that they could act with impunity. Then came the Barbados Agreement, sold by Washington with six‑month sanctions relief through Office of Foreign Assets Control general licenses that reopened the oil, gas, and gold spigots; Maduro pocketed the benefits while reneging on core electoral guarantees. In the months that followed, regime coffers swelled — the state-run PDVSA energy company booked $17.5 billion in oil sales in 2024 — while Maduro tightened his grip. Inside Venezuela, the state jacked up spending by 77 percent and allotted roughly $684 million to the defense ministry; after the fraudulent July 2024 vote, security forces unleashed a wave of repression — 25 killed, 2,400 arrested — and announced two “reeducation” maximum‑security prisons for protesters.
Meanwhile, Washington waited months to call opposition candidate Edmundo González Urrutia the “president‑elect,” finally using that phrase in November 2024, while the regime’s crackdown was long underway. This coincided with the largest border surge on record — 2.47 million encounters at the southern border in fiscal year 2023 — and with the Venezuelan Tren de Aragua gang’s establishing a documented footprint in the U.S., according to Customs and Border Protection intelligence and DHS removals. Democrats like Juan González overlook that Trump’s rise was fueled by their own policy failures — some of which exported Venezuela’s lawlessness to U.S. streets.
The U.S. isn’t being capricious with Venezuela — Maduro exploited years of failed nonmilitary efforts to secure sanctions relief and break promises. Venezuelans decided on July 28, 2024, that they no longer want the Maduro regime, when the tallies showed Edmundo González winning the presidential election with more than 67 percent of the vote. Venezuela is not Iraq or Afghanistan; there is no ethnic or religious conflict that could drag out an intervention. The best parallels to Venezuela are Grenada, Panama, and Kuwait — where U.S. interventions restored sovereignty and lasting stability. At least now, with Trump, someone is fighting alongside Venezuelans.