In Venezuela, Which Leader Will Trump Choose?

Left: Venezuela’s interim president Delcy Rodriguez speaks during a ceremony honoring Venezuelan and Cuban military and security personnel who died during the U.S. operation to capture Nicolas Maduro, in Caracas, January 8, 2026. Right: Venezuelan opposition leader Maria Corina Machado gestures at a protest ahead of the inauguration of Nicolas Maduro for his third term, in Caracas, January 9, 2025. (Leonardo Fernandez Viloria, Maxwell Briceno/Reuters)

Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has the early advantage, but democratic María Corina Machado offers better long-term prospects.

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Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has the early advantage, but democratic María Corina Machado offers better long-term prospects.

L ast week, Venezuelan opposition leader María Corina Machado visited the White House and presented President Donald J. Trump with her hard-earned Nobel Peace Prize medal, as a “sign of brotherhood between the U.S. and Venezuela.” It was a touching gesture, and for the moment, Trump was pleased: “María presented me with her Nobel Peace Prize for the work I have done. Such a wonderful gesture of mutual respect.”

Although Machado left with no guarantees of support, the visit highlighted her political smarts. Not presenting Trump a list of demands, a la Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in his contentious Oval Office meeting last February, ensured a positive outcome. Still, Trump remains cool to a democratic transition.


In fact, the Trump administration is moving closer to her rival Delcy Rodríguez’s leftist “Bolivarian” regime in Caracas. Trump called the far-left Rodriguez “a terrific person” and has stated she is doing everything the U.S. asked of her. Last week, CIA Director John Ratcliffe visited interim President Rodriguez’s government and offered cooperation on issues such as drug trafficking. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent also said recently that the U.S. would begin lifting some economic sanctions soon.

What gives here? Those hoping that Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro’s capture early this month would lead to Washington forcing a democratic transition, perhaps involving opposition candidate Edmundo González, have been disappointed. Former Trump administration Venezuela coordinator Elliott Abrams recently criticized the administration for having no clear plan. He cited several areas that the U.S. is neglecting: removing corrupt ministers, developing a workable program for Venezuelan oil, and pressing Caracas on freeing political prisoners.

So far, the policy does lack consistency. The U.S. just seized its sixth oil tanker transporting Venezuelan oil. Washington maintains the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier strike group in Venezuela’s vicinity. Although no attacks on Venezuelan drug boats have been reported lately, these could start up again. In a recent call with the G7, Secretary of State Marco Rubio still referred to “a proper, judicious transition of power in Venezuela.”




Perhaps some “strategic ambiguity” is wise at this early stage. After all, the limited operation to arrest Maduro and put him on trial did not mean decapitating the government. Former national security specialist and Iraq expert Charles Duelfer praised the administration for learning something from our ill-fated decision in 2003 to dismantle the Iraqi government and military. For its part, the Trump administration has been clear that maintaining continuity in government to maintain order was always a goal. Trump did not believe an opposition-led government could do that, a position reportedly briefed to the administration by the CIA. Meanwhile, important pieces must be put in place, such as reopening the embassy in Caracas and reestablishing diplomatic missions.

Besides, Venezuela is not ripe for a political transition. The dire economic conditions that led to a mass exodus from Venezuela during Trump’s first term have improved somewhat. Hyperinflation has ended. Even the sky-high murder rate has shrunk. Although the population has gotten much poorer over the past several years, conditions are not critical.


Yet there is still hope for Machado’s prospects. Washington might come around to regime change as its eventual policy for Venezuela. Trump probably will find out soon that having a cooperative relationship with Rodríguez’s far-left regime in Caracas is easier said than done. In fact, all his strategic goals for Venezuela — foreign powers out, U.S. oil companies back in — probably can only be achieved by a pro-U.S., democratically accountable government, whether led by exiled Gonzalez or perhaps Machado herself after new elections.

Since 1999, when Venezuela’s far-left Bolivarian movement of Hugo Chávez came to power, all U.S. governments have sought a constructive relationship with Caracas. All eventually gave up out of frustration. The reason is simple: The Bolivarian movement was founded on opposition to U.S. political and economic hegemony in the region. It aspired to take Venezuela in an opposite direction from the more pro-U.S. policies of the previous democratic governments. Hence, Caracas kicked out the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration in 2005; we have not had an ambassador serving in Venezuela since 2010, and the U.S. embassy itself has been closed since 2019. Resisting Washington is in Caracas’s DNA.


Now, the Trump administration is raising the bar for cooperation very high indeed. Caracas must force out our rivals — the Chinese, Cubans, Iranians, and Russians. This alleged narco-state must cooperate on counterdrug efforts. Most significantly, it must turn over its oil production for Washington to manage. Basically, Caracas must surrender its foreign policy and economy. It is difficult to believe any government, and especially one as left-wing as Rodriguez’s, can agree to such terms and remain in power.

Likewise, Caracas has no intention of being dominated by foreign oil companies. Its relationship with Chevron, the only U.S. oil company operating in Venezuela, is tolerated out of desperation. In his January 9 meeting with U.S. oil company CEOs, Trump got an earful on how inhospitable the current Venezuelan environment is to U.S. oil producers. It seems far-fetched to think that any government headed by Rodríguez and her allies would offer broad concessions to U.S. oil firms.


Rodríguez’s regime may not be going anywhere soon, but it still finds itself in a tough spot, so outward cooperation with Washington makes sense. Its army and Cuban mercenaries were humiliated by the U.S. Delta Force’s raid on Maduro’s compound, which allegedly killed 32 Cuban members of his security team. Maduro’s trial will discomfort regime stalwarts, several of whom, like the Machiavellian Interior Minister Diosdado Cabello, are also under federal indictment for drug trafficking.

Rodríguez is trying to square the circle. Despite her cooperative tone with Trump, Rodríguez and company continue to stoke the anti-U.S. fires at home. They continue to drag their feet on releasing more political prisoners. The State Department has issued a “do not travel” warning for Americans intending to visit Venezuela.


Moreover, the opposition probably will not stay quiet for long. All through Maduro’s twelve-year rule, Venezuela experienced several episodes of major political unrest. It seems unlikely that the unelected Rodríguez regime will long escape that. Now under Washington scrutiny, it would be handcuffed in a stern response.

The drama in this dual courtship is just beginning. María Corina Machado is right to demonstrate patience. When Trump’s relationship with Rodríguez sours, as it seems bound to do, Machado will be waiting.

Michael J. Ard directs the Intelligence Analysis master’s program at Johns Hopkins University and is the former deputy National Intelligence Officer for the Western Hemisphere.
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