No, America Is Not Adopting a ‘Spheres-of-Influence’ Doctrine

I n the days since U.S. special operations forces plucked Venezuelan dictator Nicolás Maduro from his hideout on a Venezuelan military base, a theme has percolated from the pens of foreign policy elites: The Trump administration’s actions demonstrate that Washington is not only trying to enforce U.S. hegemony in the Western Hemisphere but is also ushering in a world where regions are carved up between the great powers. As author Anne Applebaum wrote in The Atlantic on Monday, “Trump’s pursuit of an illusory sphere of influence is unlikely to bring us peace or prosperity — any more than the invasion of Ukraine brought peace and prosperity to Russians — and this might become clear sooner than anyone expects.”

But is Trump really interested in adopting a spheres-of-influence doctrine as these critics proclaim? No.

On the surface, you can understand why some might assume that Trump is open to sitting down with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping to divvy up the world’s resources. After all, the Trump administration has loudly declared the Western Hemisphere as America’s to dominate. The 2025 U.S. National Security Strategy placed the Western Hemisphere on top of the list of regions where U.S. power and influence will be used most aggressively. The U.S. State Department was unequivocal on this point: “This is OUR Hemisphere, and President Trump will not allow our security to be threatened.” Trump himself has referred to the Monroe Doctrine repeatedly, which suggests that the days when the United States was willing to tolerate non-hemispheric powers in Latin America are over. “American dominance in the Western Hemisphere will never be questioned again,” Trump told reporters after Maduro was captured. “Won’t happen.”

Yet for Trump to truly adopt a spheres-of-influence framework, the United States would have to offer concessions to the world’s other great powers. In theory, that means accepting the notion that China has the right to swallow up East Asia and, similarly, that Russia has an exclusive claim to the lands of the former Soviet Union. Putting this theory into practice would translate into Trump ordering a massive U.S. military drawdown from both regions, deprioritizing trade relationships there, and essentially giving Washington’s two strategic competitors carte blanche without much or any U.S. resistance.

However, to call this scenario’s likelihood of coming to pass exceedingly slim is perhaps to give it too much credence. Even if one assumed Trump was interested in striking a grand geopolitical deal with Putin and Xi, there’s no evidence he’s actually willing to do so.

The Trump administration’s policy in Europe is an apt illustration. Much has been made of the way Trump has utilized various forms of pressure on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to strike a peace settlement with Putin to end the nearly four-year war in Ukraine. In contrast to Joe Biden, Trump is far more willing to utilize the stick on the Ukrainians; when Zelensky was putting forth a maximalist position on what a peace accord should look like, Trump threw him out of the White House in a fit of rage and temporarily restricted U.S. military and intelligence assistance to Kyiv. When Zelensky began cooperating with Trump’s peace efforts shortly thereafter, those same restrictions were lifted. The Trump administration has permitted NATO allies to buy U.S. weapons for Ukraine’s behalf ever since, an arrangement that wouldn’t be occurring if Trump was seriously contemplating a true spheres-of-influence strategy.

The U.S. military presence in Europe remains intact as well. There are approximately 80,000 U.S. ground forces deployed on the European continent today, stretching from the U.K. and Germany to the Baltics. The U.S. military continues to operate 40 bases in Europe as well, and U.S. exercises with European states haven’t declined in any precipitous way. When the Trump administration announced a partial withdrawal of U.S. forces in Romania, U.S. Army officials quickly made it known that this decision did not mean “an American withdrawal from Europe or a signal of lessened commitment to Nato and article 5.” Needless to say, these aren’t the actions of someone interested in leaving the region to Putin’s graces.

The same can be said regarding East Asia. There’s no disputing the fact that as China’s wealth has grown and its military modernization campaign has progressed over the last two decades, China has become more ambitious in its neighborhood. Beijing is picking a fight with Japan over the latter’s talk about possibly getting involved in the defense of Taiwan; the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is conducting air sorties across the Taiwan Strait median line on a regular basis; and Pentagon officials have documented China’s development of an intercontinental ballistic missile capability.

If Trump is content with a major drawdown in East Asia, however, he hasn’t shown it. The U.S. force posture in the region, underlined by a constellation of military bases, surveillance sites and mutual defense agreements, is as extensive today as it was before Trump came into office. The Trump administration announced an $11 billion sale of defense systems to Taiwan last month, the largest weapons package in Taiwan’s history, to help the self-governed island strengthen its deterrent against a possible PLA amphibious invasion. And a day after China and Russia engaged in joint air exercises near Japan, the United States followed up with a joint exercise of its own. In turn, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth is working to find more access points for U.S. forces in the First Island Chain, both to bolster deterrence against a Taiwan scenario and promote interoperability between the U.S. military and its allies.

In short, despite Trump’s promises of ushering in a more unconventional foreign policy, he’s still effectively aiming for global primacy, albeit in a more brash and unapologetic way than usual. The spheres-of-influence debate is a red herring, and we should stop pretending otherwise.