A U.S. effort to reopen the Strait of Hormuz would not replicate the operational problem faced at the Dardanelles in World War I.
A U.S. effort to reopen the Strait of Hormuz would not replicate the operational problem faced at the Dardanelles in World War I.
T his past week, Asli Aydintaşbaş of the Brookings Institution wrote an essay in the New York Times that urges the U.S. not to “repeat Winston Churchill’s deadly mistake” at the Dardanelles — the strait linking the Sea of Marmara with the Aegean and Mediterranean Seas — and force open the Strait of Hormuz. That analogy is a strained one.
The Strait of Hormuz is geographically unlike the Dardanelles of 1915. At its narrowest point, Hormuz is roughly 21 miles wide, whereas the Dardanelles narrows to about 3.75 miles. That difference matters: Physically closing the Strait of Hormuz is more difficult, particularly when it comes to reliably employing weapons across the full channel. Furthermore, U.S. partners occupy one side of the strait, whereas the Ottomans commanded both shores, and U.S. Fifth Fleet/CENTCOM planners have decades of experience tracking local craft movements that could signal mine-laying preparations.
Recent U.S. and Israeli operations have also degraded Iran’s conventional naval capacity. In addition, U.S. and Israeli air dominance makes it difficult for Iran to employ drones, missiles, or other weapons without rapid counter-battery strikes. Taken together, today’s conditions suggest the Strait of Hormuz could be reopened by coordinated air and maritime fires in ways that were not feasible in 1915. Although even a threat of sea mining can spike insurance rates, laying and sustaining effective minefields in the Strait of Hormuz likely exceeds Iran’s current, degraded mine-laying capacity.
Even if large-scale mining is unlikely, U.S. warships transiting the Strait of Hormuz would still face meaningful risk from missiles and drones. Reaction times to inbound missiles are measured in fractions of a second, so detection, electronic warfare, and layered point defenses would be decisive. Carrier aviation and F-35B sorties from amphibious-ready groups such as Tripoli or Boxer could provide overwatch and rapid counter-battery strikes against coastal launch sites. Even with these measures, a “damn the missiles and drones, full speed ahead” approach could still result in damaged ships and potential losses.
Unlike the Dardanelles in 1915, a U.S. fleet forcing the Strait of Hormuz would not face an extended voyage in contested waters. Once through, it would operate along a friendly littoral supported by Gulf allies and partners. In that sense, the situation is closer to Admiral Farragut’s 1862 run past Confederate batteries at Vicksburg: a dangerous passage, followed by comparatively safer waters and more reliable support.
Iran’s ability to contest a forced transit may also be more limited than it was before the current conflict with the U.S. and Israel. Recent strikes have shown Iran’s integrated air and missile defenses to be largely ineffective. The regular Iranian navy and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy have reportedly suffered significant losses, raising questions about Iran’s ability to mine the Strait of Hormuz traffic-separation scheme — or the approaches to it in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman — at meaningful scale.
By contrast, in 1915, Turkish gun batteries — especially mobile howitzers — remained largely intact and were difficult to suppress with British and French naval gunfire. Only at the mouth of the Dardanelles did British Royal Marines and sailors raid Ottoman forts and destroy some guns. The British employed early, experimental aviation-directed fires against deeper targets, but with limited effect.
The window for success also closed quickly when British naval commanders hesitated after losses. Vice Admiral John de Robeck vacillated following the failed attempt to force the Dardanelles on March 18, 1915, when two British and one French battleship were sunk by mines and three others were damaged. De Robeck’s chief of staff, Commodore Roger Keyes — who personally led efforts to recover crews while under fire — urged continuing the attack, without success. First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill offered additional outmoded pre-dreadnought battleships to replace losses, but de Robeck stalled, in part expecting the arriving land component under General Sir Ian Hamilton to seize the forts. Poor weather further delayed any resumption of the attack for nearly two weeks.
The delay proved costly. Ottoman batteries were reportedly low on ammunition, and officials in Constantinople were preparing to abandon the city, expecting it to soon fall under the guns of the British fleet. While weather played a role, the losses of March 18 — though incurred by older, outmoded ships — shook de Robeck’s confidence. And it is on this point that comparison between 1915 and 2026 is most apt. Should a modern U.S. effort to force open the Strait of Hormuz incur meaningful casualties, it could similarly erode confidence, particularly after decades of comparatively limited naval combat losses. But this is true of any hypothetical naval action.
A U.S. effort to reopen the Strait of Hormuz would not replicate the operational problem faced by the Anglo-French fleet at the Dardanelles in 1915. Modern airpower, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance), and precision fires enable far more effective suppression of coastal threats than naval guns alone could deliver a century ago. Mines would remain a serious concern, but Iran’s ability to lay and sustain minefields at scale appears constrained, and any attempted closure would unfold under persistent surveillance and strike pressure. The passage would still be dangerous and should be approached deliberately, but it has far less potential to be a graveyard for U.S. forces in the way the Dardanelles operation ultimately was for the British war on the Ottoman Empire.