These back-to-back events in Beijing have profound implications for the emerging world order.
These back-to-back events in Beijing have profound implications for the emerging world order.
D onald Trump had barely departed China after his high-stakes summit with Xi Jinping when news broke that Vladimir Putin would arrive in Beijing on May 19 for another summit with the Chinese leader. The symbolism is nothing short of overwhelming.
That’s because Putin’s visit is not merely another bilateral meeting. It is an event with profound implications for the triangular relationship between the United States, China, and Russia, and even more importantly, for the contours of the emerging global order.
For many commentators, the timing inevitably created the impression that Putin fears being “on the menu” and not “at the table.” That may be part of the reality, but it’s not all of it.
Putin’s visit was not suddenly improvised in response to Trump’s Beijing summit. The trip coincides with the 25th anniversary of the 2001 Sino–Russian Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, the foundational framework for modern Sino–Russian relations. The treaty automatically renewed itself for another five years earlier this year, and such a milestone naturally requires leader-level meetings. In fact, the Iran war postponed Trump’s summit with Xi. Had events unfolded according to the original calendar, the two summits would not have appeared so dramatically back-to-back.
However, Trump’s Beijing visit appears to have stabilized U.S.–China relations, at least for now — and perhaps to Russia’s concern. Xi even introduced a striking new formulation: a “constructive China-U.S. relationship of strategic stability.” Trump, by all indications, tacitly accepted the concept. That alone is enough to immediately raise concerns in Moscow about Russia’s standing within the triangle.
More importantly, Trump and Xi reportedly discussed both the Ukraine war and the Middle East crisis. Putin, therefore, has strong incentives to find out for himself whether Washington and Beijing have reached any meaningful understandings that might affect Russian interests.
His urgency is heightened by another important geopolitical development. After attending Russia’s Victory Day parade earlier this month, Putin signaled publicly that the Ukraine war might be approaching an end. Responding to a question about Western military aid to Ukraine, Putin declared: “I think it is moving toward an end, though it remains a very serious matter.” The remark was one of his clearest hints yet that Moscow may be prepared to seek a settlement. At precisely such a delicate moment, Putin naturally wants reassurance that his country is not on the Trump–Xi “menu.”
The stacking of these summits within a single week inevitably carries additional geopolitical meaning, the most significant element of which is that China now appears to be emerging as the central pivot of the world’s most consequential triangle.
That reality was captured in a revealing moment during Trump’s Beijing visit. Trump, astonished while being given a rare private tour of Zhongnanhai by Xi, asked whether many foreign leaders had visited the compound. Xi calmly replied: ‘Very few; Putin has.’ The symbolism was extraordinary, signaling that Xi can simultaneously host, balance, and maneuver between both Washington and Moscow. Beijing is no longer merely one pole among others. It increasingly functions as the rotational center of triangular great-power politics itself.
Of course, which side of the triangle is strongest depends on the issue area.
On anti-Western strategic alignment, opposition to “American hegemony,” resistance to so-called “color revolutions,” and support for a multipolar world order, the Sino–Russian relationship remains extraordinarily deep. Moscow and Beijing repeatedly describe their relationship as “rock solid.” Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated Friday that Russia and China are “bound together” in ties “deeper and stronger than traditional political and military alliances.” He was speaking not merely about tactical cooperation but also about a shared structural worldview.
It’s true that the modern Sino–Russian relationship is mostly one of convenience, and exists in its present form largely because of the United States. As long as America remains globally dominant and continues to champion liberal democratic values, the Sino–Russian alignment will likely endure.
At the same time, both China and Russia also seek stable relations with the United States. Under Trump, they have come closer to achieving that goal than they ever did during recent previous administrations. Yet Xi and Putin both understand something fundamental: Trump does not represent the entirety of American political power or elite opinion.
That insight helps explain Xi’s curious remark during the summit when he said the new framework of “constructive strategic stability” would guide U.S.-China relations “for the next three years and beyond.”
Why three years? Three years has no particular significance in Chinese political planning. It is not tied to a Five-Year Plan, a Party Congress cycle, or Xi’s own tenure. The meaning is obvious: Roughly three years remain in Trump’s presidency. By contrast, the Sino–Russian treaty renewal lasts five years.
That difference matters enormously. It suggests that while Beijing welcomes temporary stabilization with Washington, it still sees Moscow as the more durable strategic anchor beyond Trump’s presidency.
It also reveals a concurrent, deeper truth: China still regards the United States as its single most important foreign relationship.
America remains vastly stronger than Russia economically, militarily, technologically, and financially. China still requires access to U.S. markets, dollar-based trade systems, and a stable external environment. On Taiwan, Indo–Pacific strategy, semiconductors, finance, and global supply chains, Washington’s policies remain decisive. Xi therefore cannot afford full-scale confrontation with the United States — at least not yet.
So Beijing balances. Reportedly, Putin’s visit to Beijing will lack the grand pageantry that welcomed Trump, as it is considered a routine event in China–Russia diplomacy. This protocol arrangement reflects a simple reality: One nation treated as family, while the other is the most valued guest.
But Xi is not the only one balancing. Trump and Putin are balancing too. Moreover, all three leaders now share a common desire for stability.
Trump urgently needs a clean end to the Iran war. A prolonged conflict would continue damaging American interests, energy markets, and Trump’s own political standing. China, while benefiting strategically from American distraction in the Middle East, nevertheless requires stability in the Strait of Hormuz and uninterrupted energy flows. Beijing would welcome an end to the war and would assist in efforts to keep Hormuz open.
While Russia has benefited economically from higher energy prices and strategically from America overstretching itself, Moscow desires flexibility to conclude the Ukraine war. That requires careful management of relations with both Washington and Beijing.
Ukraine presents another alignment of interests.
After more than four years of war, Russia faces mounting human and economic exhaustion. At the same time, Moscow sees opportunities. American–European tensions have widened. NATO’s cohesion appears weaker. Europe’s military capabilities remain limited. Russia may calculate that now is the ideal moment to freeze the conflict while retaining roughly 20 percent of Ukrainian territory as a lasting geopolitical gain. China also sees enormous economic opportunities in eventual reconstruction across both Russia and Ukraine. Meanwhile, Trump wants an end to a costly war that many American voters increasingly view as peripheral to core U.S. interests.
Supply chains and global trade create another area of overlapping interests. Trump and Xi both need stability in global production networks, shipping routes, and trade flows. Russia, especially if the Ukraine war winds down, has little reason to oppose such stabilization because reconstruction and renewed commerce would also benefit Moscow.
East Asia is another critical subject of Xi–Putin discussions.
Xi needs stability in the Taiwan Strait because he seeks time: time to strengthen China further, pressure Taiwan diplomatically and economically, and pursue peaceful unification if possible, while preserving military options if necessary. He requires a prolonged “strategic opportunity period.”
Trump also wants East Asian stability. As he reportedly remarked, “The last thing we want is a war that’s 9,500 miles away.”
Putin may care less directly about East Asian stability, but he will support China’s position on Taiwan in order to preserve the Sino–Russian partnership while simultaneously increasing strategic pressure on Japan.
Earlier this year, a well-connected source in China told me that Xi had reportedly defined China’s diplomatic strategy for 2026 as: Move closer to America and Russia simultaneously; distance Europe, especially value-driven Europe; pressure Japan; constrict Taiwan’s international space; and continue deepening influence across the Global South. I cannot independently verify the claim. Yet much of China’s recent diplomacy points in that precise direction.
And so we arrive at a remarkable historical moment: All three major powers now seek stability simultaneously. That is understandable. At this stage, major conflict no longer promises meaningful gains for any side, only imposing significant costs.
I suspect much of the stabilization these powers seek will emerge in the not too distant future. But stability on whose terms?
That question matters enormously because the stabilization of the U.S.–China–Russia triangle may become the foundation for a fundamentally new international order, one very different from the post–World War II system.
The more difficult questions come next. Is this new order inevitable — or merely accidental? Will it ultimately benefit humanity or produce deeper instability? If the emerging order proves to be unstable, should America seek to restore the old postwar order? Or should it instead attempt to build a higher and more sustainable order centered on genuine human flourishing based on liberal democratic values?
There is also another uncomfortable reality: The stability of this triangle is highly personalized. Much depends on the character, worldview, and political instincts of Trump, Xi, and Putin. What happens when one, or all three, leave the stage, one way or another? Can America and China truly avoid the Thucydides Trap, as Xi insists?
No serious observer can watch these events unfold without contemplating such questions.