Uncertainty at Shangri-La: Will America’s Indo-Pacific Allies Hedge?

T he Shangri-La Dialogue — Asia’s premier security summit where defense ministers, military leaders, and regional powers take the measure of a rapidly changing Indo-Pacific — opens this week. The timing matters. Coming on the heels of the Trump-Xi summit, the dialogue is the first reveal of how regional allies are recalibrating their positions amid intensifying U.S. — China competition. Two major questions will dominate the discussions: What happens next with Iran and the Strait of Hormuz, and do America’s allies still believe the United States can deter China over the long term?

The instability surrounding Iran matters enormously in the Indo-Pacific because Asia is far more vulnerable to energy shocks than the United States. Japan, South Korea, India, and much of Southeast Asia depend heavily on oil and gas flowing through the Strait of Hormuz. America is far less exposed today because Republicans and President Trump helped unleash domestic energy production at scale, though the pain is still very real for inflation-fatigued consumers at the pump. That energy independence matters strategically, as it gives the U.S. leverage and resilience that many of our allies simply do not have. Even so, there are serious political headwinds at home to applying the kind of sustained pressure needed to keep Iran from following North Korea’s path: quietly advancing to a hardened nuclear threshold, shielded by missiles, proxies, and regional coercion.

I will attend the summit in support of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, representing Eastern Washington, where national security is tied directly to jobs, trade, agriculture, and military readiness. Fairchild Air Force Base helps sustain the mobility and refueling network that underpins American power projection across the Pacific. Our exporters and farmers depend heavily on Indo-Pacific commerce.

A hard fact that unites America’s Indo‑Pacific security partners, our national security interests, and the needs of my constituents is that a nuclear Iran, sitting astride one of the world’s most important energy chokepoints, would threaten not just the Middle East, but the entire Indo‑Pacific economy.

In a region already grappling with China’s growing military and economic pressure, every spike in uncertainty about American resolve and capability to keep sea lanes accessible creates openings for Beijing to expand its influence. And across Asia, allies are asking a hard question: Can the United States sustain deterrence faster than China can exploit that uncertainty?

China has expanded its navy, militarized the South China Sea, intensified pressure on Taiwan, and poured massive state resources into artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and advanced weapons systems. But Beijing also arrives at Shangri-La carrying major weaknesses. China’s economy is slowing. Its population is shrinking. The property sector remains trapped in crisis. Senior PLA commanders and defense officials continue disappearing in anti-corruption purges. All signal distrust and instability inside the Chinese system.

America’s allies are balancing both realities at once: a China that is increasingly aggressive but brittle, and a United States that remains a partner of choice but is militarily stretched across the globe and is rebalancing its trade relations within the region.

That is why many countries are hedging.

India is deepening cooperation with the U.S. and regional democracies like Japan and Australia, while preserving strategic autonomy. The Philippines is expanding U.S. military access while continuing economic engagement with Beijing. Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore are strengthening security ties with Washington while remaining tied to Chinese trade and supply chains. Across Asia, governments and companies are trying to reduce their dependence on China without severing economic ties altogether.

This is the real strategic map of Asia: tighter military cooperation with America, continued economic connection to China, and growing anxiety about whether the United States can sustain power across multiple crises at once.

That anxiety is driving a deeper shift. The wars in Ukraine and the Middle East have exposed a hard truth: Deterrence is now an industrial production contest as much as a military contest. Stockpiles matter. Shipbuilding matters. Munitions production matters. Energy security matters. Industrial capacity matters. The next major conflict would not simply test militaries. It would test economies, alliances, political systems, and technology platforms.

That is the real issue hanging over Shangri-La. The Indo-Pacific is no longer debating whether China has arrived as a peer power. That debate is over. The question now is whether America and its allies still have the cohesion, industrial strength, and confidence to preserve stability and freedom in a region increasingly defined by uncertainty.