The West stands to gain.
The West stands to gain.
A nother major conflict beyond the Iran war directly implicates American interests. A patient, quiet, committed effort has stopped the Russian war effort cold. President Trump’s Pentagon wants to pare American commitments in Europe. But the only way to do so is by putting American weight on the scales and generating a decisive final settlement to the Ukraine war, placing the country in the European sphere, a move that would equally bolster American power in the Middle East and supercharge the U.S. military-industrial revival that is a cornerstone of this administration’s agenda.
American policy toward Ukraine under the Biden administration was barely short of a spectacular failure, redeemed only by the efforts of Ukrainian soldiers and society. The Biden administration was fully prepared to let Russia devour Ukraine, indeed hoping that the subsequent occupation would bleed Russian military capacity. Behind the Biden administration’s rhetoric of democracy protection and Euro–Atlantic unity was an unmistakable strategic vacuum. There was no substance, only process; no strategy, only deliberation and policy by inertia. The U.S. drip-fed weapons and intelligence to Ukraine, then blamed Kyiv for failing to conduct its own defense more effectively.
This harsh tutelage, however, created a radically different Ukrainian military system than that of 2022. Ukraine experienced a de facto aid cutoff for six months in 2023–2024. It adapted through societal mobilization, not simply for military personnel, but for industrial production. Throughout 2024, the Ukrainian military transformed itself into a technology-centric force, leveraging a new mass of unmanned systems to impose a brutal attrition on Russia.
The Trump administration’s initial theory was, therefore, wrong. It assumed that Ukraine wholly relied on Western arms transfers and that American transfers were essential. Hence, by ending those transfers, it could compel Kyiv to negotiate. In fact, Ukraine could survive on its own production and with Western cash — which in 2025 became predominantly European cash. Time and again, an increasingly capable Ukraine resisted American pressure to surrender its Donbas fortress belt to Russia.
The Trump administration, however, was right to assume one side in the Ukraine war was vulnerable. It was the larger, ostensibly more powerful side. Russia, not Ukraine, has been vulnerable to extensive military pressure. It is acutely vulnerable today. Ukraine has pounded the Russian military, killing or wounding upwards of 30,000 Russians per month in 2026. When Ukraine achieves this, Russian advances stop cold. Ukraine does this by using short-, medium-, and long-range drones to create a 250-kilometer-deep kill zone. The more effective this becomes, the more Russian casualties will mount.
Ukraine, the smaller power, has successfully checked its larger adversary.
Russia is thus in an identical position to November 2022, after Ukraine recaptured Kherson and drove Russian forces from the Dnipro’s right bank. Russian forces have advanced under 40 kilometers since 2022 and have still failed to take Ukraine’s heavily fortified remaining cities in the Donbas. A move on Kyiv remains fanciful. Russia can still hammer Ukrainian cities with daily bombardment, but strategic bombardment will not deliver victory.
Bringing the Ukraine war to an end, however, matters for far more than simply Ukraine. The Ukraine war is symptomatic of a European security system badly out of balance, and therefore dependent on the United States. Ukraine was the largest, most strategically consequential state left in the grey zone between Russia and NATO after the Cold War. Russia without Ukraine is not a great power, an unmistakable reality considering Ukraine’s tenacious resistance against Russia’s invasion. Europe with Ukraine gains a defensive bulwark against Russia, one that fields one of the world’s largest, most experienced armies, and with a world-leading defense-industrial base underpinning it.
It is unsurprising that NATO as currently constituted is dysfunctional, thereby imposing costs on American resources and strategic bandwidth. America’s NATO allies have fought shoulder to shoulder with it in Afghanistan, and at times in Iraq. But Belgium, Spain, and even France do not pull their weight in conventional terms. Those allies that do contribute effectively are typically small — the Baltic States, Scandinavians, and Poles are all critical, but cannot form the backbone of a European security system. It is the laggardly Western European states that unbalance the framework and compel not simply American investment, but American diplomatic and strategic attention.
The solution is to integrate Ukraine into Europe’s security architecture, marrying its defense-industrial capacity and combat experience with European cash to create a serious, self-sustaining deterrent against Russia. The U.S. must be a part of this system. It must provide intelligence; it must train and coordinate between allies. Indeed, it should be a part of this system because no future action anywhere in the world is possible without American basing in Europe. British, German, and Romanian air bases have been crucial for refueling American aircraft in the Iran war. In a war with China, the U.S. will find a European–Middle Eastern logistics highway invaluable, as it will provide an alternative to the currently vulnerable, brittle system in the Western Pacific. In turn, Ukrainian military technology is already demonstrably effective against the problems the U.S. struggles with most — low-cost, high-volume weapons. A more equitable U.S.–Europe partnership requires Ukrainian participation to balance the scales. And the U.S. needs this partnership for its own strategic purposes.
Generating this system of equitable partnership requires compelling Russia to come to the table and sign the best deal it will receive — a peace settlement that recognizes today’s front line as its final stopping point. Ukraine would accept this deal and has signaled as much for three years. Russia is getting closer to reality as well. Although Vladimir Putin remains committed to the fanciful goal of capturing the Donbas this year, Russian elites have begun speaking openly about the benefits of a cease-fire.
The U.S. has already taken several steps to drive Russia to the table. Elon Musk, for instance, disabled Russian Starlink access, providing Ukraine a major battlefield command-and-control advantage. Considering Starlink’s operational integration with the U.S. government, it is unlikely Musk took this step absent consultation. In turn, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has indicated the U.S. is disengaging from the Ukraine track until progress becomes clear, demonstrating to Russia that intransigence carries at least some cost.
The solution, in turn, is not the imposition of even broader sanctions. These are unlikely in the current macroeconomic environment to bring Russia to the table and are irrelevant considering Ukraine’s deep-strike campaign on Russian oil infrastructure.
Instead, the U.S. should expand its explicit battlefield support for Ukraine. Three steps are necessary.
First, the U.S. should channel existing funds, including Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List (PURL) funding, for low-cost munitions into Ukraine-related Foreign Military Financing (FMF) packages. It has done this at smaller scale with the Extended Range Attack Munition program. But expanding Ukraine’s access to U.S.-built low-cost weapons will diversify Kyiv’s arsenal while also building capacity for American industrial production in wartime.
Second, the U.S. should transfer a small quantity of very high-end systems to Ukraine, including Tomahawk cruise missiles. Transferring a half-dozen Tomahawks to Ukraine — and allowing Ukraine to use them on any target it wants, including on Russian territory — would demonstrate the United States’ willingness to accept escalation, finally breaking with the bootless policy of restraint to which American policy has hewn since 2022. The point is not numbers, but political optics: the Russians will get the message that U.S. policy has fundamentally changed.
Third, even as the U.S. prudently and justifiably pushes Europe to raise defense spending, it should build in a series of snap exercises with the forces it has deployed for the Iran war to demonstrate America’s rapid potential to surge assets. These should include nuclear-capable strategic bombers and tactical fighter aircraft, reminding Russia that the U.S., at short notice, can place a nuclear strike force on its border at will.
By dint of its own efforts, Ukraine has foiled both Russia and those who predicted Moscow’s victory. The U.S. should exploit this success to end the war.