Trump Shouldn’t Delist Syria Without Conditions

T his Wednesday, on the sidelines of the NATO summit, Syrian president Ahmad al-Sharaa will sit down with President Donald Trump for the third time. Less than a year ago, Sharaa became the first Syrian leader to visit Washington. Since then, world leaders have received the former al-Qaeda commander with open arms, demonstrating their belief — or at least their hope — that he has turned away from his extremist past and is seeking to reset Syria’s role on the world stage.

When Trump met Sharaa in Riyadh in May 2025, the U.S. president said he wanted to give Syrians “a chance at greatness,” and so announced the lifting of sanctions that had long constrained the country’s recovery. Washington subsequently removed Caesar Act sanctions targeting the former Assad regime and its enablers and rescinded Sharaa’s designation as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. Now, Sharaa is seeking to build on that momentum. During a May phone call with Trump, he pressed for additional relief, most notably Syria’s removal from the U.S. State Sponsors of Terrorism (SST) list.

Washington designated Syria as an SST in 1979 because it supported Palestinian armed groups and later reinforced it in response to Assad’s backing of Hezbollah and other Iranian proxies. The listing is now the last major comprehensive U.S. restriction on Syria. It bars most arms sales and foreign assistance, restricts financial transactions involving U.S. persons, and exposes Syria to terrorism-related lawsuits.

Sharaa is likely to raise Syria’s removal from the list during his meeting with Trump; Syria views the designation as the “last milestone” needed to unlock much-needed American investment in the war-torn country, according to Syrian Finance Minister Yisr Barnieh. The designation has deterred not only U.S. companies but also foreign governments and firms wary of the legal and financial risks of investing in Syria. Gulf states have pledged roughly $30 billion in investments, but much of that capital has yet to materialize as banks remain reluctant to process Syria-related transactions while the designation remains in place.

Still, Washington should not remove Syria from the SST list unconditionally. Instead, Trump should use the designation as a source of leverage to secure measurable progress from Syria on counterterrorism, minority protection, accountability for sectarian violence, and the development of a stable relationship between Syria and Israel.

The meeting between the heads of state is also expected to focus on what Syria can deliver for U.S. interests. Lebanon and Hezbollah will likely feature prominently. Trump has repeatedly suggested that Syria could play a role in confronting the Hezbollah challenge, comments that officials and commentators in Beirut and Damascus widely interpreted as a reference to a greater Syrian role against the group inside Lebanon.

Behind closed doors, the more realistic discussion will presumably focus on Hezbollah’s ability to rearm through Syrian territory. Damascus has already shown a willingness to act against the Iran-backed group, intercepting weapons shipments destined for Hezbollah and disrupting plots to launch attacks against Israel from Syrian soil. Yet these steps have not stemmed the flow of arms. Hezbollah continues to exploit long-established smuggling networks along the porous Syrian–Lebanese border. Additionally, Hezbollah-linked financial entities have continued to profit from their presence in Syria, even under Sharaa’s rule. Two weeks ago, the U.S. Treasury Department designated a Syria-based company for providing material support to Hezbollah. Trump is therefore likely to press Sharaa on whether his government can move beyond isolated interdictions and establish a strategy that includes sustained border control and financial enforcement to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding and regenerating.

Washington has other reasons to proceed cautiously. Damascus joined the anti-ISIS coalition after Sharaa’s first Washington visit. Yet ISIS has also penetrated Syria’s own security apparatus. The U.N. Security Council’s monitoring team warned that the terror group had “infiltrated newly formed Syrian security structures, particularly at the lower and mid-level ranks,” a concern that materialized when a member of Syria’s General Security Service killed two U.S. servicemen in December 2025.

The challenge is heightened by Damascus’s integration of designated foreign jihadist factions into the army, including the Uzbek-led Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and the Uyghur-led Turkistan Islamic Party, whose leader, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, still sits on al-Qaeda’s Shura Council. Meanwhile, foreign fighters helped ISIS families escape al-Hol, where residents had established their own “morality police.” One observer described al-Hol as “less a refugee camp than a breeding group. Children are raised on ISIS slogans.”

Washington must also assess whether Sharaa can keep his forces in check, prevent sectarian massacres, and build a political system that acknowledges Syria’s religious and ethnic diversity before deciding whether to remove the SST designation. Domestically, the situation for minority groups remains deeply troubling. Sharaa-affiliated forces have carried out massacres against minorities, including Druze in Suwayda and Alawites on the Syrian coast. The violence has pushed southern Druze communities to call for independence, while clashes persist with the Alawites.

This fragmentation is risky for U.S. interests, as it could reopen the door to civil war and create opportunities for security vacuums that would allow America’s adversaries to reassert their influence. To achieve domestic stability in Syria — and earn U.S. support — Sharaa must fulfill his pledge to “achieve civil peace and pursue those who committed massacres.” Justice Minister Mazhar al-Wais has promised public trials for those involved in sectarian massacres, a step that could reassure minorities. But little is known about the judicial mechanism, especially when suspects may include members of the government’s own ranks.

To convince Trump to delist Syria, Sharaa must prove that his government has truly turned a page. Cooperation against Hezbollah and ISIS will matter, but the U.S. should not view it as sufficient on its own. Washington should also demand evidence of accountability and minority protection before it takes the momentous step of removing Syria from the SST list.

For Washington, Assad’s fall created a rare chance for engaging a country that was long aligned with America’s enemies in Moscow and Tehran. But that opportunity will mean little if Sharaa cannot deliver genuine progress at home. Trump should not trade delisting for symbolic cooperation. He should use the SST designation as leverage to demand measurable changes in how Syria governs itself, polices its borders, and treats its people.