Undoing Stalin’s Crime: Romania and Moldova Should Reunite

L ast week, Romania’s Chamber of Deputies adopted a bill authorizing its government to begin talks with neighboring Moldova with the aim of unifying the two countries. The bill was enacted tacitly under Romania’s parliamentary rules, which automatically approve any bill that has not been voted on within a 45-day deadline. While the bill, put forward by the ultranationalist S.O.S. Romania party, is expected to fail in the Senate, it has nevertheless reignited debate over Romania and Moldova’s future. While unification would of course require consent from both countries, there are good reasons for the West to support such a move.

In 1918, the Russian Empire’s Romanian-speaking Bessarabia area declared independence and promptly voted to join Romania. Bessarabia remained in Romania until 1940, when Joseph Stalin, who had an eccentric penchant for arbitrarily redrawing borders, announced the creation of the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic from parts of the Bessarabia region that the USSR had recently annexed from Romania. After World War II, all of Romania found itself behind the Iron Curtain, though Romania — unlike the newly created Moldavian SSR — remained nominally independent.

After the Soviet Union dissolved, those who wished to undo the Stalinist project of separating Romania and Moldova enjoyed a burst of political momentum. Romania, acting out of solidarity with its separated brethren, became the first country to recognize Moldova’s independence, doing so on the day it was declared. Moldova’s very first president, Mircea Snegur, spoke openly of a common identity between Moldovans and Romanians; at least initially, he appeared to be open to reunification. Yet several factors, among them civil war in the Moldovan breakaway region of Transnistria, deterred both Moldova and Romania — which was still trying to regain its footing after almost half a century under communism — from proceeding.

From the West’s point of view, there are several reasons to wish for the project of unification to be resurrected. First, like Romania already is, unification would embed Moldova in the West. While Moldova has made progress in recent years, it is a small, poor country incessantly targeted by Russian information warfare; backsliding cannot be ruled out.

Within Romania, support for unification is overwhelming, with a poll from May suggesting that 72 percent would like to see the country merge with Moldova. Within Moldova, opinions are more split; a March poll found 44 percent of citizens in favor of unification and 39 percent opposed. Among Moldovans living abroad — a group that makes up around a third of all Moldovan citizens — 61 percent favor reunification compared to just 24 percent who are opposed. Most notably, Moldovan President Maia Sandu, who was elected with strong support from the diaspora, stated in January that she would vote yes on unification in a hypothetical referendum. She is the first Moldovan president to hold this view. Her foreign minister, Mihai Popschiu, expressed the same view in May.

Were Moldova to merge with Romania, it would automatically become a member of the European Union and NATO, much like what happened with East Germany after it reunited with West Germany. Because of this, unification with Romania is often spoken of as a “Plan B” to join the EU, if Plan A — to join as an independent country — does not work out. And there are many reasons to believe Plan A is not a realistic possibility: While the EU loves to dangle membership in front of poorer countries as a carrot, not least when it wishes to induce those poorer countries to adopt certain policies (e.g., on climate or social justice), it is reluctant to actually let them in. As a case in point, the EU’s enthusiasm for Ukrainian membership has already cooled.

While Moldova’s population of 2.3 million would not entitle it to a great number of seats in the European Parliament, it would have the same veto power wielded by all member states in the Council of the European Union. After the headache caused by Hungary’s veto of Ukrainian aid packages under the premiership of Viktor Orbán, the EU will be especially loath to welcome a country that has both a more than 300,000 strong Russian-speaking minority and a pro-Russian breakaway region — Transnistria — where between 1,000 and 1,500 Russian troops are stationed. It is an open question whether Moldova, if it were a member state, would be able to appeal to the EU’s mutual defense clause for assistance from other members in expelling these troops. Unlike NATO and its Article 5, the mutual defense clause has never been used.

That Moldova is extremely poor — with a GDP per capita 2.5 times smaller than Bulgaria, the EU’s poorest member — is yet another concern. As a member, it could veto the EU’s budget if Brussels refused to provide it with however much regional development funds it demanded.

To be sure, Brussels will never shut the door in any applicant’s face, because the EU’s long-term goal has always been to encompass all of Europe. Nevertheless, the EU prefers to string candidate countries along — sometimes for decades (Turkey first applied in 1987!). Instead of giving Moldova false hope by moving its application process along, EU leaders should tell the Moldovan people the truth: Moldova, as an independent state, won’t be admitted in the foreseeable future.

As part of Romania, however, the EU’s issues with Moldova would be significantly mitigated. Within the much larger Romania (a country with a population of 18.8 million), the Russian-speaking minority would have far less political influence. As a nation that is bigger and wealthier than Moldova (albeit still poor, in comparative European terms), Romania is much more difficult for Russia to hijack. Furthermore, Romania has also already proven its commitment to stamping out Russian influence; in 2024, it canceled a presidential election due to Russian meddling.

Moldova’s poverty means it would still receive a great deal of the aforementioned regional development funds, but as part of Romania, other members would not have to worry about it holding up the budget. Bucharest would also no doubt seek — and receive — support from the EU to cover the not-insignificant costs of absorbing Moldova.

While both Romania and Moldova struggle with corruption, Moldova’s issues are more severe (although significant progress has been made under Sandu’s leadership). Unification could, if implemented correctly, constitute a fresh start and root out old, corrupt networks and institutions. Ideally, this would happen in both countries.

While Moldova has not applied to join NATO — and in fact adheres to a constitutionally mandated neutrality — joining the EU without joining NATO would be a terrible idea. In fact, Moldova’s lack of NATO membership may even be a factor holding up its EU application, even though Marta Kos, the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement, publicly insists that “Moldova’s European integration and territorial reintegration are separate processes, and Moldova’s future should not be held hostage by the frozen Transnistrian conflict.”

Moldovan supporters of EU membership invoke Cyprus as a precedent, which joined the EU despite not controlling all its internationally recognized territory. In the case of Cyprus, EU laws and rights are indefinitely suspended in the part of the island — North Cyprus — not under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. North Cyprus, however, is a Turkish client state, whereas Transnistria is essentially under the military occupation of Russia — a country far more imperialistic and far more dangerous to Europe. With Moldova as an EU member, but with Russia still holding Transnistria as its de facto satellite state, the EU could do nothing but feebly shower Transnistria with regional development funds in the hopes of fostering a “European identity” among its population. It wouldn’t work, and even if it did, Transnistria is not a democracy.

On the other hand, Moldova — as evidenced by the past 35 years — is incapable of militarily crushing the separatists on their own and is, for the most part, unwilling to rock the boat. With a population of 376,000, Transnistria is too large for the rest of Moldova to pacify. But if it were part of Romania — and NATO — the issue could be resolved, with the EU and NATO working in tandem.

The easiest strategy might be to give Russia an ultimatum upon unification: Fulfill its 2002 commitment to completely withdraw from Transnistria, or Russian bases will be placed under siege and blockaded until they eventually surrender. Transnistria borders Ukraine, meaning Russia would have to go through Western Ukraine to resupply the bases — and suffice it to say, Russia is currently struggling to go through Ukraine. The first option would allow Russia to save face, whereas the latter would be a highly public and humiliating spectacle that would demonstrate even further to the world just how diminished Russia is as a military power.

In such a scenario, EU members would then coordinate to address the humanitarian issue; the EU would, together with Romania, commit to replacing the Russian financial support and subsidies that keep Transnistria from collapsing. Pro-Russian sentiment won’t dissipate overnight, but Transnistria eventually could — especially if it were granted some kind of special status or expanded degree of autonomy — find a place within the new Romania.

While the United States cannot and should not attempt to force unification, it ought to use diplomatic channels to nudge lawmakers in both countries toward support for uniting Romania and Moldova. The U.S. should also publicly pledge to aid in the removal of Russian troops in Transnistria upon unification and work to deepen security cooperation with Romania in preparation for such an operation.

A unified Romania would be a stronger, more stable partner on NATO’s eastern flank, and it would at last rectify an almost century-old Stalinist absurdity. This is an outcome well worth supporting.