The geostrategic benefits remain as murky as the terms of the agreement itself.
The geostrategic benefits remain as murky as the terms of the agreement itself.
T he Trump administration has provided ample assurances that its nuclear deal with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is nothing to worry about. Trust us, they say. All the necessary checks and safeguards are in place. And yet, even those with faith in this presidency’s competence and forthrightness should be cautious about what the future will hold when the Trump administration is gone.
The 30-year deal to which this administration consented this week provides American companies with a prohibitive role in developing Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear infrastructure. That’s certainly a boon to U.S.-based firms. And although the deal does not immediately envision the development of a domestic uranium-enrichment capacity inside the Kingdom, it does open up that prospect following a requisite period of “study.”
Fear not, Secretary of State Marco Rubio insists. “The U.S. is not going to reach any agreement with any country in the world that leads to the risk of proliferation,” he told reporters. And yet, the supposed checks on Saudi Arabia do not seem especially robust.
The Saudis rejected the “gold standard,” as it’s described in nonproliferation parlance: a legally binding commitment to neither enrich uranium domestically nor reprocess spent nuclear fuel rods. Beyond that, the Saudis also rejected the “Additional Protocol” in which the International Atomic Energy Agency would have a role in monitoring and inspecting the Kingdom’s nuclear facilities.
There’s nothing reassuring about that. The arrangement provides its skeptics with ample reason to suspect that Riyadh is at least reserving for itself the option to pursue a nuclear weapons program whenever it chooses. “If Riyadh had wanted to just have U.S. backing for a civilian program, it would have done so years ago,” the author and geopolitical analyst Michael Horowitz contended. “In other words, the goal is to get U.S. support for a deal that doesn’t fully exclude a pathway to a nuclear program.”
The Trump administration is not without arguments that justify the president’s long-standing favorable inclination toward the Saudis’ nuclear proposals.
When it achieves maturity, the Saudi nuclear industry will “free up more of its oil production for export and boost revenues,” the Wall Street Journal reported. The White House would welcome that, and not just because it would relieve the pressure on global energy markets. Saudi strength has played a key role in the Trump administration’s efforts to reshape the geopolitical landscape in the Middle East. A Riyadh that is flush with cash and a model for regional development augments the regional Sunni bulwark against Iranian influence and aggression.
That’s the pro side of the ledger. The con side is, however, more voluminous and more compelling.
The Kingdom is not like France, Britain, or even Israel — nations that nuclearized with America’s tacit acceptance — because its government does not enjoy the consent of the governed. It’s an authoritarian regime with plenty of ominous domestic challenges and a lively culture of Islamist radicalism. America should not make an enemy out of Riyadh, as the Biden administration foolishly attempted. But neither should U.S. policy take the House of Saud’s stability for granted and rule out the prospect of a profound change in Riyadh.
The administration insists that the deal ensures that the Saudis cannot divert enriched uranium for military purposes, and it cannot go looking elsewhere for enrichment capabilities (although, only for the first ten years). But, in the event of a shakeup inside the Kingdom, the U.S. would have less control over the capabilities it is exporting to Saudi Arabia than it envisions.
None of this is to say that the government in Riyadh is today an exemplary member of the community of nations. As Rubio himself said of the Kingdom in 2018, back when he opposed this very transfer of nuclear technology, “If a government is willing to murder a U.S. green-card holder in a third country in a diplomatic facility, I think there’s a legitimate question over whether such a government could be trusted with nuclear energy and the potential weaponization of it.”
Moreover, the theoretical gains the U.S. will accrue from this deal pale in comparison with the sacrifices it will demand from Washington.
The deal undermines the arguments it has been making about the Iranian nuclear program. For years, the president claimed that Iran does not need a domestic uranium-enrichment program, even for civilian purposes, because it is one of the world’s foremost oil producers and exporters. The White House doesn’t believe it is courting the charge of hypocrisy here, and perhaps for good reason (they did offer Iran access to low-level enriched uranium in their scramble to cobble together the now-failed memorandum of understanding). But whether they believe it or not, entertaining a Saudi civilian nuclear program alters America’s posture on nonproliferation issues.
Even the Biden administration refused to entertain the Saudis’ solicitations unless a nuclear deal was tied to a process that would result in normalized relations between the Kingdom and Israel. There’s no evidence in this deal that the Trump administration insisted on a similar concession from the Saudis — not publicly, at least. If the Abraham Accords are as central to this White House’s vision for the future of the Middle East as its members insist, that’s a lot of leverage to give away.
Most disturbingly, the lack of an observable failsafe that could be relied on to block the Saudi pathway to a fissionable device will encourage other actors in the region — Turkey and Egypt, in particular — to reexamine their own commitments as signatories to the 1981 nonproliferation treaty and its annexes.
Legacy media reports on the Saudi deal note that Congress has a role to play here, but it will likely be a ceremonial one. “Congress would have to assemble a veto-proof majority to override Mr. Trump’s initiative,” the New York Times observed. And yet, “debate over the accord is likely to be fierce.”
Hopefully, that debate will reveal what America is getting out of this arrangement. For now, the geostrategic benefits that the U.S. can expect to receive from this arrangement remain as murky as the terms of the deal itself.