We are preparing to learn again that a constitutional republic and democracy cannot achieve satisfying ends in war without the consent of its true sovereign.
We are preparing to learn again that a constitutional republic and democracy cannot achieve satisfying ends in war without the consent of its true sovereign.
I n February of this year, President Donald Trump launched an assault on Iran, announcing the operations in the middle of the night. For those watching the news in the weeks before and noting the extraordinary movement of personnel and resources into the region, the attack wasn’t a surprise. For everyone else — most Americans — it was.
Most observers (but not all) thought Trump had an unambiguous success in 2025, achieving his objective while keeping the mission strictly limited. But quietly, the White House had been backing off Trump’s initial unambiguous claims. In November 2025, “completely and totally obliterated” was reduced to “significantly degraded.”
Wasn’t this the president who had explicitly run against long wars in the Middle East and staffed his second term with voices of restraint like Vice President JD Vance? And voices for peace like Tulsi Gabbard? Also, hadn’t Trump told everyone in June 2025 that the United States had totally destroyed Iran’s nuclear program?
Well, yes, he had.
But Trump did not make a case to the American public for war with Iran before he reengaged in it. The apparent success of the Fordow strikes, and the apparent lightning success of his raid on the government of Venezuela, were taken as a model. If a new engagement would be decisive and swift, there was no need to consult the public.
Some warned that achieving great things strategically usually requires great sacrifices and that the American people had not been prepared to make any; nor did they know what aims such sacrifices would achieve. In January 2026, Trump’s threats to Iran seemed to be about protecting Iranian protesters. That’s a humanitarian mission, a world-policing mission — or at worst, it is a call for regime change hidden as the former, just the way the Libyan adventure under former President Barack Obama turned out. The Trump administration proceeded with strikes, confident that quick and costless success would be self-authenticating.
But the rationale was shifting rapidly. On the day the bombs began falling again this year, he claimed again that the nuclear program had been obliterated. He invited Iranians to “take over” their government, saying it would be their only chance for generations. Days later, he told congressional leaders that if America hadn’t struck, Iran would have had a nuclear weapon within weeks. Two weeks after that, his director of national intelligence (Tulsi Gabbard) told Congress that Iran had made no efforts to rebuild its enrichment capability.
By March, as the cost of energy was already rising rapidly and starting to kick off general inflation across the economy, Trump told reporters, “I think we won.” He also told the Financial Times that his favorite idea would be to take Iran’s oil and dismissed domestic objectors as “stupid people.” By April 1, a cease-fire, we were told, would be possible once the Strait of Hormuz was reopened. In June, there was a signed memorandum to end the war. It still didn’t end. He told Fox & Friends his preference had always been to take Kharg Island but said, “I don’t know that America has the stomach for it.” Well, yeah — suddenly the cost of the war was rising rapidly or kept off the books. Casualty figures seemed to be hidden. The depletion of our interceptor stockpiles, and the increased destruction of our regional bases and the energy infrastructure of the region, were the results.
Fast forward to this month. In North Carolina — where gas is now $4.50 a gallon and diesel above $6 — the president finally addressed the idea of national sacrifice. “It’s a very inexpensive price to pay for what we’ve done,” he said. “Frankly, even if it was a lot more.” But what was done? The destruction of nuclear facilities that were supposedly obliterated more than a year ago? Whatever it was that was done, it was still not done. If anyone is still paying attention, the rationale seems to have shifted to the goal of reopening the strait that hadn’t been closed before the war was resumed in February.
There would have been one of two results of properly deliberating this war before it started.
One scenario is that the administration would have made a more direct case, and the public and Congress, having deliberated and accepted the cost, would own the consequences — and would be directing their anger at Tehran for frustrating our mission, rather than Trump for imposing one we never accepted.
Or, like the debate about whether to make regime change the U.S. policy in Syria during the Obama years, the costs and risks would have been aired, the public mood for sacrifice and adventure solicited, and the mission would have been rejected. Prices would likely have continued falling, and perhaps Trump and Republicans would not be where they find themselves today. Trump’s approval rating has fallen from 47 percent at the start of his second term to the low 30s now.
Trump tried to conduct this part of his foreign policy without the people. He has found, as with Kharg Island, that American public opinion has narrowed his options. We are preparing to learn again that a constitutional republic and functioning democracy cannot achieve satisfying ends in war and foreign policy without the support and consent of its true sovereign, the American people.