Speaking at her annual “state of the European Union” address, Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the EU Commission, announced that she would like to see Brussels open the door for Canada to become “the first associate member of the European Union.” Von der Leyen is not known for her humility and had not bothered to inform the leadership of the EU’s member states that she was going to float this idea. This was a tellingly tactless omission given that they would have to approve any deal, and one that has clearly raised a few eyebrows in the bloc’s capitals. Berlin welcomed the prospect of closer ties with Ottawa but didn’t think much of packaging it in the way that von der Leyen appears to want.
That’s a view that Canada may share. Its ambassador-designate to the EU said that Ottawa was “not there” for the idea of associate membership, adding that he did not know what it might mean. In that, he was not alone. Associate membership is not provided for in the EU treaties. Von der Leyen has merely produced a blank slate and given it a fancy name. Some details may be scribbled on it after the EU–Canada summit at the end of October. While they are at it, Canadians might take the opportunity to apply a little pressure on the EU to get around to finalizing the Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the free-trade deal between the EU and Canada. It was signed in 2016 but has only been in effect provisionally since 2017. Ten EU states have yet to ratify it.
The best response by the U.S. to von der Leyen’s move would be a display of polite indifference. Typically, the EU does not, as the CETA story shows, move rapidly. What’s more, many Canadians, if not Mark Carney, a man with his own agenda, will understand (or come to understand) that Brussels can be tricky to deal with. The worst response by the U.S. would be threats. But the worst response appears to be what President Trump may opt for: “If I think it’s at all a hostile act, I will put very serious tariffs or stop trading with Europe on many things.”
This risks messing up the fragile trade “truce” between the EU and the U.S. and, at a time of acute geopolitical tension, will increase the temptation for China and Russia to test the unity of what looks like an increasingly divided Western alliance, a test that could have extraordinarily dangerous consequences. It will also be more likely to push Ottawa toward Brussels than away from it. For someone who prides himself on his nationalism, Trump has been oblivious to the negative consequences of trampling on the national pride of other countries.
The president should take the time to reflect on how the U.S. has arrived at this moment. Canada may not have paid what it should have toward its own defense, but it has been a friendly, resource-rich neighbor to our north for a very long time. That is worth a lot, as is its geographical location, at a time when the Arctic is becoming a focus of great power competition. Few international trading relationships are entirely problem-free, but NAFTA and then its successor, the USCMA, negotiated by the first Trump administration, kept frictions to a minimum, something that is clearly no longer the case. Making matters worse, insulting “jokes” (or more) about Canada becoming the 51st state not only propelled Mark Carney, someone about as close to Davos Man as is possible to imagine, into the Canadian premiership; they injected a large amount of rancor into the relationship between our two countries. As a result, the supposed 51st state is drawing closer to Brussels than Washington.
Given the chance, such poisons can drain out over time, but an overreaction to von der Leyen’s proposal might prevent that. It could institutionalize what, given geography, a common language, and trade flows, should only be a temporary breach, as well as strengthening the EU and adding to its global pull elsewhere. It is hard to see how the U.S. gains from that, but it is easy to see that America’s enemies might and, moreover, that a future, progressive U.S. administration would relish the prospect of working with a Brussels/Ottawa bloc.
As it is, Canada’s relationship with the EU is going to deepen, whatever happens, as doubts over the reliability of the dependability of its relationship with the U.S. linger. If, however, the administration can refrain from trying to muscle into the dance between Brussels and Ottawa, “EU associate membership” (or whatever it ends up being called) will, especially given the EU’s blend of incompetence and arrogance, probably turn out to amount to much less than either von der Leyen or Carney might hope.