Will the deal revive the anti-American sentiment that has fueled socialism in the region for a century?
Will the deal revive the anti-American sentiment that has fueled socialism in the region for a century?
T he history of U.S. intervention in Latin America is complicated, to say the least. For decades, Latin American socialists have used the concept of “American imperialism” to convince millions that Washington is a threat to Latin American sovereignty. That perception has faded somewhat, but the oil deal with the Trump administration gives them a new inroad.
Growing up in Caracas, I experienced the slow decline of Venezuela’s institutions and economy. I was always taught that oil is a valuable resource that’s also tied to our national pride. That didn’t mean much — until oil prices tanked in the mid-2010s, the government started printing money, and I had to carry a backpack full of cash to buy an empanada. The Chávez and Maduro regimes eroded our national treasure to buy political influence, and officials got rich as Venezuelans starved. For me and many my age, “fighting for a better future” was not a catchphrase, but a conviction carried on the streets of Caracas at a great personal risk.
After the U.S. military apprehended Nicolás Maduro earlier this year, an overwhelming majority of Venezuelans were optimistic. At first, this seemed like a new era of U.S. interventions in Latin America.
However, Venezuelans’ welcoming of the U.S. intervention did not give Washington a mandate to decide what comes next.
Maduro’s removal came with democratic aspirations that have yet to materialize. While many political prisoners have been released, many still remain in jail; economic recovery is still largely invisible to most Venezuelans; and the government is still controlled by interim figures who were part of the Maduro regime.
Then came the oil deal.
In late August, President Trump announced the “biggest oil deal in world history.” The agreement gives U.S. companies a major role in developing Venezuela’s enormous oil reserves.
From the Venezuelan perspective, the optics are quite different. The country that removed its dictator now has a major role in deciding what happens with its most valuable natural resource.
This opens the door to the old Latin American narrative that American interventionism is more about extracting resources than about democracy. It does not matter whether that assessment is fair. The question now is: Can the U.S. turn a popular intervention into a legitimate democratic transition, or will it revive the anti-American sentiment that has fueled socialism in the region for a century?
That distinction matters because the U.S. does not need Venezuelans to believe that it has good intentions. The U.S. needs to build institutions that make its own intentions less important.
According to President Trump, the deal effectively doubles U.S. proven oil reserves. Reportedly, it gives the U.S. a 55 percent operational stake in 17 oil fields in exchange for a $100 billion investment at no cost to the American taxpayer. It will generate $209 billion in fiscal revenue for the Venezuelan government, drawn from 65 billion barrels of reserves.
The problem is not the injection of foreign capital; the revival of Venezuela’s run-down oil industry will need capital, technology, management, and infrastructure that U.S.-based oil companies are particularly capable of providing. But will Venezuelans feel represented in this investment deal? Or will they once again see their national treasure being transferred with no democratically elected government to represent their interests?
This is not a hypothetical quandary. According to a Megánalisis poll, 89 percent of Venezuelans disapproved of the Trump administration’s support for Maduro’s vice president, Delcy Rodríguez. The same poll found that 87 percent said the country’s most urgent issue was holding a presidential election.
For decades, Chávez and Maduro gave preferential oil deals and discounted rates to Cuba, China, Iran, and other politically aligned countries to ensure political support. Venezuelans understand that U.S. intervention has a cost, and many are willing to pay that cost if it translates into a functional democracy. But if it instead solidifies Maduro’s lieutenant as the new foreign-imposed dictator, that support might quickly disappear.
Intervention has not always resulted in anti-Americanism. Panama offers a valuable example.
Manuel Noriega tried to remain in office despite losing his election. The U.S. captured him in 1989 and reinstated Guillermo Endara, the president Panamanians had elected seven months earlier, and dismantled Panama’s security apparatus. The country went through four continuous election cycles with power transferred peacefully between rival parties. The U.S. kept its promise to return Panama’s most valuable resource, and in 1999, it fully ceded control of the Panama Canal back to the Panamanian government.
In Panama, intervention and resource control moved in a fully democratic direction — and Panamanians have historically expressed some of the strongest pro-America sentiments in Latin America.
Most agree that a Venezuela without Maduro in power is a good thing, but there is still no verifiable timeline to free and fair elections. The best way to solidify support for the oil deal is for the U.S. to help establish credible institutions in Venezuela that have some degree of independence from Washington and Chavismo.
As in Panama, a peaceful transfer of power and a stable economy will make for a valuable U.S. ally in the long run, but first, elections need to be held, institutions must be renewed, and justice must be served to the victims of the Chavista regime. To this end, Washington’s continued deep involvement in Caracas is both unnecessary and undesirable.
A Latin America that embraces market principles and voluntarily aligns with U.S. interests makes the job of any U.S. president easier. It opens a huge market for U.S. products and helps build an enduring economic relationship. Alternatively, when populist socialist leaders take control in the region, crime, instability, and migration become a problem for America. In Venezuela, the United States has a valuable opportunity to change the narrative of extractivism-based imperialism into one of successful intervention that brings stability and prosperity to the region. And both countries will be better off for it.
Venezuelans overwhelmingly welcomed U.S. intervention because they wanted their country back. Now, they just need evidence that America is going to give it to them.