The region is no longer characterized by cross-border networks, but rather by states expanding their defense industries.
The region is no longer characterized by cross-border networks, but rather by states expanding their defense industries.
A merica’s ongoing confrontation with Iran has exposed more than the limits of Tehran’s regional strategy. It has exposed the limits of the strategic framework through which Washington still views the Middle East. Those limits are rooted in a sobering reality: For a quarter century now, U.S. policy in the tumultuous region has been shaped by the strategic assumptions of the post-9/11 era.
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks — when al-Qaeda, under Osama bin Laden, killed nearly 3,000 Americans — President George W. Bush launched what became known as the “War on Terror.” This American-led global effort marked a sharp departure from traditional military doctrine in its redirection of focus from nation-state adversaries to decentralized terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda and ISIS.
“We are, in a sense, seeing the definition of a new battlefield in the world,” Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told reporters at the Pentagon the day after the 9/11 attacks. Rumsfeld argued that this new conflict involved non-traditional, asymmetric threats that operate across borders, rather than conventional armies, navies, or air forces tied to a single state actor.
That assessment defined an entire generation of American strategy. For 25 years, American counterterrorism has focused on decentralized terrorist organizations. Today, however, that strategic posture no longer effectively responds to the realities of the Middle East.
For decades, Iran projected its power through terrorist proxies such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Houthis. This strategy allowed Tehran to challenge the U.S. and Israel without being held accountable, while reducing the risk of direct military confrontation. Countering those proxies became synonymous with containing Iran itself.
That assumption is increasingly becoming outdated.
Iran has not abandoned its proxies, but they are no longer its only instrument of power. Senior Iranian officials have publicly tied any cease-fire agreement with the U.S. to developments in Lebanon. In doing so, Tehran has signaled a notable strategic reversal regarding its most powerful proxy. For decades, Hezbollah served as Iran’s forward shield — a heavily armed deterrent meant to raise the cost of any direct strike on the Islamic Republic. Today, Iran is increasingly seeking negotiations to shield Hezbollah itself.
Here, Tehran tipped its hand. Rather than acting mainly through its proxies, the Islamic Republic is increasingly willing to project power directly: CBS has reported that nearly 100 American service members have been injured in Iranian attacks on military bases across the Middle East, with two U.S. soldiers killed in Jordan.
Iran is not an exception to this trend. Across the Middle East, governments are investing in military capabilities designed for long-term strategic competition. Iran continues expanding its drone and ballistic missile programs while pursuing a nuclear capability and asserting control over the Strait of Hormuz. Turkey has transformed its defense industry into an instrument of statecraft, emerging as a major exporter of drones and other advanced military technology. It now supplies nearly 40 countries, mainly across the Gulf, Africa, Asia and parts of Europe. Buyers are drawn to Turkish systems because they are often cheaper, faster to deliver, and more adaptable than alternatives.
Saudi Arabia is moving in the same direction. Agreements signed with Turkish defense companies are intended to bring the production of drones, ammunition, optical sensors, electronic systems, and mechanical components into the Kingdom. Under Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia aims to localize more than half of its military spending. That objective extends beyond economic diversification — Riyadh is building the industrial capacity needed to sustain military power over the long term.
Egypt offers another illustration. The construction of The Octagon — one of the world’s largest military headquarters — reflects the central role that the armed forces continue to play in the country’s national strategy.
Israel has reached similar conclusions under very different circumstances. After nearly two years of sustained regional conflict, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has declared that Israel must become a more self-reliant “super-Sparta” in the years ahead. At the same time, debate over manpower shortages and draft exemptions for ultra-Orthodox Jews has become a central issue in Israel’s national security discourse.
Taken individually, these developments may appear unrelated. Together, though, they tell a different story. For two decades, analysts measured the balance of power in the Middle East primarily through proxy networks and insurgent warfare. Today, the region is increasingly shaped by states expanding their defense industries, strengthening conventional military capabilities, and preparing for long-term strategic competition.
To be clear, this does not mean that terrorism has disappeared. Hezbollah, Hamas, ISIS, and other extremist organizations remain malign regional threats. Still, counterterrorism can no longer serve as the organizing principle of American strategy in the Middle East.
Washington has begun adapting its policies to the region’s changing realities. Yet individual decisions do not amount to a coherent strategy. Lifting sanctions, expanding military partnerships, and negotiating new regional agreements may reshape relationships, but they cannot substitute for a strategic framework that recognizes how fundamentally the Middle East has changed.
The “War on Terror” has reshaped American strategy for a generation. But what happens when terrorism is no longer the region’s defining security challenge? The question facing Washington is not whether it can continue to deter Iran’s proxies. It is whether the U.S. is prepared for a Middle East in which states — not proxies — once again define the regional balance of power.
Rumsfeld was right about the battlefield of 2001. The question today is whether Washington is prepared to recognize that the battlefield of 2026 looks fundamentally different.
Bradley Martin is the executive director of the Near East Center for Strategic Studies. Dr. Liram Koblentz-Stenzler is the head of the Global Extremism and Antisemitism Desk at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) at Reichman University, Herzliya, and a visiting scholar at Brandeis University.